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In 1923 Martin Buber published his book
I sad Aou
,
in which he formulated for- the
firot time his concept of the two fundamentally
different types of relation of which man is 0r.p-
abl'-.j the I -Thou relation and the I- It relation.
In its formulation and in its importance
for our time, I feel, this concept - which is
at the same time the central theme of all of
Buoer s tnought - is unique and outstanding.
It will be the purpose of this thesis,
f-i o, to give an account of Buber’s concept of
the I-Thou relation es opposed to the I-It re-
lation, and secondly - and mainly - to elaborate
end interpret Buber’s views on religion and ethics,
social philosophy, epistemology, and ontology
in the light of Ills I-Thou philosophy. Lastly,
a short comparison of the mentioned aspects of
Buber’s phlloso hy with the philosophies of Kierke-
gaard, Bergson, l/hiteheed, and with Hinduism and
Buddhism will follow.
PART OE.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016
https://archive.org/details/unityofbubersthoOOzuck
I-THCU and I- IT
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35uber holds that nan is capable of two fundamentally
different attitudes, two radically different types of
relation. These can be expressed with the primary
words ’I-Thou* and *I-rt.* *The spheres in which the
world of relation arises are three. '
First, our life with nature. There the relation
sways in gloom, beneath the level of sue ch. Creatures
live and move over against us, but ca not come to us,
and when we address them as Thou , our words cling to
the threshold of speech.
Second, our life with men. There the relation
is open and in the form of speech. We can give and
accent the Thou.
Third, our life with spiritual beings. There the
relation is clouded, yet it discloses itself; it
does not use speech, yet begets it. We perceive no
Thou
,
but nonetheless we feel we are addressed and
we answer - forming, thinking, acting. We speak the
primary word with our being, though we cannot utter
Thou with our lips. (ITh p. 6) 1
Authentic personal Existence is Existence in the I
-
Thou
A man can enter into an I-Thou relation only with
his whole being, as a genuine person, while the I-It
relation does not require such complete giving. It is not
even possible that the primary word 'I-It* is sooken
with the whole being.
The primary word I-Thou can only be spoken with the
whole being. The primary word I-It can never be
s )Oken with the whole being. (Ibid. p. 3)
The I-Thou relation - also called 'dialogical relation* or
•true relation* - is a relation of person to person, of
subject to subject. It is characterized by mutuality, direct
-4-
ness, presentness, intensity, and ineffability
, The
I-It relation, on the other hand, is a relation of indi-
vidual to thing, of subject to object, usually involving
some form of utilization, domination, or control,
li. e I in t e two relations is not the same, While
the , I t in the I-It relation is an ’individual,* the *1'
in the I -Thou relationship is a 'person, 1 2 Only the
silent or spoken dialogue between the I and the Thou brings
personality into being. Although we all are different
from one another by virtue of heredity, we are not
necessarily persons. By virtue of our heredity we differ
only as individuals. Personalities come into being only
insofar as the individual enters Into dialogical relation-
ships with others. 'Personality is neither simply an
individual matter, nor a social product, but a function of
relationship. Our personalities are called into being
by those who enter into relationship with us... To become
a person means to become someone who responds to what
happens from a center of Inwardness,’ (Fried pp, 60-61
)
The Dlalorlcal keetlnr. Defies Causal! tv and Fate
In the dialogical meeting, l.e. in the I-Thou rela-
tionship, man is no longer subject to causality and fate.
Both belong to the realm of the world of It and receive
their meaning therefrom. Unlike the It, the Thou is not
determined. ’So long,* says Buber,
as the heaven of Thou is spread out over me the winds
-5-
of causality cower at my heels, and the whirlpool
of fate Stays Its course. (ITh p. 9)
'he who goes out to /the Thou/ with concentrated being
and risen -ower to enter into relation becomes aware of
freedom.' (Ibid. p. 58 ) 'He who knows about the presence
of the Thou is capable of decision.' (Ibid. p. 51 ) Only
in times of sickness
.. ./when/ the world of It /is7 nolonger penetrated and fructified by the inflowing
world of Thou as by living streams but separated
and stagnant, then smooth causality rises up till
it is an oppressive, stifling fate." (ibid. pp. 53-54 )
The I
-
Thou Is not in Grace and Time
Meeting the Thou is also not in space and time,
but space and time are in the meeting. While the I of the
I-It experiences moments which have no present content
since they are filled with experiencing and using, the
present of the I-Thou is something real and filling; it is
an end in itself. It is not the abstract point between past
and future, but the present filled with intensity and
wholeness. (Ibid. pp. 9»t2; Fried p. 53)
Mu tualltv of If
e
I-Thou
In order to be fully real, the I-Thou relationship
has to be mutual . This mutuality of the I-Thou is so
unconditional, that even God seems to be subject to it.
Buber says
:
You know always in your heart that you need God more
- 6-
than everything. But do you not know too that God
needs you - in the fullness of His eternity needsyou?... You need God in order to be - and God needsyou for the very meaning of your life. (iTh p. 82)
however, mutuality* in this context must not be confused
with unity or identity, neither is it any sort of empathy.
Although i-ihou Is the word of relation and togetherness,*
writes Friedman, 'each of the members of the relation
really remains himself, and that means really different
from the other. Though the Thou is not another It, it is
also not another I. A man who treats a person as another
I does not really see that person, but only a projected
image of himself
.
Such a relation, despite the warmest
"personal" feeling is really I-It.' (Fried p. 61) The
dialogical relationship Buber is talking about always
requires two. Hie I and the Thou never melt into one
another.
Every Thou in th 1 s World has to Become an It
Buber realizes that although authentic existence
is existence in the I -Thou - in the life of dialogue -
living in this world does not allow the human being to
remain permanently in the I-Thou relation. For in order to
survive we have to know, control, and use things and even
human beings. We often have to de-personalize and de-human-
ize our fellow-men, have to treat them as objects rather
3- XI
than persons - make them to mere Its. 'This is the exalted
melancholy of our fate,' says Buber,
-7-
that ^aonetlngT' every Thou in our world must becomean It...r.very Thou In the world la, by its nature,
rateo t° become a thing, continually to re-enter
C0
^
lti°n of thlh6S,..The it is the eternalcarysails, the Thou the eternal butterfly. (ITh p. 116)
The particular Thou, after the relational event has
run its course, is bound to become an It. The par-ticular It, by entering the relational event, maybecome a Thou. These are the two privileges of~the
world of It. (Ibid. p. 33 )
God 1 b the Eternal Thou
Even God we sometimes treat as though Ke were an
object, an It. Yet, Buber says, God is the only Thou that
never, by its very nature, ceases completely to be a Thou
for us. Everyone who knows God, knows also very well the
remoteness from God, but he does not know the complete
absence of God.
Z271 is we only who are not always there... By Its
nature the Eternal Thou is eternally Thou, only our
own nature compels us to draw it into the world
and the talk of It, (Ibid. pp. 99-100)
But by virtue of the privilege of pure relation to the
Eternal Thou in which 'potential being is simply actual
being,’ there always 'exists the unbroken world of Thou’
in which 'the Isolated moments of relation are bound up
in a life of world solidarity.’ Similarly, Just as man,
by virtue of the Presence of the Eternal Thou, can never
become a complete It, so - on account of his limitations
as a human bel ig - he can never become a pure Thou. 'No
man,* says Buber, 'is pure person /.Thou/, and no man is
pure individuality /it/.
'
(Ibid. p. 65)
-8-
Relatlon is uooc » Alienation j a Evil
Since, as was stated above, our personalities are
called into being through our entering into relationship
with others, it is the relation of our Self to the Thou
which, j or Buber, constitutes the essence of Selfhood.
Authentic personal existence emerges only in the meeting
of others. Entering into relation is the fact through
which we constitute ourselves as human beings, as true
persons.
' Through the Thou a man becomes I,* (Ibid. p. 28)
( *
'I become through my relation to the Thou.’ (Ibid. p. 11)
It is, thus, man’s true relation to the Other which
brings him into contact with reality. Lis I -It relation,
on the other hand, drives man into bare unreality. On the
basis of this fundamental belief, Buber holds that it
folfwa that the I-Thou relation is good, while the I-It
relation, that is, alienation from the Thou, is evil.
Complete alienation from the Thou, however - as was
stated above - is never possible. By virtue of the presence
of the Eternal ‘Thou ’we are not given up to alienation
from the world and the loss of reality by the I - to domina
tion by the ghostly,’ (Ibid, p. 100) Without this unbroken
world of I -Thou there would be no assurance for man that
his relation would not fall into complete dualism o^ I-It;
there would be no guarantee of Lie being able to transform
any I-It Into I-Thou, and of evil's becoming radically
real and absolute, (Fried p. 73)
-9-
jHhe World of It is not an Unqualified Evil
Although, in general, alienation from the Thou is
evil, it would be incorrect to say that the I-It relation
is con :letely bad, for the world of It — though detrimental
when dominating the life of dialogue - is absolutely
necessary for man to live and survive. For example, man's
drive to possess things Insofar as it Is directed at things
which we need for survival is necessary; consequently it
is not bad. Impulses in themselves are not evil. Only
when man lets loose his drives instead of controlling
(not suppressing) them, if he does not give them the proper
direction by the I -Thou
,
do they become It In the evil sense.
Man's will to profit and to be powerful have their
natural and proper effect so long as they are linked
with, and upheld by, his will to enter into relation.
There is no evil impulse till the impulse has been
separated from the being. (ITU p. 48)
Thus, on account of man's limitation - he needs the
world of It for his survival - the I-It is unavoidable.
It is therefore not existence, but predominance of the I-It
over the I-Thou that is the source of evil. 'Without it,'
says Buber,
man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not
a man. (Ibid, p. The more man, humanity, is mastered
by individuality, the deeper does the I sink into un-
reality (Ibid, p, 65 )..*Z-°e7 *11 real living ie meet-
ing. (Ibid, p, 11)
Thus, although it is man's fate that he can never completely
dispense with the world of It, he must constantly strive
-10-
for the subordination of the I-It to the I -Thou
A.1.1
^
Hiylnp, ^ -J‘ee n and Meetl tip*, Reoulres Personal
yiolPn - ss .« Si Single One, Making the Other Present,
go tal Inclusion of the Other, Experien cing: the Other Side.
Mutual Confirmation
.
Direction
, and Responsibility
1 *
As against the exclusive life of I-It, there is the
self-giving love of genuine relation, there is the going
out in order to meet the Thou. This entering into I
-Thou
relationship, however, must not be equated with emotions
or feelings which remain within the I.
It is l[also7 not a matter of intimacy at all; this
appears when it must, and if it is lacking, that’s
all there is to it. (FU pp. 144-145)
Rather, true relation is love that is between the I and
the Thou. ’That,’ says Buber,
is no metaphor, but the actual truth. Love does not
cling to the I in such a way as to have the Thou
only for its "^content," its object; but love is
between I. and rhou
.
( ITh pp. 14-15)
’Feelings ,/only/ dwell in man; but man dwells in love.'
(loc. clt.
)
Love is 'blind,' and thus not real love or
relation, 'so long as It does not see a whole being.'
(Ibid. p. 16) The Eros of dialogue has the ’simplicity of
fulness,’ in it the lover turns to the other human being
’in bis otherness, his independence, his self-reality.'
The ’erotic man' of monologue, on the other hand, is con-
cerned only with himself. He does not comprehend the be-
loved in his wholeness , but only mirrors himself in the
-11 -
other, and enjoys big own feelings.
There a lover stamps around and is in love only with
rlli ?
a8Sl
??i*
Th6re ° Iie ls vearlnP differentiatedfeelings like medal-ribbons. There one is enloyin*
ti e aaven tures of his own fascinating effect. There
one is gazing enraptured at the spectacle of hie own
supposed surrender. There one is collecting excitement.There one is displaying his "power. " There one ispreening himself with borrower vitality. There oneis delighting to exist simultaneously as himself and
as an idol very unlike himself. There one is warninghimself at the blaze of what has fallen to his lot.
There one is experimenting. And so on and on - ( BM*
pp. 29-30)
The true lover, however, turns to the beloved with 'all the
power of intention' of his heart. He does not assimilate
the other to his soul, but faithfully vows him to himself.
The essence of true love, of genuine relation, is
thus, 'experiencing the other side,' (Ibid. p. 96) in
its wholeness. It ls complete inclusiveness of the other
person in his particularity, in his actual being.
Only an inclusive Lros is love. Inclueiveness is
the complete realization of... the "partner," not
by the fancy but by the actuality of being. (Ibid. p. 97)
Inclusiveness, however, must not be identified with 'empathy,'
for the latter entails the 'exclusion of one's concrete-
ness, the extinguishing of the actual situation of life,
the absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which
one participates . ' True inclusiveness, on the other hand,
has nothing to do with ‘transposing* oneself into the other
one or with suppressing one's Self, but It means the
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extons ion of one’s own concreteness, the fulfilment
ol the ac tiial situation of life, the complete presence
of ,he reality In which one participates, (loc, cit.)
It means a relation between two persons, ’an event ex-
perienced by them in common;
' it means that the participa-
ting persons, ’without forfeiting anything of the felt
reality of ^their7 activity, at the same time live
through the common event from the standpoint ofthe other.’
(loc. cit.)
A relationship that is not inclusive is not a true
dialogical relationship. Only
a relation between persons that is characterized
in a more or less degree by the element of inclusion
may be termed a dialogical relation, (loc. cit.)
The stronger and the more mutual this common experience
is, the truer is the dialogical relation. In true relation,
thus, it is not enough to include the other one in his
otherness, but to bring the totality of one’s authentic
being to the meeting too. In order to make this possible,
man has to become a Single One, a true person; he must
not suppress his Self.
Man can have dealings with the /JFho'g/ only as a
Single One, as a man who has become a Single One.
(Ibid. p. l*3)
A man of the ’crowd,’ a Massemensch . cannot ent< r into a
dialogical relation.
One can do this only as a Single One, through having
become a r arson with th t complete and independent
-13 -
responsibillty of singleness. (Ibid. p. 173)
Only the man who has become a Single One. a self
t;/,!?1 h?-
301
.
1
’
able t0 have a complete relation0 nlfl life to the other self... It is true thatthe child says Thou before it learns to say I •but on the height of personal existence one must betrui.y able to say I in order to know the mystery
01 the 'Thou in its whole truth. (Ibid. p. 175)
hot before man can say 1 in perfect reality
... canhe in perfect reality say Thou. (Ibid. p. 43)
Only if authentic personalities enter 1 to relationship
with one another can the dialogue in turn be authentic.
Once man has achieved personal wholeness, ’personal
unity, unity of being, unity of love, unity of action -
unity of being, lixe and action together' - which, however,
'does not mean a static unity of the uniform, but the
great dynamic unity of the multiform in which multiformity
is formed into unity of character* (Ibid, p, 116 ) - man
is ready to enter into dialogical relationships with
others. For, by virtue of his wholeness and authenticity
the Single One will experience his uniqueness, his vocation,
and his direction as given to him by dad. (This awareness
of his unique way to God is neither conscious nor sub-
conscious but la at the very center of ourself as I; in
the end It is a mystery, (cf. Fried p* 96 ))
This awareness of direction is absolutely necessary
along with man's wholeness, since only the actual union
of 'direction* ana personal unity will enable man to
achieve ccmple te authenticity and wholeness. True and com-
plete wholeness of man is not exhausted by the ’totality
-14-
whlch comprises and Integratee all hie capacities, powers,
quail ties
,
and urges' (Ilv p, 175) - Buber calls it Spirit
-
neither Is the mere awareness of ’direction' sufficient
for man’s perfect authenticity. But man’s full realisation
depends upon hie entering into relationship with the Other,
that is, upon his actual living according to the God-given
direction with the united powers of his being.
l‘hio state of man as a united being working into the
direction, Buber calls ‘responsibility.’ It is the essence
of man’s life, and without it man is not a man.
Being truly responsible means that man is ready to
respond to everything that addresses him, to every -
ultimately God-given - ’sign,' with bis whole being, that
he embraces it fully by making it completely present to
him, in its full reality, uniqueness, and otherness. It
means that man affirms his Thou in the middle of ’simple,
unexalted, unselected reality,' (PU p, 135 ) that he accepts
what he meets as It is, with courage, net shunning any
problematic, danger, etc., that is connected with it. It
means that he answers from the depths of his sou] to the
mystery of the ether.
The monolog! cal man, in opposition to the dialogical
and truly responsible man, is not aware of the 'otherness*
of the other, but he attempts to incorporate the other in-
to himself. This attitude of the non-dialoglcal man Buber
calls ’ RUckbiegung, ’ reflexion. It is a bending back on
oneself and not a 'turning away as oprosed to turning
-15-
towards.' ’Reflexion* le also different from egoism or
egotism. But it means man's withdrawal from the acceptance
of the other one In his particularity and otherness, his
inability and unwillingness to see more in the other one
than those parts which correspond to himself.
It is not that a man is concerned with himself,
considers himself, fingers himself, enjova, idol-
izes and bemoans himself; all that can be added,
but it is n t integral to reflexion.
.
. I terra it
reflexion when a man withdraws from accepting with
his essential being another person in his particu-
larity - a particularity which Is by no means to b
circumscribed by the circle of his own self, and
though it substantially touches and moves his soul
is In no way immanent in it - and lets the other
exist only as his. own experience, only as a
’’part of ray self.” (BtfK pp. 23-24)
As a result of this reflexion, dialogue becomes a fiction.
The mysterious intercourse between man and man becomes a
game, and through the re lection of real life ’the essence
of all re? lity begins to disintegrate.' (loe, cit.)
From this it. follows that if the non-dialogical man
were to strive for being able to enter into true relation,
it would not be his self that would have to be given up,
but that false self—asserting instinct that makes
a man flee to the possessing of things before the
unreliable, perilous world of relati n icr has
neither density nor duration and cann t he sur-
veyed. (ITh p, 76)
He has to exchange this self-will for genuine responsibility.
For the truly dialogical response of man, unlike the condi-
tional reflex of the self willed man, comes from the whole
of hie being, and it embraces the Thou in its totality, in
-16-
ita unreduced otherness.
' or t’rmt reaeon it was said earlier that the I-Thou
relation is not subject to causality and fate. This does
not mean, though, that the dialogical man acts without
external influences, but it means that his response to
what he meets in the world is a free response with his
whole oeing to the Other in its uniqueness. The dialogical
man is free from any psychological and social conditioning -
which always entails a limitation of man's actions - he is
ire© to react with the whole of his being to each concrete
and new situation and is able to see in it the new and
unique. Freedom and dependence merge here. In true re-
lation, says Buber
,
you feel 'yourself to be simply dependent.,
,
and simply free. The unfree man, the monological man in the
state of reflexion, on the other hand, sees in what he
meets only the resemblances to himself and other things
and persons he already knows. His actions are determined
and defined by public opinion, social statue or psycho-
logical conflicts. He cannot respond openly and freely
but merely reacts to what he considers repetitions of
former experiences, ana to what he sees in terms of its
usefulness
.
Not only does the life of dialogue entail freedom but
also self-confirmation, which in turn leads to greater
authenticity and ever truer relation. Since every man,
according to Buber's anthropology, needs self-confirmation,
man - when he is not confirmed by others in hie innermost
-17-
essence - has to resort to appearance. He will try to be
«hat others want him to be in order to receive confirmation.
By doing so. however, he has to deny his authenticity -
consequently he is unable to enter into true dialogue
since this requires wholeness and authenticity of one’s
self. DlffeAt i s this, when men enter into relation with
one another. For, since true relation means the making
fully present of the other one in his uniqueness and
wholeness there is no longer any need for denying one's
<
self-hood in the aim of being confirmed, since one is
confirmed in one's very essence.
Not always, of course, are we confirmed in our essence.
And it is especially then when we have to have the courage
to retain our authenticity, even If the price we have to
pay i or it is high, ior only as a Single One, as a real
self, can we truly meet the Other. And 'all real living is
meeting,
'
Life of Dialogue has to Include God , fan, ano th
e
World
The dialogical life of man - if it is to be authentic -
must be triadic - it must include God, the Self, and God's
creation, i.e. men and the world. True relation is
essentlall y triadic. The responsibility of the Single One
thus, must not be directed exclusively either towards God
or Kan, but it has to include both.
Although God Is the Primal Source of all creation, to
-13-
Uhom everything must be directed and returned, and although
it is only through grace and with His help that man
can be redeemed, God wants man to come to Him by way of
entering into relation with His creation. It Is there that
He will address us and where we can respond to Him and
enter Into relation with Him. Man, if he wants to meet
and reach God has to hallow also His ci'eation from the
depths of his soul.
Consequently the I- Thou relation among men, and of
man to the world, ie essential and not unessential or
coincidental, or simply a means to some further end
which is thrown away once the end is obtained. It has
int
r
insic va 1 ue
.
Real relationship to God cannot be achieved on
earth if real relationships to the world and to
mankind are 'lacking* •* both love of the Creator and
love of that which He has created are finally
one and the same. (AT p. 33) hie man who loves
God also loves him whom uod loves. (I old. p. 37)
Man’s dialogues with God and his fellow-men cannot really
be separated from one another. For God is the ternal Thou
in whom
the extended lines of relation meet. . Avery par-
ticular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal
Thou. Gy means of every particular Thou the
primary word addresses the eternal Thou
.
(ITh p. 75)
Life, says Huber, cannot be divided between a real relation
with God and an unreal relation to the world.
-19-
the mrlf ]joth tr!,ly pray to aod and profit bywor d, he who knows the world as somethin by“
‘lbid! £ to'W» ** al- ^ ‘he slmo
Man’s relation to aod can be authentic and ’raised to
constancy' only if he embodies in it ’the whole stuff
ox life,,. if he realizes God anew in the world according
to his strength and to the measure of each day.’ (Ibid, p
1 14 )
ii.e relationship between God and man is one-to-
one relationship and an all-inclusive relationship at
ul e e j. 'o. In the relation with God are unconditi n-
ec exclusiveness and unconditioned inclusiveness one and
the sare.’ (Ibid. p. 7°) While entering in an I-Thou
relationship with a particular human being with His
whole being, Goc at the same time leaves room for, even
demands, an authentic relation of this man to his fellow-
men. For him 'who enters on the absolute relation.
. .every
thing is gathered up In the relation.' (loc. cit. )
For to step into pure relation /with God/ is not
to disregard everything but to see everything in
the Thoy
,
not to renounce the world but" to establish
it on its true basis. To look away from the world,
or to stare at it, does not help a man to reach God;
but he who sees the world in Him stands in His pre-
sence. "Here world, there God" is the language of
It ; "God in the world" is another language of It;
but to eliminate or leave behind nothing at all,
to include the whole world in the Thou
. to give the
world its due and its truth, to include nothing
beside God but everythin/ in him - this is full and
complete relation.
.
./Ken7 do not find Him if they
leave the world. /Only/ he who goes out with his
whole being to meet his Thou and carries to it all
-20-
bej.ng that la in the world, finds Him whobe sought. (Ibid. pp. 76-79)
cannot
flan cannot have a more direct relation si ip to
God than the one via His creation. It would be ’foolish
and hopeless
,
writes Buber, for man to turn aside from
the course of life in order to seek aod. ’For there is
nothing in which Be could not be found.’ Even if a man
’won all the wisdom of solitude and all the power of
concentrated being he would ^atlll/ 111135 God.’ (ibid. p. So
fhe real God lets no shorter line reach him than
each man’s longest, which is the line embracing
the world that is accessible to this man. For he,
the real God, is the creator*, and all beings stand
before him in relation to one another in his creation,
becoming useful in living with one another for his
creative purpose. To teach an acosmic relation to
God is not to know the creator. (BKk p. 52 )
The Single One, thus, must not hold himself aloof
from the crowd, rather, he is to spend his life in the
’body politic,’ for the ’body politic’ is the - at least
potential - ’reservoir of otherness.’ He has to do the
paradoxical work of making the ’crowd no longer a crowd.’
(Ibid. p. 65) Hie Single One, writes Friedman on -Buber,
is thus the truly responsible man who hears ’the unreduced
claim of each particular hour in all its crudeness and
disharmony and answer/s7 it out of the depths of ZFle7
being. This responsibility does not exclude a man from
membership in a group or community, but it means that
true membership in a community Includes a boundary to mem-
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beranip so that no group or person can hinder one's percep-
tion of what is spoken or one's answer from the ground of
one's being.
'
(Fried pp, 93-94)
similarly, as man’s relation to God is not authentic
if relation to mankind and the world is lacking, so is a
true dialogue with human beings and the world possible
only if the respective human beings, at tie same time,
have an I-Thou relationship with God.
Solitude, to be sure, is necessary now and then for
it 'frees oneself from the intercourse of experiencing or
using' thus preparing man for the supreme relation.
But if solitude means absence of relation, if solitude
is the stronghold of Isolation, where a man conducts
a dialogue with himself - not in order to test and
master himself for that which awaits him but in
the enjoyment of the conformation of his soul -
then we have the real fall of the spirit Into
spirituality. The man can advance to the last
abyss, where in his self-delusion he imagines he
has God in himself and is speaking with him. But
truly though God surrounds us and dwells in us, we
never have him in us. (ITh p* 104)
It is only in the simultaneous meeting of God, man,
and the world that man can truly realize himself, meet God,
and realize Him in this world
. Only by walking on the
'narrow ridge' of true responsibility does he encounter
rea1 1 ty and tru th
,
PART TWO
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Ever since the appearance of X and Thou Buber has
been a very productive writer, and he h-s shown an ex-
tended range of interests in different fields of w-
ledge* However, his later writings sustain an intimate
connection to his and Thou , Buber has shown in them
the validity of the I-Thou for various fields; he has
explored the implications of his I-Thcu ohiloaophy for
ethics, reli&i n, education, community, sociology, psych-
ology, oit, epistemology, ontology, and politic' 1 theory*
The I-Thou is an integral part of 11 of Buber philosophy*
Buber hi; self, mentions Frisdman, states in Halo, leches
Leben that the purpose of r .1 the essays anc talks in the
volume, written between 1922 and 19^1, is to show a reality
that has been forgotten, a rerlity
of which I am today, as in the beginning of this
work, certain that it is essential for the existence
of man* nighty in in mi i . . ...
’I and Thou* stands at the head while all the other-B
stand in an illustrative and supplementary relation
to it. (quoted by Fried p. 161)
Buoei
,
how vex, is no systematic thinker. *1 hrve
no inclination to system,1 tising’, Buber £ id h-jnsnli in
a letter to Friedman* (loc. clt* ) His t. series vi t
spread out over a vast amount of rltings ano. id is ti
reader's task to search for th fragments am. then to fit
them together to s wuole.
It will be my aim in this second part of the thesis
to undertake this task with respect to Buccr i etnics ?.i>.
a
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religlon, social philosophy, epistemology, one ontology.
1 snail attempt to elaborate Buber’s viev/8 and to Bhow
hov: he integrated the above mentioned four disciplines
into h s philosophy of the I-l’hcu.
ETHICS and RELIGION
-26-
An account of Buber' a ethical and religious doctrine
can be documented more thoroughly than any other field of
knowledge Buber has dealt with, such as epistemology. For,
more than with any other subject has Buber dealt with the
nature and redemption of evil. This is so, because for Buber
tne problem of evil is the central problem of human existence.
In the eno, the total attitude shown in atari's life is an ex-
pression of his concept of good and evil. It underlies all
evaluations, which in turn, are the central part of all
fields of human thought, of all of man’s decisions. It is
decisive for man’s life after death. Tims, although the
problem of evil may be most relevant to, and seen most
clearly In ethics (as defined traditionally), for Buber it
bears great importance in all other fields of human enter-
prise, such as philosophical anthropology, psychology,
social philosophy
,
ano even politics. It receives concrete
application in all fields of life and is no longer, as it
was traditionally, restricted to ethics, metaphysics, and
theology
. bthics
,
1 thus, if it is to remain the label for
the problem of good and evil, has to become a broader term,
including all of man’s life, since in the end, man’s concept
of good arid evil underlies all his evaluations and decisions.
Just as the concept of evil and ethics was widened
by Buber so to pertain to man’s total life, so does he con-
ceive of Religion as embracing man’s whole life. Consequently,
a close inter-relationship and Inseparableness between re-
ligion and ethics and tie problem of evil - defined in its
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broadest cense, as above - Is necessitated. Religion, accord
mg to Huber, although not dealing directly with the dis-
tinction between good and evil, is intimately connected
with it, since religion, that is, the binding to Gk>d, is
possible only via the world, that is, it is dependent upon
the good or bad life in this world. Only a good secular
life allows for genuine religion. The redemption of evil,
thus, - leading to a more complete relation with Gnd, to a
better religion - is as much a problem of ethics as of re-
ligion.
It is this view of religion and ethics as embracing
the whole of man’s life and as being inseparable
,
which
accounts for Buber 'e emphasis, in ail bis writings, on the
concept of religion and ethics.
According to these basic views of Buber I shall divide
the present chapter into three main parts. The first one
1 Intend to devote to an exposition of the nature and the
problem of evil as viewed by 3uber; In the second one I
shall deal with Buber’s conception of the inseparableness
of religion from ethics - defined as being the basis of all
of man’s life; finally I shall give an account of the way
which Buber suggests for the overcoming ana redemption of
evil.
I. Thg, Probler; and Nature of gyji
Buber’s concept of evil - like the rest of his phil-
osophy - cannot be labelled with traditional terms. Wag-
ing on the ’narrow ridge,* Buber overcomes and yet retains
traditional and opposing views on the nature of evil.
Ifoil in. Iteal but Redeemable
There are, on the whole, two major doctrines of evil:
the first, reducing evil to an illusion, or to objective
error of the mechanistic universe run by a first and imper-
sonal cause, the second one, absolutizing evil as something
radical, pure, and unredeemable. The first view sees good
and evil as part of a higher unity, the second one looks
at them as independent realities irreconcilably opposing
one another. Especially in our modern age - where roan, as
pictured drastically by many existentialist writers, exper-
iences a gnawing loneliness before a hostile universe and
men with whom he only associates but whom he does not meet,
where powers gained by scientific techniques seem to escape
man’s cability to integrate them into his life, where the
most cruel wars are waged and where human life is degraded
in a totalitarian system - man seems to be confronted with
evil in a more intense way than ever before, the belief in
the reality of evil is forced upon him, and consequently the
two opposing views of evil, as pictured above, are driven to
extremes. Evil cannot be regarded any longer as illusion,
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rather, in order to escape the responsibilities of evil,
Kan flees into a morgana more complete determinism. The
second view of evil, which conceives of evil as an absolute
reality, either, if belief in God is retained, falls into an
even more accentuated dualism between good and evil so to be
able to maintain the Idea of God as being absolutely good,
or it may lead to an atheistic existentialism like Sartre’s,
Nietzsche ’ a
,
and Heidegger ’ s, which assigns the creation of
reality to man himself, here the absolutlzation of evil
is at xts peak, Evil, Sartre says, ’can in no way be turned,
brought back, reduced., and incorporated into idealistic
humanism,
.
.Evil. , .like Good U^f absolu te . . . In spite of
ourselves, we came to tils conclusion, which, will be shocking
to lofty souls: Evil cannot be redeemed.’ (Fried p. 14)
Buber’s concept of evil is different from the two views
indicated above. Its standpoint is in between, including
a dialectical view of good ana evil which sees evil as both
real and rec eenable . therefore not as something absolute,
or as an illusion, or an objective error. Good, writes
Friedman on Buber, ’cannot exist in solitary splendor,
nor is it opposed by a radically separate evil with which
it has nothing to do. Evil must exist in this middle posi-
tion, but it is bound up with the good in such a way that
both are parts of a larger process, of a greater whole,
which is at once origin and goal. Thus evil is in one way
or another recognized as having reality, even if only that
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a temporary accompaniment of unredeemed creation; but
its reality is never permanent, nor is it ever completely
divorced from the good. Hence it is capable of redemption
by the process of the world spirit, the grace of Ood, or
the redemptive activity of man.’ (Fried p. 14)
Mil putuall^ dependent Upon Each v. u.er
Ihe redemption of evil, Buber feels, is made
possible because evil - although it has ’emotional and
ontological reality’ (loc. cit.) - is not an absolute
reality apart rom the good. Rather, evil stands in dialec-
tical relation with the good. ‘Good and evil,’ writes Buber,
'despair and hope, the power of destruction and the power
of rebirth, dwell side by side.’ (EG p. 21 )
root and evil are intimately bound together, requir-
ing one another for their existence. Since evil for Buber
is lack of direction, and good the finding of direction,
jthe one direction, the mutual dependence of good and evil
can readily be seen. For direction without something that
can be given direction is valueless, possibilities and forces,
on the other hand, that do not receive guidance are futile.
Moreover, the Thou, in order to be fully realized, has to
have another Thou with which it can enter into relation.
But it can only do so, if there ie an It (evil) which can
be permeated and transformed into a Thou.
Good and evil are thus 'strangely concerned with one
another,’ (EKK p.78) and therefore
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cannot be a pair of opposites like right and leftor above and beneath. ^Good" is the movement in theirectlon of home, evil is the aimless whirl ofnuman potentialities without which nothing can beachieved and by which, if they take no directionbut remain trapped in themselves, everything roesawry. (Fried p. 103 from BMM p. 78 ;
* 6 '° °
Good and evil must not be thought of as ’two poles, two
opposite directions,
.as belonging to the same kind of
being, as the same in nature, but the antithesis of one
another
.
1 This ray appear to be so only if good and evil
are treated as ethical abstractions. In the actual context
of life, however, where good and evil are 'existent states
of human reality
.. .the fundamental dissimilarity between the
two in nature, structure and dynamics' is disclosed. (I3E pp.
62-63) 'Good and evil could not be connected the way they
are if evil were a completely independent reality. The good
needs evil for Its development. ’Good,’ says Friedman for
Buber, 'can be maximized not through the rejection or con-
quest of evil but only through the transformation of evil,
the use of its energy and passion in the service of good.'
(Fried p. 15) Evil is not avoided or destroyed by the good;
' the divine force, /the source of all good/ which man actually
encounters in life does not hover above the demonic, but
penetrates it.' (EG p. 21)
Evil is Truly Encountered Only . 1th in Oneself
Successful ’attack’ on evil, feels Buber, is possible
only if man knows about its nature and causes. The encounter
with evil, from which the necessary knowledge can be gained,
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however, la not possible as long as a man remains a
stranger to himself. For, not from what man encounters out
aide himself oan he attain the knowledge of evil, but only
from his own inner experience.
I ••rtairiiy gain no experience of evil when I meet
1
7
1 ^fow-men. For in that case I can grasp it onlv
iJT
0
” ?iJ
hout
»
ffltrangedly or with hatred and contempt,in which case it really does not enter my vision: orelse, I overcome it with my love ana in that cas4 Ihave no vision of It either. I experience it when I
meet, myself, a i thin me, where no element of strange-
ness has divisive force and no love haa redeeming
xorce, there do 1 directly experience that something
whicn would force me to betray God and which seeks to
use for t iat purpose the powers of my own soul. (FSh
P* 57
)
Only when man comprehends the inner condition in which
he is evil and knows what the condition was which now is
lost and was considered ’good* formerly, does he attain
access to knowledge about evil. In the world apart from man,
i.e. in the world of ethical abstraction, evil exists only
in the form of quite general opposites. This, however, as
pointed out above, is not the true nature of evil. It is by
Introspection only, that evil can be perceived in its true
nature, that it can be encountered and afterwards made
demonstrable in the world. *A man,' writes tuber, 'only
knows factually what ''evil** is insofar as he knows about
himself, everything else to which he gives title name is merely
mirrored illusion.' (IGl p. 33 )
The encounter v/ith evil through introspection is really
first an address by an inner voice called ' conscience, ’ which
tells man in an unmistakable way when he is doing wrong, and
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alBo lets hln know what it is that
-takes him evil. By
*
’conscience’ Buber understands ‘that court within the soul
which concerns itself with the distinction between the
rlSht and the wrong in that which has been done and pro-
ceeds against that which has been determined as wrong.' (EG
P r ) It is the individual’s awareness of what he is "in
truth," of what, in his unique and non-repeatable created
existence, he is intended to be.’ (Ibid. pp. 95-96 ) It is
the voice that tells man where to go when he 'confronts
the demo lie fullness of the possible conduct and actions
given to the Individual in this moment.’ (Ibid. p. 96)
Conscience, however, is not a 'book of rules which
can be looked up to discover what is to be done now, in this
very hour,’ it is not
the routine conscience, which is to be used, is
being used and worn cut, the play-on-the-surfaee
conscience ,/but/ it is the unknown conscience in
the ;round of being which needs to be discovered
ever anew* , .in the single composure of every genuine
decision. The certainty produced by this conscious-
ness is of course only a personal certainty; it is
uncertain certainty; but what is here called person
is the very person who is addressed and who answers.
(BMM pp. 60-69
)
Although this voice calling man to be what he has been
created for occurs *in the most varied strengths and degrees...
and for the most part is stifled,’ it is to some extent
'inherent in all men.' (EG p. 95}
From this 'fundamental awareness* of one's vocation
( Bestlmn-un -, ) . especially
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wh6n It is fully present, the comparison between
• one actually is and what one is .intended to hr.c r. emerge. What is found is measured against the
rtnld
,
br°™S"
C
t
1
t
e<3 1
?
oal la,a6«. nor anything lrna-gl e y man, bu an linage arising out of the
t
Eye tery of being itself that we call person.' (Ibid. p. 96 )
Wien this comparison coincides with a discrepancy be-
tween the image of what one is called to be and what one
really is, the feeling of guilt arises.
fell one who knows himself , . .as called to a workwhich has not beer, done, each one who has not ful-
_ Iliad a task which he knows to be his own, each
who did not remain faithful to his vocation whichhe had become certain of - each such person knows
what it means to say that ''hie conscience smites
his. ” (Ibid. p. 87)
Guilt, thus, comes about as a consequence of one’s not
being true to one’s vocation, of one’s not taking the
direction indicated by his consciousness, a direction which
is always a direction towards God via the human and
natural thou. Guilt arisee when man avoids relation and
dialogue
,
If we are to discover the nature of evil in more de-
tail, then, Buber feels, we must not consult psychology
which tries to reduce conscience to a moral censorship
of society and explains evil in terms of ’inhibitions ‘ and
'repressions, 1 etc. Real encounter with evil ’is generically
different from what is called self-analysis In modern psy-
chology. The latter... is concerned to penetrate "behind 11
that which Is remembered, to "reduce" it to the real elements
assumed to have been "repressed."’ The former, on the other
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hand, Is to call to nind an occurrence as reliably,
concretely and. completely remembered as possible, which
is entirely unreduced and undissected .
*
(IGE pp. 64-65)
rteal knowledge about the intrinsic structure of evil is,
uhus, not gained by the psychologist who, in trying to re-
main ’’objective'' undertakes ‘a specific division of con-
sciousness,' but it can be gained only with the 'unbroken
wholeness of events’ upon which only later on, after having
gained the indispensable distance necessary for objective
knowledge, he reflects, thus going beyond the 'psychologi-
cal differentiations' accompanying the state of evil, to
evil as an ontological reality, (BKM pp. 124-125)
Interpret&tion o hy tb.
s
— a ource for the ^ee oer Unc er—
standing of Evil ~
If the deeper meaning of evil as an ontological
reality, ’which transcends the anthropological' meaning, Is
to be grasped, Buber feels, man must make use of the truth
found in the myths of the origin of evil, for in them 'the
experience- which has taken place (not "been gained") in
factual encounters with evil in the world and the soul is
directly embodied,
. .without making the cetoui through con-
ceptual or semi conceptual determinations.' (HE pp. 57 -58 )
Cnly in form of myths can the meaning of evil be communi-
catee. to the generality of mankind, (Ibid, p, 12)
The precondition necessary for a right Interpretation
of these myths leading to an understanding of 'the human
constitution and pjovement of evil' is the accord of man's
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belief In evil, as gained from his own encounter with it
to * rj0 recount of the myths. (Ibid. p. 58-51}
»e are competent to interpret the myths of theorigin of evil only by virtue of our personal ex-
b
^
t only it the character
of truth# Only out of the conjunction of these twoprimordial mythic intuition and directly experienced
1 e^-xty
,
does the 11. ;ht of the legitimate concent
of all °(lbid
8
p^go!
t00> probabi
^ the obscure
Although this anthropological exposition of the myths is
only an aid for man to understand them, 'its construction
is indispensable.
. an/ needs the /conceptual/ bridge.'
(Ibid. p. 12)
Sail .P.l in linger: : hoc* rl ^nleasnero. . .iron - Lecj- ion
Buber sees evil emerging In two fundamentally differ-
ent stages. In the first, which he finds typified in the
Biblical stories of Maza and Eve, and Cain, evil is decision-
lessness, directionlessnesa
.
Adam and Eve and Cain, holds
Buber, did not decide between good and evil, but rather
indulged in the imagination of possibilities of action;
afterwards, almost without knowing it, they acted out one
of these imaginations. Iheir action was, however, not the
result of a firm decision but was triggered off because of
an intensified indecision. 'In the vortex of indecision,...
at the point of greatest provocation and least resistance*
they acted. It was not baseness of the soul that caused
the sinfulness of Adam, Eve, and Cain, but
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the intervention... of the evil "imagery"
. . . The
wiG^eaness is derived from its, the imagery
’
s
wlc redness.
. .Imagery is rlay with possibility
I as self-temptation, from which ever and
again violence spring;s.
, * This imagery of thepossible, and in its nature, are called evil.(Ibid. p. 36)
Imagery in Itself is not bad. It is good and evil,
man's 'greatest danger and greatest opportunity at once.'
(Ibid, p, 39) It Is the seat of man's urges and passions
'without which he can neither beget nor bring forth, but
which lei t to itself remains without direction and leads
astray.’ (ibid. p. 42) It is thus directionlessness of
possibility that causes man to be evil. In his confusion
and indecision, 'in the swirling, space of images... he
grasps at them like a wanton burglar, not with decision,
but only in order to overcome the tension of omnipossibility.'
(Ibid. p. 37) Every human being, Buber holds, becomes time
and again - usually in a period of evolution like puberty -
aware of infinite possibility, in which the 'substantial
threatens to be submerged in the potential.' In this
‘swirling chaos of possibilities of action,’ in this 'dizzy
whirl,' the soul cannot be fixed, 'it strives to escape.’
(Ibid. p. 67) inis escape can take on two for..:s:
One is repeatedly offered it: it can clutch at any
object, past which the vortex happens to carry it;
or else, in response to a prompting that is still
incomprehensible to itself, it can set about the
audacious work of self-unification. In the former
case, it exchanges an undirected possibility for an
undirected reality, in which it does what it wills
not to do. what is preposterous to it, the alien,
the 'evil'; In the latter, if the work meets with
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.tie type of evil involved in these Biblical myths of
Adam and Eve and Gain is, thus, lack of direction, un-
Sulded and unbridled possibility and 'that which is done
out o it,..: grasping, seizing, devouring, compelling,
seducing, exploiting, humiliating, torturing and destroy-
ing of what offers itself.' (Ibid. p. 71 ) This kind of
evil is not the result of decision or action, it is the
reflection upon it, a playing with its possible actualization.
Its execution is only an unessential part in it. For the
final decision to the evil act is no real decision, it is
only a pseudo-decision. A real decision is a decision
with one's whole being. But the decision resulting from the
unbearablllty of the swirling chaos of possibility is a
mere flight, it is not made with one's whole being, and
therefore, is a pseudo-decision. It Involves only acts,
no real choices.
In the second stage, typified by the Biblical stories
of the Tower of Babel and the fall of Lucifer, and the
Iranian myth of Tima, evil is no longer dccisionlessnees
,
but it Is wrong decision, it is a decision of self-
sufficiency against God. 'It is the existential lie in which
man sees himself as self-creator.' (Fried p, 107)
According to the Iranian myth (which Buber chooses to
deal with In detail), lima
,
the primeval king, assumed dom-
ination ever the world at the order of Ahura Fazdah, the
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"i.- ect god. Alroafiy, previously, had he entreated the God
head to make him immortal and to attain power over the de-
mons. Everything was granted to him. rut lima 'a hubris
and self-adoration found no end; finally, after an enorous
flood, he claimed
that what was only vouchsafed to him he had donehimself; he ^saw/^ himself as self-creator
through himself immortal and immortalizing, /saw7it as sell
-established self
-grandeur that he held
sv/ay over the demons; he now live/d7 and act/ed7
according to this viewpoint; he thus com- it/ted/the inner untruth against dod and himself
,
v
mere
exactly: ne commlifted/ with his existence the lie
against being. (ILG pp. 53-54)
The people of Babel
,
and Lucifer - who imagined themselves
god-like - committed the same existential lie against being.
The evil involved In these myths is different from
decislonlessness
. here, evil results from an actual decision
to evil » Only in this second state does evil assume sub-
stance, it becomes 'obsessive and demonic.' (Will Herbert.
2M Writ! u -a of j art-in Buber , p. 18) While in the first
stage man is ’slipping and falling into evil, 1 in the
second stage we ’deal with an entry or descent into evil.'
(I EC p. 60) Thus, while the evil in the first stage involves
an element of chance, accident, the evil of the second stage
results fro. 3 pure deliberation
.
Although there is a fundamental difference between
evil as decision and evil as indecision, thre is no con-
tradiction between them. 'In fact, they are supplementary
to one another. .. They are not supplementary to each other
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in the manner of the two Bides of an object, but rather
In the manner of the two stages or steps of a process.’
(Ibic. p. 62) Repeated experiences of indecision ’do not
remain in /ma.n * a/ self-knowledge as a series of Isolated
moments of non-decision,’ but they ’merge into a course of
indecision into a fixation In it.’ Now, this self-
knowledge ie ’"repressed” a3 long, as the will to self-
preservation dominates that to being—able—to—affirm him-
self. ’ But when the will to affirm himself asserts itself,
’because /hi a/ self-knowledge no longer enables him to
affirm himself
.. .man calls himself in question.’ (Ibid. p.
75) this inner rejection by one's self knowledge
either assumes a pathological form, that ie, the
relationship of the person to himself becomes fragile
and intricate; or the person finds the way out where
he hardly expjected It, namely through an extreme
effort of unification. called ''conversion. ' (Ibid,
p. 76)
There is yet a third alternative - It is the decisive one:
to, says Buber, 'is an audacity of life... he therefore
requires confirmation ’ in hi a ’being-t 1*- an* by offers
and himself. ’Again and again the Yes must be spoken to
him, from the confidant and from the stirrings of his own
heart, to liberate him from the dread o abandonment, which
is a foretaste of death.' For a short while man can do with-
out being confirmed by others, but ’tie encouragement of
his fellow-men does not suffice if self-knowledge demands
inner rejection.’ If then man 'cannot readjust his self-
knowledge by his own conversion,' and does not want to fall
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in to a fragile relationship with himself, he will displace
his self-knowledge by complete self-affirmation. ’He must
render affirmation independent of all findings and base
it, instead of on Judgement-of-oneself
,
on a sovereign
willing-oneself , ' He will choose himself as he la, and
the picture of what he is intended to be is extinguished
completely, Hie ’good’ becomes what he is, the eternal order
that established good and evil is, accordingly, denied.
(Ibid. pp. 76-78)
This absolute self-affirmation, involving the domin-
ation of one’s own self-knowledge, is the worst kind of
evil, It is the evil Yima committed, the lie against Being.
Adam, too, was guilty of self-deification. But while his
aim was the becoming-like-God. * through knowing good and
evil,' Tina aimed at the ' being-1 Ike-God
’
(Ibid. p. 62)
’through proclaiming oneself as the creator both of one's
existence and of the values by which that existence is
Judged.' (Fried p* 108) The evil of the first stage is not
yet 'radical 1 evil since
whatever misdeeds are committed, their commission is
not a doing of the deed but a sliding into it. In the
second stage evil grows radical, because what man
finds in himself is willed* whoever lends to that
which, in the depths of self-awareness was time and
again recognized by him as what should be negated, the
mark of being affirmed, because it is his, gives it
the substantial character which it did not previously
possess. If we may compare the occurrence of the
first stage to an eccentric whirling movement, the
process of the freezing of flowing water may serve as
a simile to illustrate the second. (IGF pp. 80-81;
A man committing evil of the first kind is a ’sinner;’ one
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comultting evil of the second kind is ’wicked.’ The sinner
does evil, the wicked is evil. While the sinner may stand
before God, the wicked one will never be Judged by Him.
This, however, does not mean that God's way is closed to
him
' lt is the wi cked himself who has closed the way to God,
since he has negated his own existence which initially wag
intended to have a relation with God. Unlike the sinner,
he does not even wish to turn. He will be his own Judge.
(Fried p. 109; GY pp. 51 , 58)
In the end, Buber concedes, evil remains a mystery
with no answer. human being can answer how it is possible
that an evil will - a man at the radical stage of evil -
can exist when God exists. ’The abyss which is opened by
tnls question advances onto the darkness of the divine mys-
tery even more dreadfully than the abyss opened by Job's
question
.
p* 60) Yet, however great the mystery of
the nature of evil may be, Buber Insists on one thing
throughout his writings: 'It must not be attributed to a
metaphysical or ontological dualism, which sees good and
evil as substantive entities or powers. Such a dualism would,
in effect, be a ditheism, and against every ditheism Buber
repeats the words of the Lord to the prophet Isaiah: ”1 am
the first and the last, and be3lde me there is no God.'”
(Kerbor
,
op. cit., p. 18) Despite his strong emphasis on
’radical’ and 'substantive' evil in hi a later writings,
Buber holds fast to his belief In God as the ultimate source
of good and evil. Fan is not evil by nature, what is evil
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is only the use he makes of that nature. Certainly, there
are men who brlns evil to the radical stage. But this does
not mean that this evil is absolute, independent, and un-
redeemable; it only means that it has become fixed in its
opposition to God.
0od does not abridge the free will he has given to man
and, therefore, allows him to close himself off from Him
and to end up in non-existence. Yet God remains open to
man’s turning, to whatever 'radical' stage he may have
brought evil. Certainly, a turning in the state of complete
self-a >. iruat-lo - especially since God has 'hardened' in
response to man's decieion against Him - will be extremely
difficult and can be effected only through a conversion.
’3in is not an undertaking which man can break off when
the situation becomes critical, but- a process started by
him, the control of which is withdrawn from him at a fixed
moment.
'
( TTF p. 34)
Thus, Buber has remained faithful to his dialogical
principle also in his account of the nature of evil: it is
entering into relationship that makes man really eian, and
it is failure to enter into relation that constitutes evil
or non-existence. The problem of man and the problem of
evil seem to merge here. 'Primal guilt consists in remain-
ing with oneself.’ (BK& p. 166) Sin is the refus.al to enter
into relation, the turning away of man from God in self-
sufficiency and self will. Since the basic principle is
that 'all real living is meeting* the primary evil is estrange-
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ment, alienation from the Thou. It consists In the de-
personalization of life through the predominance of I-It
over I
-Thou.
In the first stage of evil, man Is without direction,
without relation, he is unable to make the decision to
enter Into relation with his whole being. In the second
state, man deliberately decides to break off any genuine
relation, he la not only unable t,0 make up his mind to
respond to 'oc
,
to take direction towards him, to enter in-
to relation with him, but he freely chooses not to have
dialogue witlr God. At the stage of ’radical’ evil, man Is
not ‘disabled
’ to take direction, but he deliberately ’dis-
ables himself’ from entering into an I
-Thou relation with
God or the world..
TI
* && Inaemrablll^y, of Ethics and Religion
Buber's view of evil, since it is also based on the
tradition-breaking dialogical principle - which demands that
man’s relationship to God be accompanied by his having re-
lationships with men and the world - necessarily implies
a change in the traditional concept of the inter-relation-
ship of ethics and religion. Up to now, Buber feels, there
has prevailed a rather severe ax>lit between ethics and re-
ligion. Ethics, to put it in a very general way, tradition-
ally has been, and is so now, concerned with the distinction
between good and evil, in the moral sense, in this world,
while religion is concerned with the supernatural. This
division, Buber feels, does not really exist between ethics
and religion. It is an artificial product created by man,
and detrimental in its present form.
Pseudoriligiona - A dausc of the Traditional ^pllt Between
Ethics and .tell- ion and a Threat to the True Life of
Bialopue
Buber holds that a major cause for the traditional and
still existing split between ethics and religion is the
existence of pseudoreligions in their various forms.
First, it Is the false dogmatism of the theologians
that often is responsible for religion's gaining indepen-
dence froJfl ethics. The logical anc dialectical God of
the theologians, Buber feels, is not the God who meets us
as the eternal Thou in the dialogic life. God is merely 'met'
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but not 'sought*' The dogmatism of the theologians la
a real threat to the dialogical life, since the 'once for
all’ contained in it makes unnecessary the 'ever anew' of
real responses to every unique Thou that is said to us. The
once for all' of dogma is a hindrance to the genuine
meeting with God In the ’lived concrete.'
Gnosis, s ringing from dogmatism, is an even greater
enemy to religion. In its attempts to ’raise the veil which
Glvid.ee the revealed from the hidden and to lead forth to
the divine mystery,
’
(Pried p. 114) and in trying to resolve
alx contradictions of existence, Gnosis stance as a great
threat to the life in dialogue. ’It,’ says Buber, (and he is
in particular referring to the psychology of C.3. Jung, accor
eing to which God is a projection of the human psyche) ’and
not atheism which annihilates God because it must reject the
hitherto existing images of God - is the real antagonist
of the reality of faith.’ (EG p. 136 )
Magic
,
another fruit of dogmatism
, is a further
threat to the turning towarcis God. In magic ’one celebrates
rites without being turned to the Thou and without really
meaning its Presence,’ (Ibid. p. 125 ) God here ’ e comes the
source of power which is possessed and used, a mere It.
Religious symbolism and ritualism too, are a danger to
religion: 'The religious reality,' says Buber,
of the meeting with the Beeter* • .knows no image of
Him. ..It knows only the presence of the *resent One.
Symbols of Him, whether images or ideas, always
exist first when ana insofar as the Thou becomes Be,
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sifS desireere toward I i?r t+ h n signs ana T,oint-
swell
He r'^ovec HimeeIf fro,: them. (Ibid? ^45^46)
The philosopher, although he ’rejects both the image
and the God which it symbolizes’ and instead offers the
pure io ea* of God is equally dangerous to the dialogic
life, Ubio. p. 46) for he holds to another form of
gnosis. Philosophy’s 'primary art of abstraction’ (Ibid. p. 38 )
and conceptualization are not adequate methods for having
relation with God. Goa cannot be represented by an idea,
or thought of as the Eternal Thought in which all ideas
are contained. lie ’cannot be "inferred" In anything, in
nature, say, as its author, or in history as its master,
or in the subject as the self that is thought in it.’ (ITh
p* XLe real God is a living God and thus cannot be
conceptually comprehensible like a thin 1 among ether things.
Since ’philosophy,
‘ according to Buber, ’is grounded on
the presupposition that one sees the absolute in unlversals,
’
(EG p, 41} it follows that it denies, or at least neglects,
the living with the concrete and the ’ever anew’ of 6nuine
dialogue. Religion
,
1 in opposition to philosophy, ’means
the covenant of the absolute with the particular, with the
concrete.’ (loc. cit.
>
’Genuine religious expression has
an open or a hidden personal character, for it is spoken
out of a concrete situation in which ti e person takes part
as a person, (lbic. p. 37 )
And lastly, neither is God met in the mystic’s ’divine-
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nega' with which the self is united. Mysticism Is an
obstruction to genuine relation with God and the world.
QlLk Mi£ sjrQ-d. 2JL *•scudorell^lons but
c-rsonal jpg
.,nc.>untc-rcA In ''ear In tb e
Xne real God is not the uocL of the theologians
,
philosophers | psychologists, magicians and mystics, or of
the dogmatic ritualistic religions, but He is a cgsterv
and Cannes g oe known* He can only be net. And this encounter
is intensely personal, taking place in the fullness of life.
Huber's religion does not allow for any security - in dogma,
magic
,
or false gnosis, but he preaches a 'holy insecurity.'
'Woe to the man so possessed that he thinks he possesses
loci. { 1 Th p. 1 06 ) All we know about God is that lie enters
into personal relationships with us. Thus, when Buber uses
the term Eternal Thou,' he does not mean a symbol of God
but our relationship to Him. Conversely, when Buber calls
God the 'Absolute Person ' then he does not mean to say that
God's nature is exhausted by his personality
; he does not
want to reduce God to a person.
It is Indeed legitimate to speak of the parson of
God within the religious relation and in its language;
but in so doing we are making no statement about the
Absolute which reduces it to the personal, v/e are
rather saying that it enters into the relationship
as the Absolute rerson whom we call 'God. One may
understand the personality of God as his act. It is,
indeed, even permissible for the believer to believe
that 'God became a person for love of him, because in
our human mode of existence the only reciprocal rela-
tion with us that exists is a personal one. (EG pp. 96-97)
i'he true g
the : ys ter
Conere tone-:
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3od only manifests Himself In the world as person and as
such we have to meet Him. But he cannot be reduced to one
of these manifestations. Buber walks on the 'narrow ridge'
oetween the mystic who claims complete union with hod
and trie Gnostic who claims complete knowledge about the
nature of God, but removes Him into a sphere transcendent
to that of human relations. Buber neither claims union
with Gog nor knowledge about him but only relation and
knowledge of one aspect of God's nature, better, of one
manifestation f God - God as personality. If man tries to
reac:. ~iod through theology, metaphysics, or psychology, he
will Come to the unfathomable .
'
If, as in mysticism,
'you deny tie life of things .. .you stand before nothing-
ness, if you hallow this life you meet the living God.'
(iTh p, 79) 'God is the being that is directly, most near-
ly, and lastingly, over against us, but may properly be
addressed, not expressed.' (Ibid. pp. 80-81 ) He is 'nearer
to me than ry I.' (Ibid. p. 79 ) 'God is the- "wholly Other,"
but he is also the waolly Game, the wholly Present
.. *he is
the oyp teriur. Ire^enaur .... the mystery of the self-evident.'
(loc. cit.)
Magic however, v/ith. its desire to use and possess
God, all forms of gnosis which attempt to do away with all
riddles and contradictions of life, as well as the acceptance
of traditional douinas and laws as 'once for all,' and
mysticism wl th its endeavour to achieve union with God -
all do not meet the real God, for all prevent man from say-
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lnS t^lou to God in the concrete of everyday life. They
effect a detrimental duallnm between the religious lifo
and the life in the world. Mysticism in its complete noglect
0i tLj<3 world
-* the Gnosis of theology and philosophy, and
social science with its exclusively reflective and contemplative
attitude towards dad, and pseudorellgion in its preoccupa-
tion with false symbols, ill disregard any concern with
the world. Consequently, all evaluations in most fields
o- human enterprise are made apart from the religious life -
supposedly the relationship with God. Morality
,
by this is
meant the distinction of good and evil in the moral sense,
as well as good and bad in the natural sense, la cut off
from religion completely.
If any connection with the truly religious is retained,
then it is done so by dogmatic religions only through tra-
ditional supernatural (revealed) laws which have really
become independent from the absolute and been reduced 'to
a mere symbolic-ritual requirement which may be adequately
satisfied in the cultic sphere.' (AX p. 15) Or else they
have ’degenerated into a human convention' (loc, cit.
)
which,
in turn, is adhered to slavishly rather than being considered
general guides of action, requiring an ever new interpreta-
tion in each new concrete situation in life. They have
lost their religious (dialogical) character and retained
only the normative one.
Since any genuine personal relationship to the real
living God 1 s lacking in all those pseudorellglons described
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above, the philosophical doctrine that the absolute
manifests itself in the universal can creep easily also
into ethical doctrines. Ethical laws, then, lose their
connection to actual religious experiences and to revelation
even as far as their origin is concerned. They are now only
human conventions - in addition to the fact that they, too,
like degenerated traditional moral laws, are crutches for
people v^ho want to live in the pseudo
-security of the ’once
for all, preventing them from the primary relationship with
man and the world. Consequently
,
also, from entering into
an I- Thou relationship with God, since the meeting with
God requires the meeting with men and the world in the
lived concreteness, uniqueness and presentness of the human
and natural Thou, The god of the theologians, philosophers,
magicians, and mystics, however, is not met in the lived
concreteness, he is not met at all. Although their ’rela-
tion 1 to God is more exclusive than that of the cialogical
man, since man and the world do not interfere with this
’relation,’ it is much less inclusive as far as the genuine
meeting with God is concerned, ior, inclusiveness and ex-
clusiveness in one’s relation to Goa go together, uvery
Thou in this worlo is a pointer towards God. There are no
short cuts.
The rtolipimia and -jocular ( wthlc 1 ) LI fa Second on an-
other for Their Authenticity
The foundation of the problem which Buber pesos -
the alternative between a life In dialogue which ia the
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Eood life, or a life ln isolation, in an I-lt rolation-
Bhlp to th® worla
> Man, and 3ocl, which la evil - i E> ln
the end, the question of the relationship of religion and
Eoralitj (ethica). Since, for Buber, people's concept of
6ood and evil underlies, ultimately, to come extent al-
most all evaluation and consequently, almost all decision
In all fields of human activity, the problem of the
dichotomy of the life ln spirit, l.e. the religious life,
and this life in the world, including all disciplines of
knowledge, is basically a problem of the connection be-
tween ethics and religion.
vt this point the relationship of Buber’s doctrine of
evil and. his idea of the ideal relationship between ethics
and .religion (which I shall expound In more detail in the
last section of the present chapter) may be clearer. Since
’evil, 1 for Buber, is lack of relation, and relation, if
it is genuine, is always directed towards God via men and
ti.e world, the traditional split of religion - as concerned
exclusively with ’God,’ and. ethics - as Independent from
religion and concerned only with man and the world by way
of a ’once for all’ pseudo
-relation, falls itself into the
category of evil and consequently, has to be rejected and
replaced by a religion Intimately related to ethics (defined
as the basis of all of man’s life).
Religion apart from ethics, In form of magic, mysticism,
Gnosis, or dogmatic cult, is not ’real’ religion any lon-er,
for it cannot involve the whole of man’s existence in its
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relation to the absolute, but only one aspect. Since
dialogue requires the giving with the wholeness of one's
being to Gog and the world, the separation of ethics (taken
in its broadest sense) and religion, of the ’living in-
God' from tile 'living in the world’ is ultimately a big
obstruction to the life of dialogue.
ti’-i-
i
.c-nt'vl . .u'cc to of the Lack of Ltalo "ue -
^
^
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:/ 1X2L. Chaaia Between the Hell -lens and V/orldlvLife - in Our M.q "
—
1 1
In our modern time, says Buber, the chasm between
religion and the worldly life has grown huge. For modern
man, religion has become a little aspect of life, rather
than its totality. The radical absence of true relation
resulting from this dichotomy - in Buber's eyes the prim-
ary evil - has manifested itself in many negative ways
today
:
In general, it constitutes a real threat to the lived
concrete 'in its unforseeablenese and its irrecoverableness,
in which alone genuine relation i3 possible. (EG p, 35)
Theology turns temporal facta into symbols; mysticism pro-
claims that all experience can be had at one; dogmatism
deprives new situations of their uniqueness; gnosis denies
all the problematic of the concrete moment, and philosophy
abstracts it from reality.
These extrareligious, better, pseudoreligious elements
exert not only active influence on the secular life, but
also passive Influence insofar as they cause the absence of
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genuine religion for which they are a substitute. Freedom,
sayp Buber, today Is sought for its own sake without the
necessary responsibility accompanying it, the responsibil-
ity springing only from a personal relationship to God.
Purposelessness has become a problem, Hirough the influence
of gnosticism which tries to overrun the realities of life,
the belief prevails that good ends justify the use of bad
means. This, in Buber’s eyes, is a gross distortion of
the trutf
. For wherever there is a separation of means from
endE man’s I-Thou relation to God, man, and the world, is
in danger. For, a means, apart from its ends, by definition
is an object of X-It. Today even people, since genuine
relation among them is absent, ai'e used as means to further
ends, whether on the individual or national level. Especially
in work this separation of means from ends has resulted in
most detrimental effects on the life of man? modern man
often performs dull mechanical work which is only a pre-
liminary step to, and thus removed from, the final product
of a chain of jobs. The attitude towards one’s work has
become that of I-It. Lack of responsibility makes men
strive for power, whether this be done in politics or
psychology or elsewhere. People deal with eaci other, even
help each other, without entering into real relation with
one another. Help is often purely technical, and, as it
occurs in education and psychotherapy now and then, a means
for domination.
Real conversation between people has become rare.
Actual monologues are disguised as dialogues. People do
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no t really have each other In mind when they talk to one
another, but rather, abstract and general opponents,
fictitious partners. hen no longer really desire to commun-
icate anything to the other or to learn from the other.
The only desire is to exert a dominating influence on the
othtr through which one’s self-reliance is strengthened.
There is no real desire to search in the other’s personal-
ity - one knows already everything about the other, because
one looks only for what fits into one’s picture of the part-
ner. All mystery between man and man has dissolved. Only
a reductive, analytic, and derivative glance passes between
man and man* host nubile discussions are not real dialogues
.'lain
-^-It talk wnich tries to win the opponent for
some cause, People are not addressed as unique persons
and in their wholeness, but are thrown in categories and
treated as specifications of those. Psychological and socio-
logical theories of ’seeing through’ have become the victim
of oversimplification and unjustified reduction on account
of their detached I-It way of seeing man. Social scientists
do not enter 1 to relationships with people tut attempt
to remain ’objective’ in their observation. This, Buber
feels, cannot yield anything but a distorted picture of man.
All science, social ae well as natural, has become exclusively
an enterprise of I-It, a constant severing of relation into
two parts - an object that is scrutinized by a completely
independent subject, i.e. of man from the world and his
fellow-men. ’The divorce between spirit and instincts’ whlc
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has driven whole peoples into a pathological condition,
too ie nothing but a ’consequence of the divorce between
man and man .
*
If religion is cut off from life, if the act of faith
is aubjectivieed and God becomes only a small aspect of
one s life, then, Buber holds, the social and political
bonds between people lose all their strength. The conse-
quence of the resulting lack of dialogue is, in turn, a
basic mistrust among men. lJian, however, needs confirmation.
Since he cannot find it in true community - which alone
can give satisfactory confirmation - he seeks it somewhere
else - In collectives or through himself. These two types
of confirmation correspond to two types of social movement
which have arisen in consequence of the dominance of the
I-It relation among people in the world - individualism
and collectivism, teal community, based on true dialogue,
is substituted by centralized states and collectives, by
clubs, trade unions, parties, etc. Individualism and collec-
tivism are alike in that both do not know true responsibility
in genuine dialogue. Consequently the security and confirmation
they yield is a pseudo-security. While collectivism ’aims...
at reducing, neutralizing, devaluating, and desecrating
every bond with living beings,’ (BKM p, 201) individualism
leads to subjectivism which usually ends in atheism or
some kind of private pseudoreligion
,
combined with a rela-
tive cation of values - thus preferring complete absence of
relation to the pseudo-relation of collectivism.
-57-
rh'i-o, and much more, Is the consequence of man's turn-
ins away from God, of the split between religion, the life
with Goo, and the life in this world. It is an 'eclipse
oj. God* which leaves man in a chaos created by himself.
Gnce God is shut off, the I-It starts to grow into huge
dimensions, for without 'God, no genuine relation of man
to his fellow-men and the world is possible. 'In our age,'
writes Buber,
the I-It relation, gigantically swollen, has usurped,
practically uncontested, the mastery and the rule".
The I of this relation, an I that possesses all,
makes all, succeeds with all, this I that is un ble
to say Ihou, unable to meet a being essentially, is
the lord of the hour. This selfhood that has be-
come omnipotent, with all the It around it, con
naturally acknowledge neither God nor any genuine
absolute which manifests itself to men as of non-
hu pin origin. It steps in between and shuts off
fror us the light of heaven. (Ibid, p. 129)
What is the most tragic aspect of this 'eclipse of
God' is the 'silence of God,' the 'hardening' of God Him-
self in answer to man’s constant turning away from Him.
Yet, 'the eclipse of the light of God is no extinction.'
Yee 'the I- Thou relation has gone into the catacombs,' but
'who can say with how much greater power it will step forth...
£ven to-morrow that which has stepped in between may give
way.' (loc. cit. ) ' The truth is that precisely at such
a time the great return and repentance which God. expects
of us becomes possible, in order that the redemption which
He desires for us, be a true self-redemption.' (S*SK p. 116)
III. the fcdenotlon o f Evil
Hed?iP-tlon of Ml ie ’ Umkehr * ( furninr ) to God
3ince evil is raan’s turning away from God, redemption
of evil is ultimately the turning back of man towards God,
the gaining of direction as indicated by his conscience,
the meeting of God and his creati n in true responsibility
in the lived concrete. The actual redemption of evil is
not effected by man, but by God’s grace, let it is up to
man to initiate the redemption by going out into life and
meeting Goa with his whole being - then He will cone to us
ana. t Is meeting will mean our salvation,
Ihe beginning and the beginning alone is Placed into
O' e i and.& o ; men. But it ±
a
placed in thci
. .'’innly
make a beginning and at once' you will set all about
you, in the very circle of your personal activity,
all kinds of threads. You will have to n*rasr> but*'
a
single one of them and it will be, if God wills It,
the right r<ne. (F3H pp. 902-203)
ton, however, does not have the power to invoke Goa’s grac
by definite acts* God’s grace is unattainable, yet not
self-withholding, ton must first act and then, if the act
was successful, he will know that God has carried him,
ton's action, however, is as real In the act of redemption
as God's grace. But yet, they are not part-causes either,
’ton’s action,’ says Friedman for Buber, ’and God’s grace
are subsumed under the greater reality of the meeting be-
tween God anc man.' (fried p. 133)
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Thi8 turnln^ Awards God must not be confused with
•repentance,' for this would be 'a misleading attempt to
psychologize.’ What the 'turning' really refers to
of the !°f?
thl
u
S ?
hich haPP®ns In the secret recessessoul, showing itself outwardly only in Itsconsequences" and ^effects;" It is something whichhprena in the immediacy of the reality between manan,. Goo..
.
.It is as little a "uayehic" we it as isa man a birth or death; it comes u^on the whole'
XS carried out by the whole person, and doesnot occur a? & man s self-intercourse, but as the olainrealx ty o.t primal mutuality. (IU p. 20)
fhe ’turning’ towards God arises when 'despair shatters
the prison wiich imprisons our latent energies.' Then the
'sources of the primordial depths begin to flow’ and man
turns with his whole being to God reaching, out for His
hand by wt ich he lets himself be pulled up. (FSH p. 116)
fiuc .Redemption uu 1 be uecer. iticn O'l if and not r ror. ovil
Ihc turning towards God has to be all-inclusive, con-
sequently, it has to include evil as well as good. Other-
wise the turning is deprived of its force. This, however,
does not mean that the dialogic man has to accept evil as
it is, but only that his attitude towards it must not
be one of complete unconcern.
It^is no more allowed to any man to live as if evil
did not exist. One cannot serve God by merely avoiding
evil; one must grapple wit* it. (Hasidism p. 29)
'This very world,’ says Buber in Israel and the World
.
this very contradiction, unabridged, unmitigated, un-
amoothea, unsimplified, unreduced, this w rid shall
be - not overcome - but consummated.
, .It Is a redemp-
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CTl1, tat
— as the ^wer whlob
0ur turning towards God has to be done with all our
pasoi ns, wu.ich Keans that man, In order to redeem evil,
must not deny or disregard his evil Impulses, but he must
transform them into good ones, giving direction to them,
direction towards God. Our passions and our powers of phan-
tasy are not bad by nature, they are evil only if they are
undirected. But if given right direction, - and. only if
given proper direction, since paaelon is a necessary
element in all successful deeds, - can real good result
from ran ’ s life. God wants to embrace Bit whole creation
and not only part of it. Man, therefore, cannot achieve
salvation by trying to fight and extinguish evil, but by
fighting it, defeating it, and - rather than killing it -
turning it around into God’s direction, thus turning it
into good. Our phantasy must not be stopped but actualized,
instead of letting it remain pure phantasy which ultimately
will lead to the sin of indecision. i£ven the worst idols
’we must not simply overthrow* but ’in each cf these
images we must seek to discover what divine quality' we
sought in them. (F3H p. 117)
Heal dialogue does not mean the keeping of the light
pure by removing it as far from the dark as possible, that
is, it does not mean ’redemption from evil,’ but it is con-
cerned with casting light onto darkness and helping it to
pierce it, that is, it deals v/lth the redemption of evil.
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Our mission, says Yehudi in For the Sake of Heaven ,
is not to the realms in which dwells the purity of holi-
ness; it is to the unholy that we must pay attention so
that it find redemption and become whole.' (FSh p. 117)
The great danger is that the evil impulse continually
separates Itself from its companion, the good urge, 'and
/.that the latter/" in this condition of independence makes
an idol of precisely that which was intended to serve
him. Man's task therefore, is not to extirpate the evil
urge, but to reunite it with the good.' (IGE pp. 40-41)
The evil urge and the good urge have to be brought to-
gether 'beneath the yoke,’ (Ibid. p. 41) Only this way do
we 'equip the absolute potency of passion with the one
direction that renders it capable of great love and of
great service. Thus and not otherwise can man become whole.'
(Ibid. p. 42) Thus 'the evil urge must also be included in
the love of God.' (Ibid. p. 41)
The totality of man's passions was created by God
for its potential use for Him. Man has to attempt to
find out what the unique task is that God wants him to
perform with these urges. The way to fulfil his vocation
is revealed to him by his conscience, i.e. by the essential,
not casual, quality of his inclinations.
As the totality of one's inner life - good and evil
urges, as well as 'imagery' - has to be included in the
turning towards God, so the totality of man's environment -
really nothing else but the counterpart of his inner life,
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th® ob<3ect of eood and evil impulses, and of his phan-
tasy - in short, everything man meets in its concreteness -
has to be included in his dialogue with God.
IdjOm in ’holy. Insecurity ’ and in
uenuine relation demands the acceptance of every
concrete situation which man confronts .This supreme prin-
ciple of the truly religious man, which does not allow
ior any convenient selection among the situations he meets,
places man in a position of insecurity. Buber's religion,
although comprising a belief in the redemption of evil,
is in no sense a cult of reassurance. Just as the prophets
of Israel 'have always aimed to shatter all security and
to proclaim in the opened abyss of the final insecurity the
un-wlshed-for God who demands that His human creatures
become real,' (EG p. 73) so to Buber, any kind of reli-
gious security is repugnant. Instead he preaches a 'holy
insecurity,’ a life on the 'narrow ridge.’ 'Oh you
secure and safe ones,' he exclaims,
you who hide yourselves behind the ramparts of the
law so that you will not have to look into G d's
abyss I Yes, you have secure ground under your feet,
while we hang suspended looking out over the end-
less deeps. But we would not exchange our diz^y
insecurity and poverty for your security and abun-
dance... of God's will we know only the eternal;
the temporal we must command for ourselves, ourselves
imprint his wordless bidding ever anew on the stuff
of reality. (Herberg, op, cit., p. 19, from her
Heill^e Vveg pp. 67-68
)
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The man who tries to deny this 'holy insecurity
'
,
who shuts himself off from meeting the world in its
problematic contradictoriness, who avoids the ever fresh
and exacting response in the concrete situations of life,
has to set up religious dogmas, philosouhic systems, a.
set of personal values and habits, in order to achieve
security, which of course is only pseudo-security. He
falls into individualism or clings to collectivism in
order to find confirmation, and soon he ends up in blind
fear and hyst >ria since a perfect 'protection* against
the unpredictability of the future moment can never be
found. The religious man, n the other hand, pref-rs the
'holy insecurity* of the 'ever anew' in true dialogue,
he prefers the meeting of every new situation with the
whole of his being - although this is done vrith fear be-
fore the riddles and problems of ev ry new me tir : - to
a pseudo-security and reality-phobia.
A counterpart of the blind fear of the non-religicus
man is the 'fear of God* of the religious man, a fear
wh ch results from the state of the 'holy insecurity*.
The religious essence of religion, says Buber, 'is the
certainty that the meaning of existence is open and
accessible in the actual lived concrete, not above the
struggle with reality, but in it.' However, Buber is fast
to say,
that meaning is open and accessible in the actual
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llveo concrete does not mean It Is to bp wnnpossessed through any ty> e of analytical or syntheticinvestigation or through any type of reflectionupon the lived concrete. Keanlng to te experiencedliving action and suffering itself, in the
reduced immediacy of the moment.
. .Only he reaches themeaning who stands firm, without holding back orreservation, before the whole might of reality andanswers it in a living way. He is ready to confirm
'
"
lo iiie t e meaning he has attained, (EG p, 35)
It is from this unquestioned acceptance of every concrete
situation, involving problems and suffering, that the
fear of God' of the religious man springs. ’It comes
into existence’ for the first time ’when our existence...
becomes incomprehensible and uncanny, when all security
is shattered through the mystery,’ (Ibid, p. 36) a
mystery which is not only relative, that is, ’inaccessible
only to the present state of human knowledge and hence
in principle discoverable,’ but it is the essential
mystery in its unknowableness and ’inscrutableness.’ (loc.
cit,
)
When man 'henceforth accepts the situation as given
him by the Giver,' he has to accept it in shattered security
as a mystery. ’Everyday.
. .is henceforth hallowed as the
place in which he has to live with the mystery,' This is
what Biblical religion calls 'fear of God,’ With it, 'all
religious reality begins,' (loc. cit.)
fear of God does, thus, not mean 'to be afraid of God'
as one is afraid of evil, but it means man's awareness
’of his incomprehensibility. Fear of God is the creaturely
knowledge of the darkness to which none of our spiritual
powers can reach,. .out of which God reveals himself,' and
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Which we have t0 and endure in all the concreteness
of life. For that reason 'fear of God* night also he
called ’beginning of knowledge.* (IW p. 31) Fear of God
is the fear of the unexpected demands and addresses which
we encounter in everyday life ana which come from the un-
fathomable God, It is man's enduring *in the face of God
the reality of lived life, dreadful and ineoisrrehenslble
,
*
(EG p. 37)
'Buber has no patience with the self-deluding
sentimentalists who like to conjure away all that is fear-
ful in the divine.
* (Berbers, op. cit,, p. 18) A god who
isn’t met with fear is an idolatrous god. ' The real God
is, to begin with, dreadful and incomprehensible,
* (EG
pp. 36-37) for He shatters man’s self-sufficiency and
security, and confronts him with the contradictoriness of
life and the mystery of suffering and evil.
* Fear f God 1 Is the Gate to 1 Love of God ’
The 'fear of God,' says Buber,. - that is, the accep-
tance of every concrete situation as given to us by an
lncom rehen Bible, unfathomable, therefore dreadful, God -
'is the dark gate through which ^wan/" must t ass if he is
to enter into the love of God.' (Ihr p. 31 ) Love which does
not also comprise fear is idolatrous. 'He who begins with
the Love of God without having previously experienced the
fear of God, loves an Idol which he himself has made, a
god whom it is easy enough to love,’ (EG p* 36 )
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0 *lsh®s to avoid passing through this iate • ey:o begins oo provide himself with a'"comprehensibleG?°» constructed thus and not otherwise/ runs the
?: having to despair of doc in view of the"actualities o history and life, or of falling in +oIrne/ falsehood. Only through the fear of God does
into the love of God that he cannot
of it. (IW p. 31)
nan enter so deep
again be cast out
Arc in i_o r tne Sake o f Heaven Bober write? :
It is dreadful, dreadful, dreadful i Bread is thegateway to Him, There is no path to Him save through
t.t*i b somber gate. Only he who has vone through thatgate can truly love Him, Him. and In the manner in
which only He can be loved. (FSB p. 46 )
Fear of God, however, is only a gate and not a dwelling,
as so’ c theologians believe. Fear must flow over Into
love. Although God Is incomprehensible,’ ’he can be
known through a bond of mutual relationship.’ And although
he cannot b© fathomed by knowledge,
, .he can be imitated,*
(IW p. 3D
It is thus only through fear of God that we can
achieve love of God, and by the resulting union of fear
and love realize that both good and evil flow ultimately
from God, from His love, the holiness which is contained
in every concrete situation simply is a ’power capable of
exerting both a destructive and hallowing effect,' depend-
ing on how man meets it. 'The encounter with this holiness
is, therefore, a source of danger to man.’ For those who,
like Jacob, Abraham, and Moses, 'stand the test,., the danger
is turned into grace.' For those who don't, it is a curse.
(Fried p. 253) This is man’s predicament.
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rrorn this ambiguity of every concrete situation it
follows that, when it was said above that the fear of God
Implies the unquestioned acceptance of every concrete situ-
ation, this did not mean that every situation has to be
acc®rted as it is, and approved of in its pure factuality.
No
,
nan
raah » rather, declare the extremes t. enmity toward
this happening and treat its Vivenness"'' as onlyintended to draw forth his opposing force. Buthe will not. remove himself from the concrete situa-
tion as i t actually is ... Whether field of work or
field of battle, he accepts the Mace in which he
is placed, e knows no floating of the stirit
above the concrete reality; to "him even the sub-
lirest spirituality is an Illusion If it is not
bound to the situation. (EG pp. 37-38)
One’s attitude towards evil net in the outside world
should
,
thus, be similar to one’s attitude towards one’s
inner evil urges and ’imagery.’ Evil must not be discard-
ed but transformed into good. And this, like the trans-
formation of evil urges, which cannot take place within the
human e ul alone, requires relation, Man
,
in his endeavour
to penetrate the impure with the pure, evil with good, thus
stands in between the man who in self-righteousness avoids
evil ant. the me who accepts it unconditionally, (fried p, 139)
Life then, should be a turning with one's whole being
towards God and His creation. It means the realization of
our vocation by God. This is true love. Love of God is not
possible without loving also Ms creation, and vice versa.
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For, to love God really means to Imitate Him in His love
towards hi* creation. We have to love His creation to-
wards Him. (Fried p. 1>3) This true love of God's creation*
however* is not a general love of humanity and of nature
in general
*
but love for the particular individual through
loving act. .on* love of the concrete situations in life. (BMM
F* 57 • i}'v en ’evil,' God wants us to love as a possible good.
Everything In this world, the whole of God f s creation,
ultimately is to be included in the holy. The final aim
of redemption is the removal of the differentiation be-
tween the profane and the holy, it la 'all-sanctification*
'
Everything awaits being hallowed by man. Nothing is 'simply
and irreparably profane.'
The
profane is... only a designation for the not yet
sanctified.
, .Everything physical, all drives and
urges and desires, everything creaturely, is
material for sanctification. From the very same
passionate powers which, undirected, give* rise to
evil, when they are turned toward God^ the good
arises. One does not serve God with the spirit
only, but with the whole of his nature, without
any subtractions. (IW p. J4)
Whatever is hallowed in the name of God is sanctified.
'Hallowing transforms the urges by confronting them with
holiness and makin,- them rcsrousl tie toward, what is holy,'
(Ibid. p. ISO) i.e. by giving them right direction. This
'giving of direction' can mean an actual change of object
of desire or a transformation of the desire leaving the
same object. Then objects of desire - which could be sinful
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such as the purposeless killing of a sheep - if they and
our relationship to there is hallowed in relation to our
relationship with God and fellow-men
- need not be re-
nounce. Even the doing of evil, as far as it is necessary
for the preservation of our life, can become sanctified if
it i 8 hallowed and done with responsibility
. And with ,
respect to evil in the world independent of our desires,
especially with regard to the evil in o tier people, God
gave us a mouth which can convey the truth of ourheart to an alien heart and a hand which can commun-icate to the hand of our recalcitrant brother some-
r * wsrath of our very blood* it is forthis that He has mace us capable of loving the sons
of Satan* ( FSH p. 121)
riepein - ti'. n of Evil Require s the Bridging of the Chasm
hetwee l th 1 c s and Religion ~*a—
The redemption of evil might also be expressed in
terms of the relationship between ethics and religion.
As already pointed out above, evil in this world arises
due to an unhappy split between the 'living with God’
(religion) and the 'living with the world' (ethics - taken
in its broadest meaning as being the basis of all value
Judgements and all decisions). It follows that the redemp-
tion of evil would mean a new interrelationship of religion
and ethics, of the 'living with God' and the 'living with
the world
.
1
'-llpinati of All Pseudo rell; ions
To this end, a radical elimination of all pseudoreli-
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Slon s has to be achieved: magic, mysticism, dogmatism, and
the gnosis of theology and psychology. These reduce reli-
gion to an aspect of life rather than making it its total-
ity
,
thus making any genuine I- Thou relationship to God
impossible since this would require the hallowing of both
God, and men and the world. As a result of this split be-
tween the religious and the secular spheres in life, and
the lack of true responsibility and true decision, these
pseudoreligions roust lead either - as in a few cases - to
moral autonomy, to complete individualism or - as they
usually do - to an outspoken moral heteronomy accepting
the lavs of the society - whether these are traditional
laws of revelation (as especially in dogmatism, with its
pseudo-relation to God in form of a cult as an ally) or
self-created laws of society (although this implies moral
autonomy from the viewpoint of society, from the practical
viewpoint of the individual, however, this is heteronomy) —
with which they guide their extra-religious actions, the
secular life.
Against Koral Autonomy and Koral heteronomy
Buber sympathizes with neither moral autonomy, nor
moral heteronom,
,
for they both are incompatible with his
dialogical principle with its emphasis on wholeness, decision,
presentnese, and uniqueness, l oral autonomy is only 'freedom
of’ and not 'freedom for,' thus denying genuine dialogue
and true turning with one's whole being. Moral heteronomy,
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on the other hand, takes away all genuine free decision
and responding toward the concrete and unique situations
in life. ’The narrow ridge between the two,' Friedman well
summarizes Buber, ’is a freedom that means freedom to
respond, and a responsibility that means both address from
without and free response from within.* {Fried p. 199 )
horal absolutists consider values as absolute, over-
looking the fact that values are always values for a oer-
son ratuer than for an absolute, independent existent,
and therefore cannot have universal validity for every-
body in every situation. Moral relativists or 'subjectivists'
reduce all values to the subjective interest of individuals
or cultural groups, rendering the 'is' and the 'ought'
identical, and therefore e iminating the normative element,
the characteristic element of morality, from all moral laws,
since it is identical with the objective fact. (Ibid, pp, 200-
201 )
As a result of this absolute freedom given to the
individual to do what he desires, Individual Relativism -
whether in form of atheistic nihilism or accompanied by a
pseudoreligion which is cut off from the ethical domain -
leads into severe totalitarianism and collectivism, since
the individual cannot bear the insecurity of the complete
absence of norms, hence it leads again into moral heteronomy.
'Thus,' writes Friedman, 'whether the I or the It, the
subjective or the objective is stressed, the failure to see
moral problems in terms of the relation of the I-Thou ends
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in the submission of the I to the world of It.' (Ibid, p, p0a)
Buber, with his dialogical philosophy cuts beneath the
distinction between moral heteronoray and moral autonomy
by walking on the ‘narrow ridge’ in between. Values, for
Buber, do not exist apart from the deciding person, yet
they cannot be reduce; to his personal interests either,
since they are bound to the concrete, God-given situation.
They lie in between the I and the Thou, i.e. in the relation
of the I to tie Thou, which, in turn, is one of genuine
responsibility, 71th this, the split between the moral
absolutists and the cultural relativist is overcome.
From the above, another step follows logically: the
bridging o' the chasm between ethics and religion. According
to the above description, Buber’s ethic is a ’situational
eti.ic of responsibility.’ (Herberg, op. clt., p, 20) But
this ’responsibility presupposes one who addresses me
primarily, that is, from a realm independent of myself,
and to whom I am answerable.’ ( BKM p, 45) The One Who
addresses is God. Now, since In every concrete situation
there is an element of the divine, a genuine response to
any concrete situation, that is a genuine I-Thou relation-
ship with it - thus also to the ethical situation - must
include God, Since the ’ethical situation,’ too, is an
address coming from God, a genuine I-Thou relation with tt
will also be a relation to God; since God is the eternal
Thou in Whom all ’parallel lines of relation meet,’ all
genuine ethical decisions are at the same time religious
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decislons
. The ethical now is bound up with the religious,
toe chasm between ethics and religion is overbridged*
iraditional Laws arc only General Guides for Acti
— ge-Interpreted in' ever • Concrete~lITFtq
on
lon
Accordingly, as the ethical is bound up with the
religious, moral laws, for Buber, as handed down by tra-
ditional religion, even if revealed, cease to be convenient
once-for-all' principles which deprive responsibility and
spontaneity. Ii used in a 'once-for-all' way, they hinder
man fron entering into genuine I
-Thou relationships with
God, creating a pseudo-security which covers the actual
problematic and mystery of every concrete situation, the
uniqueness and irrevocableness, which, in turn, requires
a unique and 'ever anew' response.
I appreciate the "ob jeetive" com actness of dogma,
but behind /it/ there lies in wait the.,.war against
the situation s power of dialogue, there lies in
wait the "once-for-all" which resists the unforseeable
moment
. Dogma, even when its claim of origin remains
uncontested, has become the raoet exalted form of
invulnerability against revelation. Revelation
will tolerate no perfect tense, but man with the
arts of his craze for security props it up to
perfection. (Ibid. p. 18)
Buber renders moral laws only general guides, placing
the emphasis on the present and the concrete, rather than
on the past and the universal. Universale, although once
revealed, must be understood as symbolic expressions of the
concrete dialogic situation, (Fried p. 204) They may at
best be suggestions and guides of action, but the real de-
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cision must come from one's apprehension of the concrete
situation in its uniqueness, Universals may be pointers to
the Absolute, but I Te is found actually only in the lived
concrete. The ethical decision, thus, docs not start with
tho absolutely valid ethical code arid then applies it to
the concrete situation, but it starts in the concrete
situation, the response to which :is, with respect tc the
ethical laws, at best a unique interpretation of these
ethical codes, which certain most closely to the situation,
(None do so completely, in most cases).
The idea of responsibility is to be brought back
from the province of specialized ethics, of an
"ought” that sw ngs free in the air, into t nt of
lived life. Genuine responsibility exists only where
there is re 1 responding. (BMM p. 16)
Whoever really unde s ands the nature of the I-Thou rel tion
to God and His creation will find that all traditional
values are implied in it. In the end, thus, writes Bubor,
3io responsible person remains a stranger to norms.
But the corns .and inherent in a genuine norm never
becomes a maxim and the fulfilment never a habit.
Any command that a reat character takes to himself
in the course of his development does not act in him
as part of his consciousness or as material for
building up his exercises, but remains latent in a
basic layer of his substance until it reveals itself
to him in a concrete way. What it has to tell him is
revealed whenever a situation arises which demands of
him a solution of w ich till then he had perhaps no
idea. . .Maxims command only in the third person, the
each and the none... 4/The concrete situation/ demands
nothing of what is past. It demands presence, espon-
sibility; it demands you. (Ibid. p. 1l'*v)
Moral laws, in other words, besides being normative, must
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also be dialogical, i.e. religious, in character. Values
are thus not simply imposed on us, yet they are also not
self-created, Invented* Values are discovered in the con-
crete situation* 'One can believe in and accept a meaning
or value,* says Buber in connection with Sartre's claim
of the atheistic self-creation of values,
one can set it as a guiding light over one's 3ifeif one has discovered it, not if one has invented it.
xt can be for me an illuminating meaning, a direction-
gj.vi.ng value, only if it has been revealed to me in
my meeting with Being, not if I have freely cho soni - far myself from among the existing possibilities
and pernaps have in addition decided with some
lellcw-creaturos. This shall be valid from cow on.
V c>G p . /0 )
In nis plea for values as discovered in the concrete
situation, Buber also warns against 'false absolutes'
wnich pooale now and then believe to h- ve received from
God directly, as plans of action, like Kierkegaard who
(-.alsol^i ) tnought tnat cod. w ntecx him tc sacrifice Regina as
He (actually) had wanted Abraham to sacrifice his son I~asc.
These •suspension^' of the ethical,* feels Buber, are to be
avoided, since it is usually not God Who reveals them, but
one of his 'apes,* Moloch, who prompts them.
Immediacy of one’s relationship to God is necessary,
but God is met directly only in the lived, concrete, Man,
thus, must escape from the modern idolatry w ich leads too
readily tc the 'suspension of the et leal* (universal) on
account of ’false absolutes.
'
In the realm of Moloch honest men lie and compassion-
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ethical responsibility,* in its broadest meaning, is
thus, in t:.e last analysis, a readiness to answer God's
words in the lived moment of existence. The religious and
the ethical (as equated with secular) life merge.
Every moral demand is set forth as one that shall
.raise ma
,
the human people, to the sphere where
the ethical merges into the religious, or rather
where the difference between the ethical an the
religious is suspended in the breathing-space of
the divine. (Ibid, p, 104)
This fusion, however, ap lies totally only to the
ethical, since it is nly part of the religious, better,
corresponds only to a part of the religious realm*
Religion has this advantage over morality, that it
is a phenomenon and not a postulate. The reality of
morality, the demand of the demander, has a place
in religion, but the reality of religion, the un-
conditioned being of the demander, has no place in
morality, Religion/ is more actual and inclusive.[Bm p. 18)
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Ethics, iwfcer says, 'is an Inherent function of religion.’
(E3 p. 107) This, however, does not diminish the value
of the ethical life. For it Is only through It, and In
companionship with it, that our religious life becomes
authentic. Only In the concrete do we meet the eternal
Thou. And in order that this responding to the concrete
situations of life be preserved, we must aim at the elimin-
ation of all pseudoreligions which separate their 'God* -
vo lea Is a pseudo-goc, an Idol - and man’s relation to him -
which is a pseudo-relation, - from the worldly life: magic,
mysticism, ritualistic dogmatism, and all forms of Gnosis.
By virtue of their pseudo-relation to God, these pseudo-
rellgions try to evade the responsibilities in the existen-
tial dialogue of life, ending up with a structure of fixed
laws, rules, orders, programs, values, standards, etc.,
which stand between them and the concrete situation, and
which decide for the individual rat; er than leaving the
decision to the person. Whether pseudoreligions are
followed by the lack of genuine relation to the world or
whether the escape from the responding in the lived concrete
is followed by the establishment of a pseudorelirion
,
is
hard to say , Probably both directions of development occur.
Atheism with its moral autonomy has, like pseudoreliglona,
with the moral l eteronomy usually connected to them, to be
rejected on similar grounds.
God is found, and with this, evil redeemed, only by
way of an I-Thou relationship to fellow-men and the world.
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The alternatives are thus not religion and morality
(whether In form f moral autonomy or moral heteronomy)
but religion combined with morality and thus wedded to the
concrete in which the Absolute manifests Itself. ( C f. Fried
p. 206)
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SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
Buber’s fight against de-personalization and
V^rdinglichp^g through the predominance of the 1-It over
the I-Thou finds an essential application also in his
oocictl pKilosophy • Since the gem ine life of dialogue,
for Buber, comprises man*® true relationship to God, as
well as to men and the world, he feels that man can fully
realize his vocation only in a true community, for only
in it is true dialogue possible*
Buber holds that 'tc the essential Thou on the level
of self-being* there corresponds the category of the
essential on the level of relation ’to a host of men* 1
(BMM p. 1 75) Just as the primitive Thou precedes the
awareness of individuality out of which the essential Thou
grows
,
so the primitive We precedes the awareness of sep-
arateness from which only afterwards the essential Vie
springs when independent individuals enter into relation#
ships*
The Thou, says Buber, includes tho We potentially.
’Only men who are capable of truly saying Thou to one
another can truly say he with one another,’ (Ibid. p. 176)
and thr s form a true community. True co munity, thus -
although it c not be reduced to a comple jC sy tern of
personal I-Thou relationships between particular indivi-
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duals - la based on the I-Thou
v/ith one another, it virtually
relation of concrete people
emerges out of the I-Thou,
Just as t, c individual becomes a person, writes Buber,
’Insofar as he stops Into a living; relation with other
Individuals' so does the social 'aggregate' become a
community 'Insofar as It Is built out of living units of
relation
.
* (Ibid, p, 203 ) 'And Just as the I of the
authentic personality emerges only In the dialogic "meet-
ing" with Clod to Whom every other Thou points, so does th
authentic Ve of community come forth only out of the indi-
vidual members of the group to the transcendent.' (Herberg,
op. cite, p. 20)
j.he community is built ur out of living mutual relation
^he individual members of the grourZ, but the
Uu-lder ie the living effective Centre, /that is, QodZ.
.
,
^
rue community does not arise through reopie havincrpeeling or one another (though indeed not without it)
but, first, through their taking their stand in living’
mutual relation with a living Centre, and second theirbeing in living mutual relation with one another. Tbe
second has its source in the first, but is not given
‘ (iTh p,
‘ *when the first alorse Is r~ive". AS)
In the end, thus, relationship to God and relationship
to men in true community are inseparable. Neither one
can exist without the other; both are essentially
necessary for man’s full realization.
As already indicated above, the fact that true commun-
ity is based on, and emerges from, the personal relation-
ships among people, does not mean that society is simply
the sum of, or a complex pattern of, dialogical relation-
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ship
s
* T5lis assumption would imply an undue blurring of
tae distinction between the ’social* in general and the
actual dialogical relationships among people. While, indeed,
society would be unthinkable without true dialogical
relationships in it, not everybody in a society has
a direct rel tionship with everybody else in the group to
which he belongs. Society is only a social aggregate of
individuals bound up with each other according to common
interests, needs, circumstances, etc. A1thou ;h personal
relationships are indispensable — and anyway do frequently
occur within the smaller groups of organic communities,
membership in a group does not necessarily imply personal
relationships to the rest of the members.
Rejection of Individualism and Collectivism
With his affirmation of true com unity, Buber
rejects both atomistic individualism and collectivism. ’or
individualism understands only a part of man /phila/
collectivism understands man only os a parts neither
advances to the wholeness of man. Individualism sees
man only in relation to himself, but collectivism
does not see man at all; it sees ’’society". With
the former, man’s face is distorted; with the latter,
it is masked. (BMM p. 200)
Reality, says Buber, is not to be sought in the camps of
either individualism or collectivism but ’between* those
two alternatives - in the relation between man and man.
While for the individualist, interpersonal relations and
society are unessential and derivative, and while for those
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who make society the basic reality the individual is only
of derivative value and interpersonal relationships are
only essentially indirect, l.e., mediated through their
common relation to society, (Fried p, 209) for the
dialogical philosopher the basic reality is the dialogue
between people from which both the individual and the
society are derived and given reality, ’individual 1 (a
man without genuine relations) as well as 'society 1 (a
political order not based on dialogical relations) are for
h Ira abctrac ti one *
fhe fundamental fact of human existence is nett’ er
the individual as sue! nor the aggregate as sucl
.
Lach, considered by itself is a mighty abstraction,
-he individual is a fact of existence insofar as
he steps into a living relation wit! other indivi-
duals. The aggregate is a fact of existence insofar
as it is built up of living units of relation. The
fundamental fact of human existence is man with
man, (Bh? ,; pp. 202-203)
Individualism and Collectivism - Two Forms of Illuaorv
Self-Confirmation
All forms of individualism and collectivism, xdiber
holds, 'however differ nt their causes may be, are essentially
the conclusion or expression of the same human condition,
only at different stages.' (Ibid, p. 200) This condition
is a decline of dialogue either as a result of man's fear
to go out Into the world and meet every situation, or as
an outcome of some kind of pseudoreligion which separates
the 'living with God 1 from the secular life. As a result
of this decline of dialogue, man's basic need for con-
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firmation finds no longer a natural satisfaction. Con-
sequently 'man sets out on one of two false ways i he
seeks to be confirmed either by himself or by a collective
to which he belongs,’ In both cases, however, his under-
taking- is doomed to fail. ’The self-confirmation of him
whom no fellow-raan confirms cannot stand,’ it is illusory.
* With ever more convulsive exertions’ he has to struggle
to save it, but ’ finally he knows himself as inevitably
abandoned,' On the other hand, ’confirmation through the
collective... is pure fiction.’ For although the collective
accepts and employs each of its members as particular
individuals, it does not 'recognize anyone in his own
being.
, * lode 'ende^tly of n i. a usefulness for the collective,’
(xo p, 225 ) The self that is to be confirmed is actually
lost In the collect!viatic submerge. (Kerberg, op. cit., p. 21
han, thus, says Buber, ’insofar as he has surrendered
direct and personal mutuality with Lie fellows, can only
exchange an illusory confirmation for the one that 3.9 lost.
There is no salvation save through the renewal of the dialo-
gical relation.’ (FW p, 225)
Indlvlchuii l a i - o n into Ccllec t ’ vin:
Individualism, Buber holds, when pushed to the
extreme, usually leads over into collectivism. For man,
when he has become solitary through the lack of courage to
live in ’fear of God,* to respond ’ever anew ’ to the problema-
tic, God-given world, becomes ’alien and uncanny, he can no
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longer stand up to the universal forne of present
being; he can no longer truly meet them.’ Consequently
he 'seeks a divine form of being with which, solitary as
he is, he can communicate; he stretches his hands out
beyond the world, to meet this form.' he falls victim to
a pseudoreligion — either self—created or one taken over ~
for, the- saying of the Thou to ' God* without the saying
of the Thou to men and the world is addressing an idol.
Finally, man reaches a condition when he can no
longer stretch his hands out from his solitude to meet
a c.ivlne. for". Tl ft solitude in which he is has become
’colder and stricter than the preceding' ones; that, says
Buber, is the basis of Nietzsche’s saying, 'God is dead.'
(BMK p. 1 £7 } Kan abandons even his idol-god, thus falling
into atheistic existentialism, he now, in order 'to save
himself fro" the despair wi th which his solitary st^te
threatens him.
. , plunge/s7 into an affirmative reflection*
and 'resorts to the expedient of glorifying' his solitary
state. This self-glorification, however, since it is,
like any self-glorification, illusory, ’is not capable
of actually conquering the given situation,' it falls
into the severest form of collectivism, in individualism,
says Buber, ’which has essentially an imaginary basis,'
(Ibid. p. BOO)
the person, in consequence of his merely imaginary
mastery of his basic situation, is attacked by the
ravages of the fictitious, however much he thinks,
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or strives to think,
as a person in being.
that he is asserting himself
(Ibid. p. 202 )
Individualism, thus, never has long existence; it las to
founder on its very basis.
Here it may seem that the rather persisting existence
of groups such as ’beatniks' or 'existentialists' could
serve as a disproof of, or at least be an exception to
Buber's characterization of 'individualism' as an un-
tenable position. This however, in my eyes, would involve
a misunderstanding of the core of these 'individualistic'
movements. For, those who call themselves 'existentialists'
for example
,
are not individuals in the sense of atheistic
existentialism as Nietzscl e or Sartre understood it, but
in actuality they are just as much collectivists as all
the rest who left the road of individualism and took that
of collectivism without pretending to have gone to the
very end of individualism before. The last rung of the
ladder of individualism, that of atheistic existentialism,
ie real ly reached only by few people. 'Existentialists,'
'beatniks,' etc. are only pseudo-individualistic, for al-
though outwardly non-conformisto
,
inwardly they are the great-
est conformists since in order to receive the necessary
confirmation they do not exercise real self-confirmation,
as the truly autonomous individualist does, but they
receive confirmation by conforming to the absurdities
practiced by all the members of tl eir group as well as through
the attention of the masses which they attract by being differ
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ent frorr. the rest of society in absurd ways. What is most
detrimental in this concealed and more subtle conformity
is that it is unknown to the pseudo-individual himself,
he does not realize that Instead of being a real indivi-
dualist re is just different from the masses in absurd
and superficial ways - so attracting attention and receiv-
ing pseudo-confirmation - and looking for confirmation
in a different though smaller collective. The modern
individualist does not stand on the last rung of indivi-
dualism (as opposed to, and a step to, collectivism) but
his individualism ' is only a collectivist reaction of
a conformist against collectivism. The result is an even
extremer conformity and collectivism.
The Decline of Ibce rn Individual 1
Collectivism er 1 nto bode rn
The two forms of illusory confirmation have appeared
iu ou, , c c on the Individual level, in form of individual-
ism and conformism, as well as to a great extent on the
level of social life in form of the dichotomy between
capitalism and collectivism. Both personal, as well as
social, collectivism have resulted from 'a union of
cos ‘,!iC anc social homelessness /a.s a consequence of the
lack of true dialogue and true community/, dread of the
universe and dread of life, resulting in an existential
constitution of solitude such as has probably never existed
before to the same extent.' (BMM p, 200}
Since, as was shown above, individualism in the end
has to founder on its own basis, modern personal as well
as social individualism have to break down sometime. It is
now, in this century, Buber feels, that modern individual-
ism is on its decline. 'In spite of all attempts at re-
vival,' he says, 'the time of individualism is over.'
(Ibid, p, 202) Although, as will be shown shortly, in
the western world modern individualism still exists to a
small extent, Buber feels it has played its role. 'Collec-
tivism, on the other hand, is at the height of its devel-
opment.' (loc. cit.
)
It is today's greatest danger to the
world, for It Is the detrimental expression of man's flight
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*>rom t xe exacting *ever anew’ of persona l responsibility
into tne secure ‘once for nil* of membership in a collec-
tive, whether in form of totalitarianism comprising
personal as veil as social collectivism - as found in
Russia, or in form of loyalty to political parties, state
policy of defense, or private capitalistic enterprises
on the social level, and in form of conformity with
respect to social behaviour, religion, art appreciation,
spending of leisure time, etc. on the personal level -
as found in the West. Modern man with hi insecurity and
repressions is isolated from his fellows, and clings
desperately to the collectivity to which he entrusts his
own protection and decisions in life.
Pers nal individualism, which during the last few
generations had raa ifested itself in the form of an atom-
ized society made up of individuals who had no genuine re-
lation with others in true community, but yet were non-
conforming with respect to their Weltanschauung, hos been
re laced today by individual collectivism, that is, by the
conforming of people with respect to taste, values,
social behaviour, interests, etc. As a result of this
kind of conformity, true personal relations ios a ong
people have become extremely difficult, for t \c require
genuine persons. A genuine person, however, (as v. pre-
supposition for his entering Into relation) has to be an
individual, that is, must have retained his uniqueness and
not have given it up t rough conforming. Few people today are
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true persons, that is, P6sl individuals entering into
dialogue
. That the existence of groups auct as the
‘beatniks’ or ’existentialists’ are more of a proof than
a disproof of the predominance of collectivism over
individual! sin in our age, can be seen from what has been
said above, in connection with these movements. For one thing,
these movements are mere reactions against collectivism,
and for that very reason are Indicative that collectivism
dominates our time. Secondly, the members of these
movements themselves are anything but true individuals
,
but t! ey are, as already mentioned above, people who,
in trying to escape conformity, fall into an even worse one
by conforming to a new collective, their own movement.
They thus conform to their own non-conformity. Moreover,
the fact that they try to receive confirmation from the
rest of society by attracting its attention also shows
that the members of these movements cannot be termed true
Individuals. For the true individualist seeks confirmation
only through himself.
Modern social individualism, in form of centralist!
c
capitalism, is also on its decline. In its place total-
itarian collectivism has entered upon the scene. Essentially,
Buber holde, collectivism on the social level too follows
upon the foundering of capitalistic individualism, Just
as individualism on the personal level leads over Into
widespread conformity. Before elaborating on this connection
between the decline of individualistic capitalism into
-91 -
State collective sin, it will be necessary to sketch very
briefly the development of society, as seen by Buber:
e essential o.; all those things which enabled man
to emerge from Nature and to assert himself, writes Buber -
"more essential even than the making of a "technical”
world out of things expressly formed, for this purpose' -
was that be banded together with others in social life
for 'protection and hunting, food gathering and work.'
It was the 'creation of a "social" world out of persons
at once mutually dependent and Independent.* The line
of human evolution up to now has been 'the forming and re-
fer? ing of communities on the basis of growing personal
independence, their mutual recognition and collaboration
on that basis.' The moot important steps to the develop-
ment of human society were : the division of labor which
'recognized and utilized /every individualT’ in his special
capacity' resulting in an ever-renewed association of
persons. The second step was the banding together of
people in quest of food and campaigns, so that 'as once
between individuals, so now between communities people
discerned and acknowledged, differences of nature and
function.' Wherever genuine society has developed, Buber
writes, it was based on 'functional autonomy, mutual
recognition and mutual responsibility, whether individual
or collective.’ When power center^ have split off, then
this happened only in order to maintain the security of the
community. Against the centralizing tendencies of the State
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th ere was always opposed the organic, functionally
organized society as ouch, a great society built up
O', various societies, the great societv in which
men lived and worked, competed with one another
' nd helped one another, (HJ pp, “1 30— 1 3 1
)
This mutual dependence of increasingly independent
Individuals and communities within a society Buber calls
the 1 clecen trail stic social principle.’
Wherever advanced societies have existed, there was
the danger that the ’decentrallstlc social principle’
would be subordinated to the ‘centralists political
princl le’ with its emphasis on the necessity and standard-
ization of the world of It in the State. The first real
overthrow of the ’decentrallstlc social principle*
meant first the development of centralists capitalism,
that is
,
individualism in the political sphere. This
took place in France. Although In the pro- Revolutionary
central is tic State in France there were totalitarian
tendencies inherent and the autonomous life of individuals
and groups weakened, society was still composed of differ-
ent societies, * it was complex and pluralistic in structure.*
(Ibid, p, 139) This complexity gave the State vitality
and powers of resistance against the totalitarian tenden-
cies of the royalty. This resistance, however, was
broken b the French Revolution with its cry for Freedom,
and its bitter opposition to ’the special rights of free
associations,’ (loc. cit.
)
besides its opposition to the
royal centralization. As a consequence
,
centralization in its
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new capitalistic form succeeded by ’atomizing society *
and 'dispossessing groups of their autonomy.' (loc. cit.)
Everybod now had the same rights and possibilities. The
success of the individual vjas dependent upon his own
initiative.
Accordingly as human beings differ in aspiration and
ability
,
a. t was once more an elite — this time not a royal
one but one of capable business men - who appropriated
most of the capital again, leaving the majority of the
people poor and without & fulfilling type of work. It is
at this point where individualism - in form of centralized
capitalism (rather than centralized royal government as
it was before the revolution, which at least allowed for
relatively autonomous small groups) - began to be poison-
ed bp collectivism. The western world today still suffers
from it. Capitalism as an idea is only concerned wit!
the individual, but the practical effects of capitalism
always lead more into the direction of collectivism. The
people owning the capital, the alleged individualists,
become richer and fewer at the same time. This means that
their organisations attain ever greater dimensions, which
in turn, stifle the individual and smaller enterprises.
For example, th« cerj shdps ere replaced
by the big chain stores. The owner of the little store
is forced to go out of business since he cannot compete
with the big enterprise. He enters a big organization - not
any more as an independent owner with individual relation-
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ships to people, but as a worker completely dependent on,
and det rmined by, the company or corporation. One could
sum this up by saying that in the capitalistic systems man
becomes insecure since, by virtue of the great irresponsi-
bility in the business world, his success is constantly
at stake. Consequently he flees into the big protective
collectivity, into a big or anization within the c'tate.
This social and economic insecurity resulting from
capitalistic individualism (atomized individualism by
itself creates insecurity but tills insecurity is increased
through the rise of capitalism) has found, today also,
a moae radical and more detrimental reaction t aan that
of collectivism within a society in form of huge private
enterprises: this is the completely centralized Ctate as
found in the oviet Union, Needless to say, in Buber’s yes,
Soviet collectivism, much less than capitalism in Western
democracies (with its own kind of collectivism) can remedy
the pove ty in organic structure and true community of
atomized society. Neither does it solve the problem of
capit lisrn for it lays stress on political centralize tion
w lich is, to an even greater extent than capitalistic
centralization, the arch enemy of multiplicity and freedom,
of the life of dialogue. Both Marxism and the Soviet
regime have constantly subordinated the social principle
to the political principle. Although they have been
tolerant of slight de-centralization in form of compulsory
co-operatives and producer soviets, and thus have we kened
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radical centralization, the social principle has always
been subjected to the political one, compulsion and donin-
ation have prevailed m place of free fellowship and
association in true eoimruni ty
*
This existential and social threat of atomized
society and its resulting centralietic capitalism which
drives man into collectives, is found not only within
societies but also on the international level, between
wl.ole societies.
As
.
a result 01 modern industrial development and itsoraero. chaos, involving the struggle of all againstall i or access to raw materials and for a larger
;r
c in toe p orid-market, there grew up, in 'lace
?* the ole struggles between States, at rublesbetween whole societies. The individual society,leeling itself threatened not only by its neighbors’lust i or aggression but also by things In general,inew no way oi salvation save in complete submission
to „ne principle of centralized power... In thedemocratic form of society no less than in its
totalitarian for®*, it •: adc this its gui&ins prin-dpi©. (Ibid, pp, 131-132) b
Consequently the important thing in all societies is
tne n-inute organization of power, trie unquestioning
observance of slogans, and the saturation of the whole of
society with the real or supposed interests of the State.’
(loc. cit.) with respect to the democratic capitalistic
forms of government in the west, this means thus, that
tit., collective 8 :. found within them is not only one resulting
from non-governmental private capitalistic enterprises,
but also one resulting from the centralizing tendency of
the State, here we find the link between the we atern and
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Sovlet central lea tic
.
Nov the parallel Is:: between personal individualism
and collectivism . and sod .1 individual! sm and collectivism
can be seen with respect to their causes, nature, and
inter-rel
• tior'..el ips * Just as the individual - when with-
out dialogical relationship to other people and to God
falls into solitariness, and when this state Becomes un-
bearable for 1- eh of confirmation - seeks relief in the
collectivity, so capitalism - the correlate of individual-
ism on the x-olitical level - comes about when true commun-
ity is destroyed (because of r,eo le’s not having true
relation with ore another) and then falls into collecti-
vism on recount of lack of social and economic security
of the individual/'
The 'framed
y
of Collectivism
In Buber’s eyes the rise of modern collectivism
upon the foundering of individualism - on the personal
as veil as social level - constitutes the greatest danger
to mankind today. 1 The last generation’s Intoxication
with freedom, * Buber writes, ’has been followed by the
present generation’s craze for bondage; the untruth of
intoxication with freedom has been followed by the un~
tru tb o f hy sterla. * (3M p« 70
)
The human being tries to escape his destiny of
solitude by becoming completely embedded in one of
the massive modern group format! ns* The more massive,
unbroken and powerful in its achievements this Is,
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U-ip nore that non is able to feel V ,t he is savedfrom both forms of homelessness, the social and the
cosmic. There is obviously no further reason for
the dread of life, since one needs only to fit one-
self Into the general will” snc let one’s own
responsibility for an existence which has become all
CO I pl-Cci '.;ec he absorbed in collective reenonsi-
bllity, which proves itself able to meet all com-
1 .icatlons , Likewise, there io obviously no further
reason for the dread of the universe, since tech-
nic 1 2ed nature - with which society ag sue! manages
vrell, or seems to - takes the place of the universe
which fas become uncanny and with which so to
speak, no further agreement can be reached. The
i curity
.
There is nothing imaginary here, a dense reality
rules, and the general” itself a; gears to have
become real. (Ibid. p. 201)
Lut this security offered in the collectivity is a pseudo-
••
•
! r,
1
3 tially
illnsor, .
’
(loc. ci t . ) Today it is mankind’s greatest
danger, it imperils ’the immeasurable value weld con-
stitutes man,’ for it destroys the dialogue between man
and God and man and the world. (Ibid, p, 80) * The collec-
tive ty , ’ writes Buber, ’cannot enter instead of the person
into the dialogue of the ag.ee which the Godhead conducts
with mankind.' (loc. cit.) On the contrary,
the modern zeal for collectivity is a flight from
community’?3, testing and consecra tion of the person,
a flight from the vital dialogic, demanding the stak-
ing of the self, -tick, is in tie heart of t! e ? orld.
(Ibid. pp. 31-32)
The ’false at! p of .-;ul Jectivlr ’ ( modern individual' on)
,
writes Buber, ’have been left behind on the road of ob-
ject.! v' s ’ (modern collectivism). (Ibid, p, yf)
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ev(-n the noblest hymns' on authority
standing. (Ibid. p. 32)
Collectivity la not a real ‘binding* but a 'bundling
together.* (Ibid. p. 31
)
fen in a collective ie not man with man. Here th
n k- V . iy A V V V*- i VJ—
c.r>:
,
neutralizing, devalue tin and desecrating
every bond with living beings. That tender surface
0 personal life which longs for contact ith otherlii6 ifl progressively deadened or desensitized. Kan*
a
isolation is not overcome here, but overpowered and
numbed. Knowledge of it is suppressed, but the actual
condition of solitude has its- insuperable effect
in the depths, end rises secretly to a cruel tv which
become manifest with the scattering of the
illusion. Modem collectivism is the last barrier
raised by ran against a meeting with himself. (Ibid.
P* 20 1
>
’Based on an organized atrophy o° personal existence’
collectivism marches ’without Thou and without I* into
th e * afey as.
’
( Ibid
. up
. 31,33)
* Ex 1 a ten 1 1. 0 1 h'ixO trus t ' - A Source of Ever Greater
Collectlvi tv
~~
In our age, social homelessness and the collectivism
resulting from it, are intensified by what Buber terms
’existential mistrust.’ This ’mistrust’ is of a new quality
it is no longer simply the age old mistrust which men
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have always felt tow : rds one another
such ae that directed against those with strange
ways, those who are unsettled, and those without
tradition - the mistrust th* t the farmer in his
Isolated farmstead feels for the tra p who suddenly
appears before him. (FW p, 222)
If ere have always been countless situations in which
a man in intercourse with a fellow-man is seized with
the doubt whether he may trust him; that is, whether
the other really means what l e says and whether he
will do what he says. There have always been count-
less situations In which a man believes his life-
interest demands that he suspect the other of mak-
ing it his object to appear otherwise than he is.
The first man must then be on his guard to pro-
tect himself against this threatening false
appearance, (Ibid. p. 223)
Today
,
however, this r is trust has een replaced or been
overridden by a more detrimental mistrust resulting from
the disintegration of true community in rur age. formerly,
Buber writes, societies have - like our society - been
subject to cosmic insecurity, bit there has always been
some kind of social security resulting from ’the living
In real togetherness’ in *a small organic community.' (BMM
p. 19f) And where this social security existed, confidence
also reigned among people, and man did n t have to repress
hi a wishes ’to such an extent that the repressions acqulre/d/
a dominating significance for his life, ’ although at times
he ha c. to subject his wishes to the demands of the commun-
ity, (Ibid. pp. 96-97) But for the meet part they co-
alesced with the needs of the community which were ’ex-
press C in its commands.’ (Ibid. p. 197)
Today however, where true organic community has decay-
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ea and been replaced by collectivism, the ’agreement
between one’s own and the other’s desire ceases, for there
is no true coalescence or reconciliation with what is
necessary to a sustaining community, and the dulled wishes
ereu: o.rlescly into the recesses of the soul.* (loc. cit.)
As a result we find ourselves in a community where frustra-
tion, repression, anc sublimation rule, in which the in-
stinct is o ivorcea from the spirit, ’The divorce between
instinct and spirit,’ feels Buber, is in the end 'the con-
sequence of the divorce betv?een man and man.’ (loc. cit.)
With this decay of true society and its pathological
effects th former social security and confidence in one’s
fellow-ra
. n got lost. Today ’the demonry of basic mistrust’
rules over the world, ’The abysses between man and man
threaten ever more pitilessly to become unbridgeable.* (PW
p. 222)
Today man no longer simply suspects that the other
one is consciously being dishonest, but he euspecte the
very being of the other. He
no longer merely fears that the other will voluntarily
dissemble, but one simply takes it for granted that
he cannot do otherwise. The presumed difference be-
tween his opinion and his statement, between his
statement and his action, is here no longer under-
stood as his intention, but essential necessity , .It
is no longer only the uprightness, the honesty of the
other which is in question, but the inner integrity
of his existence itself. (Ibid. pp. 223-224)
ihe mask which one’s fellow-man has on and which one tries
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t° take off
» ie not one which the other has put on
knowingly with the attempt to deceive, but Instead is ’a
mask that has, without his knowing it, been put on him,
indeed positively imprinted on him /by his own frustra-
tions and its effects/ so that what ie really deceived is
his own consciousness.’ (Ibid. p. 223) Consequently, man
does not accept what the other one says - in fact he hardly
listens to the words of the other. Rather, he devotes him-
self to 1 seeing through' and ’unmasking' the other, he
looks for the ’behind' of outward expression, for its
concealed causes.
This attempt, on the part of modern man, to 'see
through' those with whom he comes in contact results in
part from the ideas of those philosophers and psychologists
such as Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, and Jung who have given the
'scientific rationalization’ (FW p, 224) for the disease
of our time, putting forth the theories that man is not
what he thinks himself to be, that he has little control
over what he is in reality, but that he is a product of
his environment and his own subconscious psychic condition,
leople today grab onto these 'scientific rationalizations’
of psychology and the mistrust among men is pushed to
extremes
.
Man, thus, in this pathological condition where the
'immediacy of togetherness of man and man is destroyed’ (Ibid,
p. 224) has lost confidence in existence in general.
The existential mistrust is Indeed basically no longer,
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li*e the old kind, a mistrust of my fellow-man It
That*™*?
the d
fetruCtlon ° f eonf^«»ee m general,l t we can no longer carry on a genuine dialoguefrom one camp to the other Is the' severest symptom
o. the sickness of present-day man. Existential mis-trust is this sickness itself. But the destruction
°*
J
n
,
human existence is the inner poisoning
oi the total human organism from which this sickness
stems, ( loc
. clt,
)
As a consequence of today’s basic mistrust people
feel more lonely and more insecure than ever before -
the flight into collectivism has become hysterical. The
life of dialogue is threatened ever more. This existential
mistrust in human beings ultimately leads to a loss of
trust in God. The amount of atheism today la enormous.
If there still exists the belief in God in many indivi-
duals then, in most cases, this ie a belief in a pseudo-
god, in an idol, for no collectivist, since by definition
he has no true relation to his fellow-men, can have a true
relation to God. The atheistic psychological theories
which reduce God to a mere t>ro lection of the psyche are a
fatal aid on man’s way toward complete alienation from God.
The human race today has arrived at a stage where it can
‘no longer stretch out /its/ hands from /its solitude/ to
Z>ts7 divine Thou.’ Nothing is left to man but his ’intimate
communication with himself .
'
( BMM p. 16?) Yet man cannot
remain with himself, especial!, today when he cannot even
trust himself since he too le a member of a frustrated,
repressed, and sublimating aggregation of people - so he
steeps himself in the collective.
III. il; e flemedv
Necessity of tl e xe- Structurlnr of Society
The alternative to collectivism, for Buber, is
no i- individualism, i or tl is woulo mean regression rather
than progression. Buber refuses to accept the 'elther/or'
proposition of our age - the demand that one accepts either
collectivism in form of the centralized socialized State,
on account of the defects of capitalism, or that one
accepts the capitalistic system, because of the draw-
backs of collectivism. The false alternatives of our age,
that of Individualism and collectivism, have to be smashed
o.ll together. ’Man, 1 says Buber, ‘is truly saved from the
"one" /the collective/ not by separation but only by
being bound up in genuine communion.' (BMK p. 177) Genuine
realization is found only in a third alternative - in
the relationship of man to man with his whole being.
Kan's salvation from the illusion of modern collectivism,
thus, is a question of the rescue of man's personal self,
of the rebirth of dialogue, and lastly, of the re-structuring
of society into a true community since only in it is true
dialogical life fully possible.
True community, however, cannot be brought about
through abstract ideas, political force, or new institu-
tions, but the re-structuring of society has to begin with
the change of the basis of every true community - the
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relations between man and man. The remedy for the complete
elimination of true dialogue in collectivlstic States, and
for the indirect and perverted relation between men based
on a desire for exploitation rather than true togetherness -
as found in the capitalistic States - is not a super-
society, but simply the strengthening of the will for
genuine relationships among people, (Fried p. 47) The
lack of true dialogue among men cann t be overcome by
anything else but by the concrete individuals through,
their responding to the concrete situations which confront
them, by men who have the courage to live in 'fear of God,’
and who accept every situation with all its danger and
mystery with an open heart. The rebirth of true dialogue
can come on y through individuals 'vrho mean community
in their innermost heart and establish it in their
natural sphere of relations,’ (Fried p, 146) through
individuals who are willing to stake their life in the
meeting with people and who deny no answer to the world,
'The erection of new institutions,' Friedman well summar-
izes Buber,
can only have a genuinely liberating effect when it
is accompanied by a transformation of the actual life
between man and man. This life between man and man
does not take place in the abstraction of the state
but rather there where a reality of spatial, functional,
emotional, or spiritual togetherness exists - in the
village and city community, in the workers' fellowship,
in comradeship, in religious union. (Fried p, h6)
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fho * Poll tier ! Trine
* Social brincl "TP~
°ne of the greatest obstructions in our- day againat
the rebirth of dialogue and the development of true
de-centr&lietic principle 1 meaning free fellowship and
association tc the ’central! a tic political principle'
meaning compulsjon ana control, which constitutes what
was called above social-political collectivism, and the
overcoming of which will be an important initial step
on the way to t .e est&blist Blent of a fertile ground for
oh® ro/i t ox true dialogue, Although the actual rebirth,
of dialogue
,
as was said above, can start only from the
actual entering into relatln with me another, the first
step in the direction of true community will have to be
the breakdown of social-political collectivism, especially
in totalitarian States, since the presupposition for man’s
entering into dialogue is the destruction of any outward
control which would choke every attempt to dialogue at
its very beginning* In other words, the presupposition for
the rebirth of dialogue - man’s ou twarc freedom to have
relations - must be fulfilled first. In totalitarian States,
where the whole life of people is controlled, true dialogue
cannot develop, even if certain individuals wanted true
communi ty
.
community is the confusion of the political principle
with the social principle, and the domination of the 1
by the former. It is this subordination of the ’social
c latter
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1
• © reconstruct ton jf society
,
only he;.- in with
'•Tr* te r' Buber, can
a radical alteration of the relationship between the
social and the political order. It
od
-
-
-
- es-n no longer he
substituting one political regime for
of the emergence, in place of a
~ w - j , of a regime
expressive of society itself. (FI r. 07^
a matter
,
but c 3
, p
political regime graf ted^upon’ society
ir
While socialism, cased on the politics,! principle, starts
with an abstract idea and a uniform and rigid political
system , true community based on the social principle must
start with the concrete persona with their problems and
tt eir potentiality of forming a true community. True
socialism must grow from the urge in the concrete human
beings to form a community based on common needs, Interests,
language, tradition, etc.; it must come from beneath
the hardened mechanism of the State. The State must stop
being a * '-nac-.l na roachinaruni that turns everything belong-
ing to it Into the components of some mechanism' and that
’strangles the individuality of small associations,' but
it has to become a ' communi tas communi taturn
.
the union of
the communities in community,’ within which the proper and
autonomous life of each community and all their members
can unfold.' (Ibid, p, 39 ) Free associations must replace
the centralist! c State in which nothing or anic can 're-
sist "the rigidly centralized directive mechanism"' which
1 devour/s7 everything living j' (loc, cit.) organic
communities which have sprung from common possessions,
morals, beliefs, interests, have to be exchanged for the
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mecharr cal association of Isolated
’held together by force, compromise
opinion.' ( 'rlec p. 45} Unless the
froai ’ t: e pressure of the political
e *de-centralization of political r.
' If-eeekS S idivi duals
,
convention, and public
freeing o J' soclet”^ </
principle’ through
over’ if- effected, the
see ial epontauei ty o
r‘
a, people will he endangered and
diminished and with it Its social vitalit;
. For, writes
Buber
,
the social vitality of a nation, and Its cultural
well, depend very largely
upor. the degree of social spontaneity to be found
there.,. the larger the measure of autonomy granted
to the local and regional and also to the function-
al societies, tl e ore. re on is left for V e free
unfoldin of social energy. (PW p, 175)
fie radical abolishment of the centralized State in
favor of true community, which Buber advocates, does
not, l ow ever, em that any kind of State 1 s to he
destroyed, that the political principle k s to be sub-
stituted by the social prinolyle completely. In true
community, although it if based on free .association, there
has to be a certain amount of compulsion by the State, the
amount of this legitimate compulsion being determined by
the degree of incapacity/ for voluntary right order In the
eommuni ty
.
This difference between the strength of the social
and political principles Buber calls ’political surplus,’
and is defined by him In terms of the difference between
* Administration’ and ’Government.
*
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j
(Ibid, p, 174)
•1 on
,
the 11 1 ts e rc
1 pc- c on t al 1 oge U c r
.
c xce if-.,,
j x ep en t e
Justification
from the external and internal Instability, from thelatent state of crisis between the nations and
within every nation, which may at any moment become
an active crisis requiring more immediate and far-
reaching measures, (loc. cit.
)
The- constant danger, however, in every State is that the
* political surplus' becomes much bigger than am latent
crisis would require. Today, especially in collect!viatic
Staten, the political principle is in complete domination
of the social principle. It is therefore necessary today -
despite all internal and external latent- crises - that
'efforts /are/ renewed again and again to determine in
what spheres it ie possible to alter the ratio between
Governmental and Administrative control in favor of the
latter.' (Ibid, p. 175) The demarcation line 'between the
spheres which must of necessity be centralized and those
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whlch can operate In freed oir
(Government and the decree of
and It cr-o
v
ed contiru a 1 ly » i
^
historical circumstances .
* (i
end, the change in the 'a~ror
hetween the degree of
autonomy' has to "be revised
accordance with changing
oc. cit.i PTJ p. 134) In the
tl^nrscnt of rowe r. * which
should always he accompanied by ’a continuous change In
th€
--w. Lf re of power', should he a transformation of 'Govern-
ment Into Administration as far ar the general and par-
ticular conditions permit.'
41 though this to eh is
risky one, it is uncondlti
re-structuring of society
reduction a * the Otate to
to maintain unity, than a
a difficult, strenuous, and
sary,foi rati - ’a
as a League of Leagues, and a
Its proper function, vhi ch is
devouring of an amorphous
society by an omnipotent State:' better 'the right proportion,
tested anew every day according to changing conditions,
between group-'reedom and collective order,* than 'an
absolute order imposed Indefinitely for the sake of an era
of freedom alleged to follow "of its own accord."’ (PD p.
1 48 )
Th e Overcoming of ' Existential M s tru s
t
'
The elimination of central! a tic collectivism, however,
is only one of the two moot important presuppositions for
the development of true dialogue and the development of
true community in which there is the right balance between
the powers the political and social principle. The second
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one- concerned not primarily with conditions outside
the individual person, as was the first one with the rigid
order of the centralis tic state, but with man himself -
is the overcoming of the 'existential mistrust’ which domi-
nates the relationship among people today.
The successful removal of the centralists State is
not possible uless there are truly responsible persons
who become bearers of the true alternative
- true community.
Otherwise, if the centralists State is destroyed in a revo-
lution by individuals who are basically irresponsible,
the outcome will be an anarchistic, atomized society
which finally will again develop into centralized collecti-
vism. Individualism is the false alternative. The pre-
dominance of the social principle over the political one
cannot be achieved by any devices of political re-organiza-
tion, (since community starts from the bottom, with
concrete relations, and not from the top with ideas), nor
by the radical destruction of political power by ’ irrespon-
sible ' peorle, (which would bring chaos), but only through
basically changed relatl ns between men and between
communities, that is, by the concurrence of the abdi-
cation by the State of some of its power with the 're-
sponsible activity of individuals who want genuine
community and who transform the political principle into
the social one. Since the political surplus is, in a way,
the expression of the extent to which there is lack of
true community in a society, the destructi n of the political
-Ill-
principle in a revolution would result in a chaotic
atomized society (which formerly was held together by
political power) which, in order to escape this chaos,
would have to set up a political principle stronger than
the one destroyed by the revolution. The mechanistic
political principle, therefore, must not be destroyed
any faster than true organic community is actually
developing. The creation of real organic society itself will
eventually destroy the ’political surplus,' since it
will make it unnecessary. (In practice, the abdication
of power by the State - even if it would be replaced by
true community and not by chaos as in revolutionary
destruction - will naturally rarely be voluntary, but
usually requires the vigorous pressure of groups of people
capable of voluntary order which can force the State to
relinquish some of its 'political surplus.' While this is
thinkable in the western world, it is difficult to
imagine how this would be possible in Russia, where a
'vigorous pressure’ of a group of people who want volun-
tary order is very unlikely, since any formation of such
a group would be stifled in its very be inning in the first
place
. )
In any event, the re-structuring of society into a
true community requires the presence and responsibility
of true persons. True dialogue among people, however, is
possible only if they have confidence in one another. But
today the demonry of basic mistrust is rulinp the world
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and obstructing the rebirth of dialogue.
Nothing stands so much in the way of the rise of
a Civilization of Dialogue as the demonic power
woich rules our world, the demonry of basic mistrust.
*hat. does it help to Induce the other to Break ifbasically one puts no faith in what he says? The
meeting with him already takes place under the per-
spective of his untrustworthiness, And this perspec-
tive is not incorrect, for his meeting with me
takes place under a corresponding perspective. (PW
p . 222
)
What is therefore necessary is that man overcome this
basic mistrust which separates him from his fellow-man
and which makes true community impossible. This, feels
Buber, must begin with a 'criticism of criticism!,' with
the showing, up of the 'fundamental and enormously in-
fluential error of all the theories of seeing through
and unmasking.
'
(Ibid, p. 226) This error is that the
newly discovered elements in the psychical and spiritual
existence of man are Identified with the total structure
of man instead of being assigned their proper place in
the context of a much greater organic whole. Consequently,
an 'uncritical acceptance of man's statements' is considered
absurd. But man, writes Buber,
is not to be seen through, hut to be perceived ever
more completely in his openness and his hiddenness
and in the relation of the two to each other, (ibid.
P. 227 )
This does not mean blind trust but clearsighted trust,
so that we wish to perceive the other's
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manifoldness and bis wholeness, his prooer character
without any preconceptions about this or that back-
'
ground
,
ano with the intention of accepting,
accrediting and confirming him to the extent that
hie perception will allow, (loc. cit.
)
I- this happens, genuine dialogue between men can
be re-established. Accordingly then, the rise of true
community within States will be possible again, which in
turn, will eventually bring about an alteration of the
present relationship between the social and the political
principle in favor of the former. So can the capitalistic
central! zati n, which virtually forces thousands of people
into performing dull Jobs for some huge private enterprise,
be dissolved and replaced by a more intimate relation
between employer and employee and by a more satisfactory
work on the part of the employee, a work which will do
greater Justice to hie capacities. There will also be the
proper basis for a radical decrease In personal conformity
then partly due to 'responsible’ use of o-ass communication
with respect to social behavior, art appreelation, taste,
etc., which is enormous today in the west and presumably
also in the east.
The destruction of this basic mistrust is also a
necessary condition for dialogical international relation.
'Only if this happens' (the destruction of mistrust), says
Buber, can a 'genuine dialogue begin between the two
camps into which mankind is split.' (loc. cit.) Only men
who have 'overcome in themselves the basic mistrust' and
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re c ipable of recognising In their partner in dialogue
the reality of his being,* can be true spokesmen for
their countries. This kind of representation is entirely
different from today's political representation which has
reachec *a state of practically unlimited representation'
and with this has brought about 'the reign of practically
unlimited eentralistic accumulation of power.' (PU p, 133)
It is a representation based on far-sightedness, experience,
ano responsibility, free from the 'incrustation of catch-
words* (Fried p. 221) and ’acquainted with the true needs
of lits/ own people ’ as well as with those of other peoples.
(PV p, 228) These true representatives will be able to
extract the true need from the exaggerations' and they
will 'unrelentingly distinguish between truth and propa-
ganda within what is called the opposition of interests.'
(loc. cit.) Only when this extracting of the real conflict
between genuine needs from the alleged amount of antagon-
isms is done, will they procede to a solution of the
problems
,
casing it on the question; What does every man
need in order to live as man? For, writes Buber, if the
globe is not to burst asunder, every man must be given what
he needs for a really human life.' (loc. cit.) Only if men
come 'together out of hostile camps* and enter into true
dialogue despite their opposing views, guided by 'unreserved
honesty' - is there hope for the rescue of man.
Once the mistrust among nations is destroyed, and true
dialogue is established, the fear with which every country
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tocay meets other nations and societies will vanish. Tils,
in turn, will make any centralization by the State in
the aim of national defense superfluous. It is therefore
here, with the establishment of peace amonsr, nations,
that Buber finds the true start for the establishment
of organic societies.
Under rigorous scrutiny, thus, it is the elimination
of the basic mistrust among men which is the first step
towards true community. Everything else, even the destruction
of political power, which above was treated as being a
prerequisite for true community, as a simultaneously
necessary starting point along with the elimination of
existential mistrust, is secondary. Only from the view-
point of a single totalitarian nation, as for example
Russia, the abdication of centralized power is as much a
prerequisite for true community as is the overcoming of
basic mistrust, since any development of true community
is impossible without the state's allowing for it. In
this case international peace on account of the elimination
of ’basic mistrust' would not mean any de-centralization
of the State since the latter has an internal ideological
basis, and is only to a smaller part the outcome of
international insecurity. From this point of view, the
difference between the treatment of the relinquishment of
centralized power as of the same importance as the removal
of basic mistrust as seen above, and the present treatment
of the elimination of basic mistrust as the only first
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step towards community must be understood. But from the
international viewpoint, as well as from the viewpoint
of a nation th- t is centralized only for its own de-
fense, the destruction of this cetralized force is a
direct result of peace - a peace which, in turn, c- n
only exist when Individual nations have confidence
in each other and people no longer fear one another.
Or, this destruction of centralized power is a result
/
of the pressure of organic groups which have developed
as far as the State has allowed, and which too are based
on blue dialogxcal relationshl s, whose prerequisite is
that basic mistrust be removed.
The most efficient way, Buber feels, for society
to eliminate the basic mistrust among human beings and
to weaken the power of the political principle, is social
education. In contrast to political propaganda which 'seeks
to "suggest" a ready-made will to the members of society,'
social education attempts 'to arouse and to develop in the
minds of its pupils the spontaneity of fellowship which
is Innate in all unravaged human souls and which harmonizes
very well with the development of personal existence
and personal thought.' (PW p. 176) This, Buber feels, can
only be accomplished by a complete overthrow of the politi-
cal trend, which nowadays dominates education in the world.
True ©due tlon for citizenship in a State is the education
for the 'effectuation of society* towards a 'truly social
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outlook and a truly social will.’ (loc. cit.) In the end,
ic it? lie education ot peoele ready to respond with
their whole being and with true responsibility to everything
they meet in life.
—— ,.
c
a
— km m dommuni tv of Communl ties
Buber’s trust in the capacities of aan leads him to
believe that the complete elimination of the existential
mistrust among people may ultimately lead to the 'resolute
will of all peoples to cultivate the territories and raw
materials of our planet and govern its inhabitants,
p. 132) This, for Buber
,
is the only guaran-
tee for prolonged peace. Only if there is co-operation
in the control of raw materials, agreement of methods of
manufacture of such materials, and regulation of the
world market will society be able to constitute itself as
such.
At this point, however, Buber clearly rmli-es man
will be ‘threatened by a danger greater than all the pre-
vious ones: the danger of a gigantic centralization of
power covering the whole planet and devouring all free
community.’ (loc, cit.) Evermore, therefore, is it necessary
that with ’unwearying scrutiny’ society is given its proper
independence and saved from the depredations of the State.
(Ibid, p* 13^) Everything, sayo Buber,
depends on whether the collectivity in whose hands
the control of the means of production passes will
facilitate and promote in its very structure and in
all Its institutions the genuine common life of the
various groups composing it - or whether, In fact,
these groups themselves become proper foci of the
productive process; therefore on whether the masses
are so organized in their separate organizations
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(unc various communities") as to be as powerful astbe common economy of man permits; therefore on
waether centralist representation only goes as far
as the new order of things absolutely^ demands. (Ibid.
PP« '33-»34>
On the other hand - while objecting to a regula-
tion of the relation between centralization and de-central-
ization by general political principles, Buber, in order
to prevent the development of society into an aggregate of
independent communes or co-operatives, does not undertake
to solve the Questions as to the degree of economic or
political autonomy to be permitted these communes or co-
operatives alone, rather, Buber feels, this massive pro-
blem must be approached with the ’autonomy of the spirit,'
with a constant and tireless weigh’ ng and measuring of the
right proportion between centralization and de-centraliza-
tion, The community process and attitude simply have to
determine the relations of the communes with e-a ch other
to a large degree since, says Buber, only a community of
{
communities deserves the title of Commonwealth. For if the
various communes fall to co-operate among themselves, the
devel pment to real community and to a world-wide com: on-
wealth will be barred. A certain amount of res onsible
centralization - of course based If^ely upon the Indivi-
dual nature of each commune - will be necessary to insure
true community.
Buber's Utopian Socialism, of which the aim Is inter-
national co-operation in form of a confederation of common-
wealths which, in turn, are composed of communities made up
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o f ^ommmQQ and co-operatives of all sizes, is thus de-
pendant upon what he nails ’Full Co-operatives’ in their
various forms, and on various levels. And ’the more,* says
Buber, "’Utopianism’’ clarifies its ideas the more patently
does the leading role seem to fall to' the Full Co-operative
in form of a ’ Producer-cum+Oonaumer Co-operative.’ (PU p. 81}
inis ^ind of Pull Co-operative (Yollgenosaen-schaft) however,
must not be confused with the co-operative system as found
in capitalistic states in the West. For there, the Consumer
and Producer Co-operatives do not, in turn, form an organic
co-operation of production and consumption whether on
the level of the village, the district, or the State.
Ha tier, the Consumer Co-operatives have become big cap-
italistic bureaucracies (Ibid. p. 65 ), and the Producer
Co-operatives have succumbed to the fatal desire of getting
other people to work for them. The Producer Co-operative,
however, is better suited in itself than the Consumer Co-
operative to take part in the re-structuring of society
since ’production of goods implicates people more pro-
foundly than a common acquisition of goods;... it embraces
much more of their powers and their lifetime,
’
(Ibid. p. 78)
Consumption, on the other hand
,
brings people together only
with a highly impersonal part of their being, yet both -
the Consumer Co-operative in a ’technical and managerial
sense* and the Producer Co-operative in a ’structural and
psychological sense’ - adapt themselves to the capitalistic
pattern, (loc, cit. ) 'The militant capitalistic organizations,'
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e.g. labor unions and trade unions 'which the proletariat
erected against Capitalism,' since they have 'no access
to the life of society itself and Its foundations: pro-
duction and consumption,
' fall to solve this capitalistic
and non-co-operative trend of production and consumption.
(Ibid, p, 139)
The remedy for all these deficiencies, Buber holds,
is the 'Full Co-operative' which is a synthesis of a de-
centralized production (including industry, agriculture,
and the handicrafts), and a non—conforming consumption in
a confederntlve community.
It the principle of organic re-structuring is to
become a determining factor the influence'of the
Full Co-operative will be needed, since in it
production and consumption are united and in-
dustry is complemented by agriculture
. .
./A
7
genuine ana lasting re-organization of society from
within can only prosper in the union of producers
and consumers, each of the two partners being
composed of independent and homogeneous co-oper-
ative units. (Ibid, pp, 78-79)
These Full Co-operatives must not, however, remain
isolated experiments but the ultimate aim is an organic
confederation of Full Co-operatives, for the vitality of
Socialism can only be
guaranteed by a wealth of Full Co-operatives all
working together and, in their functi nal synthesis,
exercising a mediatory and unifying influence. (Ibid
p. 79)
Thus, although 'genuine ’’Utopian" Socialism can be termed
’’topical” Socialism' in that 'it is not without toporranh
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lcal character* because it
- e eks to realize itselt in a. given olace and. under
Riven conditions, that is, ’’here and now,” and to
the greatest degree possible.
.. It regards the local
realization,
.
.as nothing but a ooint of deoarture,
a beginning. ..that roust be there if this realization
is to fight for its freedom and win universal validity,(Ibid. p. 81)
Then, maybe,
la more than a hundred years of struggle there
L*ill/ emerge a network of Settlements, territorially
based and federatively constructed, without dogma-
tic rigidity, allowing the roost diverse social forms
to exist side by side, but always aiming at the
new organic whole. (Ibid. p. 79)
I4ost experiments of the establishment of Pull Co-
operatives up to now have been unsuccessful since they
have been based on feelings, or have been started from
an abstract dogma or idea without considering the local
needs of people, or they have been failures because of
their isolation from other communities, that is, because
of lack of federation.
The- most successful attempts to achieve the Full Co-
operative so far, Buber feels, have een the various forms
of the Village Communes, for there ’communal living is
based on the amalgamation of production /in form of an
organic union of agriculture, industry, and handicrafts/
and consumption.
’
(Ibid, p, 140) The gre- t value of these
village communes for society lies in their potential In-
fluence to 'transform the town organically In the closest
possible alliance with technological develo ments and to
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tum It into an aggregation composed of smaller units.'
( Ibid
, p, 1 ' 1 ) (If this development of smaller and Inde-
pendent communities In big, towns is to be possible, then,
Buber feels, besides the de-centralizing influence of the
village communes, it will also be essential that further
tochnolo ical developments will 'facilitate and actually
require the de-centralization of industry.’ (loc. clt.)
For only de-centrail zed industry can be an ally in the
endeavor of the social re-structuring of society.)
The most successful actualization of Buber’s concept
of the Village Commune today is the 'Jewish Village
Commune in its various forme, as found in Palestine.
'
(loc.
cit.) This 'signal non-failure,' Buber writes, can be
attributed in part, to the unusual approach of the founders
who
did not, as everywhere else in the history of
co-operative settlements, bring a plan with them,
a plan which the concrete situation could only fill
out, not modify; the ideal gave an Impetus but no
dogma, it stimulated but did not dictate. (Ibid,
p. 1^3)
This Commune is based on the response to a need rather
than being simply the romantic attempt to fulfill a
doctrine or ideal. Its movements, aims, and activities
never ’hardened into a cut-and-driec programme.’ (loc.
clt.) Its process Is one of differentiation which is yet
'intent on preserving the principle of integration.' (Ibid,
p. 145) And while the men who make up these communities
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have exercised remorseless ’clear-sighted collective
self-observation and self-criticism’ and established an
' amazingly positive relationship - amounting to a regular
faith - ...to the inmost being of their commune,
'
(loc. cit.)
they have at the same time, exercised a ’formative structur-
al effect on the social periphery.’ (Ibid, p, 143) They
have also left freedom for the branching off of new forms
of communes. Each one of these new forms
grew out of the particular social and spiritual
needs as these came to light - in complete freedom,
and each one acquired, even in the initial stages,
Its own ideolo :y - in complete freedom, each strugg-
ling to propagate itself and spread and establish
Its oror-er sphere - all in complete freedom. (Ibid,
p. 145)
These men realized that each Village Commune with Its
special mode of being demanded its particular sort of
realization. According to the peculiarities of local needs
the Village Commune had its particular form which, in turn,
was molded with a change of internal or external conditions.
With the influx of refugees, the original character
of the founders of the Jewish Village Communes was altered.
As a consequence, real problems arose which had their
basis not in the alteration of the outward structure of the
communities - idea, work, etc. - but rather in the funda-
mental aspect of inter-human relationships. ’Where people
are ant to slip, ' says Buber in this connection,
is in their relationship to their fellows. . .£Thig7 is
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not a matter of intimacy at all... The question is
rati.er one of openness
.
A real community need not
consist, of peorue who are perpetually together; t-utit must consist of people who, reclsely because
o/ ore comrades, have mutual access to one another
and are ready for one another. A real community is
one which in every point of its being possesses
,
potentially at least, the whole character of commun-ity. The internal questions of a community re t' usiu reality questions relating, to Its own genuineness,
hence to its Inner strength and stability.' (Ibid. p.
Again we see from this special ca.se that, in the end, the
base of any true community is the genuineness of the rela-
tionship between men, based on mutual confidence and respon-
sibility
.
true focialla m 1 c l-..o nell ^icue -loci:.- 11 am
If men, as today, have turned away from God, and
have caused the hardening of Him, the only way bock to
Him will be through a renewal of the immediacy between
man and man through genuine relations in true community.
When man has become solitary and ’can no longer say "Thou”
to the '’dead'1 known God, everything depends on whether he
can still say it to the livln unknov/n God by saying ''thou”
with all hie being to another living and known man. 1 (BKM
p. 16P) ’Then after lor silence and stammering, we shall
have addressed our eternal ’’Thou 11 anew.’ (FW p, 229)
'At its core, 1 says Buber, ’the conflict between
the mistrust and trust of man conceals the conflict be-
tween the mistrust and trust of eternity.' (loc, clt.)
Religion and true community, feels Buber, are closely bound
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up with each other; ultimately, true socialism is really
religious socialism. Genuine 'Utopian Socialism' is the
latter’s most mature expression. Religious socialism,
therefore, does not imply the gathering of people for the
worship of God according to rigid rituals. It Is not an
organized world church; neither does it mean that the
kingdom of God Is to be equated with true community; nor
must It be confused with the
joining of religion and socialism in such a manner
that each of the constituents could aci ieve, arart
from the other, independence If not fulfilment; it
cannot mean merely th't the two have concluded an
agreement to unite their autonomies In a comm n
being and working. (Ibid. 112)
Religious socialism can only mean th^t religion and
socialism are essentially directed to each other,
that each of them needs the covenant with the
other for the fulfilment of its own essence, (loc.
cit.
)
It means that man can truly realize himself only In the
true community, since only through his genuine relation-
ship to his fellow-men can he have true relationship to
God; and man is not fully man, unless he can say ’Thou’
to Him. It means that only through men’s being open to
one another, helping each other, and being responsible to
one another, Is God - who is In all things - actually
realized and met In all his mystery. Only in between,
in the genuine dialogical relation between man and his
fellow-men and the world, only in true community, does
the Absolute manifest itself, only there is He realized.
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itellrious socialism, therefore, Is based on community built
out of direct relationships among men and communities, on
men who go out in the world and meet it with courage and
responsibility and in ’fear of God.’ It means that the
center o> community must be the common relation of all
individuals to God. Although, says Buber, the Single One
'cannot win to a legitimate relation with God without a
legitimate relation to the body politic,
' the relation
to God is the 'defining force' of all relations. (BMft p. 70)
Community and Religion, thus, although not to be equated
with each other, cannot find true realization without one
another.
Beginning with Leonhard Ragaz's words, 'Any socialism
whose limits are narrower than God and man is too narrow
for us,' Buber writes in the first thesis of his short
essay on 'Three Theses of Religious Socialism,' stressing
the necessity of the covenant of Religion and community:
Rellplo « that is the human person's binding of himself
to God, can only attain its full reality in the will
for a community of the human race, out of which alone
God can prepare Lis kingdom, ^oclalltas . that is man-
kind's becoming a fellowship, man’s becoming a fellow
to man, cannot develop otherwise than out of a common
relation to the divine centre, even if this be again
and still nameless. Unity with God and community
among the creatures belong together. Religion with-
out socialism is disembodied spirit, therefore not
genuine spirit; socialism without religion is body
emrtied of spirit, hence also not genuine body. (P'w
p/112)
With respect to the gross confusion between true and ficti-
tious religion and society, Buber says:
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rg3 l
re
/^i -p7 +?'mS * lna titution8, and societies arely^ ?ney serve as expression, as shareand bearer of real re! i,io - a real self-binding o?
f
n FerS°n t0 God *’* So
* too, all "socialist"*tendencies, programmes, and parties are real.
1”sofar as7 they serve as strength, direction,and instrument of real so cla litas - mankind’s
really becoming a fellowshlp.
.
. At present the pre-
vailing religious forms, institutions, and societieshave entered into the realm of the fictitious: theprevailing socialist tendencies, programmes, andparties have not yet emerged from the fictitious.(Ibid, p, 113)
Finally, emphasizing that the point where religion and
socialism can meet ia the ’concrete personal life,' Buber
writes
:
As the truth of religion consists not of dogma or pre-
scribed ritual but means standing and withstanding
In the abyss of the real reciprocal relation with the
mystery of God, so socialism in its truth is not
doctrine and tactics but standing and withstanding
in the abyss of the real reciprocal relation with
the mystery of man... It is presumption to "believe”
in something without - however inadequately - living
that in which one believes.
. .Religion must know
that it Is the everyday that sanctifies or desecrates
devotion. And socialism must know that the decision
as to how similar or dissimilar the end which is
attained will be to the end which was previously
cherished is dependent upon how similar or dissimi-
lar to the set goal are the means whereby it is
pursued. Religious socialism means that man in the
concreteness of his personal life takes seriously
the fundamentals of this life; the fact that God
Is, that the world is, and. that he, this human person,
stands before God and In the world. (Ibid. pp. 113-114)
Buber’ s Uto • la is not a Romantic Illusion
In his passion for ’Utopian’ Socialism, Buber is In
no way a victim of utopian, and romantic Illusions, for
he is well aware of the difficulties which would be in-
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volved in applying his social philosophy to any large-
scale economies and societies. ‘Therefore, Buber is not
giving only an ideal picture of society but also a real-
istic suggestion for steps to be taken in tie direction
Oi. its realization — whether now the ideal state is
v,itf in the realm oi history or not. he emphasizes that he
is not suggesting a radical change from the rre sen
t
political system into a commonwealth along the lines of
the Jewish Village Commune, but he is presenting merely
an ultimate goal toward which man has to work if his
authentic existence is to be saved. He is suggesting only
a direction of movement toward this goal. Accordingly, he
does not speak for revolution which will break down the
central! stic State, or for mere rearrangement of political
power. Rather, he starts with the relationship between
individuals which, Buber feels, can best be achieved
through social education directed at the 'effectuation of
society.’ Buber is not advocating rapid and com lete de-
centralization, but only as much decentralization as is
possible in order to remain secure from other societies
and to maintain internal unity. Be is realistic in that he
does not start with a '"schematic fiction” which begins
with a theory of the nature of man and deduces a social
order which shall employ all man's capacities and satisfy
all his needs' but he 'undertakes to transform contemporary
man ana his conditions on the basis of an impartial and un-
dogma tic understanding of both,’ (Fried p, 211) Buber tries
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to preserve the diversity and contrariety of trends in our
age up to the point that they are harmonious with true
community
.
Buber knows that the state of the ’original rightness'
of man is not an historical possibility and that 'in all
probability, there will never, so long as man is what he
Is, be freedom pure and simple, and /that^ there will be
State, that is compulsion, for lust so long*' (PU p, 104)
Therefore, although he warns against the using of evil
means for good ends, he does not fall into utopian ideal-
ism in his social ethics, but he recognizes that living
entails suffering and doing injustice. 'In order to pre-
serve the community of men,' writes Buber, 'we are often
compelled to accept wrongs in decisions concerning the
community.' (IW p. 246) And in a letter to Gandhi, be
writes: 'If there Is no other way of preventing evil
destroying the good, I trust I shall use force and give
myself up to God’s hands.' (quoted by Fried p. 145)
What matters is that in every hour of decision we
are aware of our responsibility and summon our
conscience to weigh exactly how much Is necessary
to preserve the community and accept Just so much
and no more. (IW p, 246)
However, although Buber's Utopian Socialism is maybe
not an historical possibility - and Buber knows this - his
ideas must not be discarded as utopian illusions, for
what Buber pictures is what man is ultimately Intended for -
complete personal authenticity o.nd freedom, hie true cornmun-
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lty, therefore, has relevance as an ideal towards which
man has to move, whether it can he reached or not. And
the ideal has reality Insofar as it directs man's response
to the concrete situation. Buber’s Utopian Socialism has
practical validity as a guide to the re—structuring of
society - the only thing which will rescue man’s authen-
ticity. However impractical and impossible the re-structur-
ing of society into true community may thus be, it is the
only means for the saving of our real personal self from
the fiery Jaws of totalitarian collectivism. It is also the
solution to the other alternative, that of carl taller.
,
which along with the centralization in the aim of national
defense, has created the rasa societies in the west
through large scale and highly industrialized centralistlc
mass production economy, mass consumption, and irres onsi-
ble use of mass communication. So is it the only true al-
ternative to the various drawbacks of present day demo-
cracy: political centralization in the aim of national
defence; centralization to the end of the social welfare
State; tie presence of capitalists In form of single, pow-
erful owners, or members; of capitalistic producer and con-
sumer co-operatives - remnants of the alternative of collec-
tivism, i.e. individual lam; uniformity of work, brought
about by the capitalistic and large scale private enter-
prises and producer co-operatives which force reople out
of their own small enterprises, and by a large scale, highly
industrialized mass production economy also resulting from
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tfie substitution of handle re.
' ts by huge prlvr.tc.lv owned
capitalistic industries; mass consumption, made possible
through mass production and intensified by the irresponsi-
ble use of mass communication
.
Man, if he wants to escape from de-personall zation
In collectivity, and from the empty subjectivism of
individualism, has to enter into relation with his fellow-
men. And this, Buber feels, is possible to a full extent
only in true community , Consequently, the way towards
personal authenticity has to be the way towards true
community, regardless of whether the latter can ever be
perfected in the sense of Buber's Utopian Socialism.
KFIST&40LGGX
Buber * s theory of knowledge differs from all the
traditional theories essentially. ghile all the tradi-
tional forms of epistemology have been based on the
reality cf the subject-object relationship, Buber pro-
poses a more humanly realistic account of truth and of the
way in which we know, that is, a dialogical theory of
knowing, and of truth, based on the reality of genuine
dialogue, on the view that renllty is not" moved Into
the systematic and abstract, but is to be found in the
particular, in the concrete, in the real meeting of
the Other.
iTuth is In the eetiiv; with the Other
Human truth, Buber holds, is to be found in man’s
relationship to God, fellowmen, and nature, in a relation-
ship which is effected with man’s whole being. Human truth
is the making present ( Vergegenwaertigung) of the
Other in true dialogue. Although, writes Buber, ulti-
mate truth is one. It is given to human beings only
as they enter into true life-relationships with the
Other. Human truth s ring 3 only from genuine realization
( Verwirkllchung ) , that is, from those intensified
momenta of existence in which the totality of one’s
being is brought to a single thing or ev nt.
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M&inst the Correspondence Coherence
Praprma tl s
t
1
a Theory of Truth
anc3
The dialogical concept of truth is naturally in-
compatible with the traditional theories of truth.
Truth, for Buber, is not the conformity or correspondence
between a proposition and that to which the proposition
refers. It is also not the coherence of an array of pro-
positions
,
since this is incompatible with the concrete-
ness of 1 i
-
T e
. According to the logical conception of
truth’ (coherence theory), says Buber,
only one of two contraries can be true, but in the
reality of life as one lives it they are inseparable
•
The person who makes a decision knows that his
deciding is no self-delusion; the person who has
acted knows that he was and is in the hand of God.
The unity of the contraries is the mystery at the
innermost core of the dialogue, (quoted by Fried p. 3)
The pragmatic theory of truth la equally untenable in
Buber’s eyes, since it is not based on true reality,
which is lived reality here and now . Truth, for Buber, is
always in the present, and has value in itself here and now;
it is not a means to something that is going, to occur in
the future. The pragmatic ti eory of truth is based on
the categories of ’means,' ’usefulness,' and ’future; 1 Buber's
dialogical theory of Truth is based on the categories of
’presentness,’ 'immediacy,* 'ends,' and 'value in itself, 5
Tru tin is not Subjective
Truth, Buber holds, is also not subjective. Stlrner -
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a German proponent of subjectivism
- Buber feels is wrong
in claiming that
' Truth
... exists only - in your head.’
'iou alone are the truth.’ ’The truth is a - creature.’
I'rut!: is what is Mine,’ 'Human truth,* says Buber, ’is
here bound up with the human person's lack of responsibil-
ity,’ i.e., hie lack of true relation. Truth cannot be
suDjectivisedj it is not a ’creature,’ but can only be
'discovered' in true dialogue.
Truth la Unoo sees sable
Although, writes Buber, Stlrner is wrong in declaring
uruth subjective, he is right when - in the aim of making
truth subjective - he undertakes 'the dissolution of
ssco. i-ruth, of ’truth’ as a general good that can
be taken into possession and possessed, 'that is once in-
dependent of and accessible to the person.' (BMK p. 46)
Possessed truth, /Buber says/, is not even a creature,
it is a ghost, a succumbus with which a man mav
succeed in effectively imagining he is living/ but
with which he cannot live. You cannot devour the
truth, it is not served up anywhere in the world,
you cannot even gape at it for it is not even an'
object.
Although truth is ’eternally Irremovable
'
(Ibid. p. 4?)
it can never be possessed.
Truth Cannot be Collectivized
Stlrner, thus, as can be seen from the above, was
aiming at the right thing - the dissolution of possessed
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truth - but he wae wrong In Baking truth 'subjective'
Instead. And this is so not only because truth is simply
not subjective, but because the oubjectlvization of truth
leads to the concept of truth as being psychologically
and sociologically relativized. Fcr, says Euber, since
Stlrner ' s dissolution of possessed truth Is based on
'the demonstration that it is conditioned by the person,'
what else does It mean to say that "'Truth Is what
Is Mine".
..-'And what I take as true Is defined by what
I am,"' than to say that ' "What I am is conditioned by
ay complexes'*... "And what I am Is conditioned by the class
I belong to.'” (Ibid. pp. 46-47)
*he c 1 solution of possessed truth is right, but
its substitution by * subjectivlzed truth’ is escaping from
one trap, falling into another, and falling into a third
one - one more vicious than the last - into the psychologi-
cal and sociological relativization of truth. Here the
truth is neither created by the individual, nor possessed
in a freely chosen way, but one is virtually possessed
by a truth* which is in turn determined by, and relative to,
a person's complexes and the psyche of the masses. Truth
becomes, in the end, collectivized.
fo this development of truth Buber is bitterly
o ppo s ed . h e v;r i tes
,
.ihe sociological doctrine of the age has exercised a
relatlvizing effect, heavy with consequences, on
the concept of truth, in that it has, in the depen-
dence of the thought processes on social processes,
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which also carries along with it the wholepersonal power of standing his test. (Ibid, p 81)
It is of course impossible, says Buber, time and again
to determine whether a discovered truth can or cannot be
derived from the social factor.
hu .it is an ineluctable duty to accept what cannotbe bo derived as a border concept and thus to
point out, as the unattainable horizon of the dis-
tinction mace by the sociology of knowledge, what
takes place between the underlvable in the recog-
nizing person ana the underlvable in the object of
his recognition, (loc. cit.
)
Tru tu is ixlstentl illy Realized in I rue iialo.pue
Again we can see Buber’s philosophy of the ’narrow
ridge.’ Truth, for him, is neither subjective, nor collec-
tivistic, nor is it an independent good that can be possessed
but it is dialogical. It is found in the meeting of man
with the Other. Although, says Buber, truth cannot be
possessed, or created,
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5S!2
e” l
“; *™V man who standfits
; r ^;
exists a real relation of the whole humanpei son to the unpossessed, unpossessable truth8
“?”? C' t6<5 ?
n
i
y la standing Its test. Thisreal relation, whatever It Is caller,, la therelation to the Present Being. (Ibid. 47 )
test.
and
Although truth cannot be possessed, it 'can be served...
by perceiving and standing test.' (loc. cit.)
nere Buber is closely related to Kierkegaard who
says
;
he who communicates it /the Truth/ le only a Single
^ne» Ano then its communication is again onlv fortne^ingle One; for this view of life, "the SingleOne ,1s the very truth, (loc. cit.)
Buber points out that it is not that the Single One
exists or should exist which is described as the truth,
but ’’this view of life'* which consists in the
Single One’s existing, and which is hence also
simply identified with him. To be the Single One
is the communication of the Truth, that is, the
human Truth, (loc. cit.)
•Stlrner'fs ’You alone are the truth' and Kierkegaard* a 'The
Single One is the truth* thus mean completely different
things
. The Single One is the truth, not because he thinks
1
it, but because he existentially stands the test of the
appearing truth by the personal existence expressing ’what
is unsaid.' (Ibid, p, 48)
God is the truth because he Is, the Single- One is
the truth because he reaches his existence, (loc. cit.)
The ’ human side of truth/ e&ys Buber, 'is in
human
not a
existenc
having -
e.' (loe. clt.) luean truth U, therefore
tat a ^ooailty, it vital rather than
»
conceptual. It can be confirmed only in the life of man,
in the life of a community. It loses its meaning if it is
cut loose from its connection with the life in true dlalogu
It has to become life If it is to remain real truth. Buber
agrees with Kierkegaard’s claim that ‘the truth for the
Single One only exists in his producing it himself in
action. ’Human truth,’ Buber says, ’is bound up with the
responsibility of the person.
. .ton finds the truth to be
true only when he stands its test.’ (Ibid. p. 82)
’Whatever the word ’’truth” may mean in other spheres,’
Friedman well summarizes Buber, ’in the realm between man
and man it means that one imparts oneself to the other
as what one is.’ It means avoiding all appearance, but
allowing the person with whom one communicates to par-
take of one’s being.
’
(Fried p. 86) It means affirming
ano com inning the other one’s full being, by making him
fyll£ present, by becoming aware of him as a whole, single,
and unique person.
Living with one’s whole being, to be sure, is danger-
ous and strenuous - it always threatens the stability of
tne thinker. It does not allow for complete security
through the possession of a solid general truth. Yet only
the man who experiences with his whole being, using the
powers of true realization, will gain unch rived truth which
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ne himself has discovered. The realising man Is
t 0t
* wlthout Ecounty
,
yet only he la able to
with re- llty anfi. truth.
unpro-
’meet
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'J'D, 02 thls rePaon
> ®uet have faith In the truth
'as that which is Independent of him...which ho cannot
-c,u.ic for hlcself, but With which he can enter Into a
real relation of his very life.' ( Bfs p . 82) He rauBt hove
faith In truth os In 'Itself Inac eeslble but disclosing
itself. In the fact of true responsibility which awaits the
teat', (loo. clt.) as that which c'n neither be possessed
nor expressed, but which can only ’be existentially realised'
in true dialogue. (Ibid. p. 48)
Any genuine llfa-rel ticnehip to Divine 3einp; -th-t is,
-ny such relationship effected with the man's
- is a human truth, and m n has no othertratu. j.o realise this does not mean to relatlvisetruth. The ultimate truth is one, but it is riven
to man only as it enters, reflected as irj a prism,into the true-life-rel; tionsaipB of the human persons.
a tv re it, and yet we have it not, in its riultl-
colored reflection* 'The True, which is identical
wiUi tne Divine, can never be perceived by us dir etlv
wo only contemplate it in its r flection/' in the
example, the symbol.’ .. .(Hunan truth) is participationin Being* It cannot elalm universal validity, but
-• lj
‘
L -' lived, and it can je lived exemplary, symbol-ically. (PW pp. 79-80)
Human truth and the way of achieving it seem to merge
into one.
*- • e ,; -' a vr of ' ''nov/l ntr 1^
In the following section I shall attempt to describe
In more detail the ’dialogical’ way of knowing, and its
relationship to the traditional views of knowledge.
j j^fflnatlon of Traditional Epistemological Problems on
oS ^^ 1 1* temo 1 o lea 1 irloritv of I- Thou ovfcVT-It
As already mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, traditional epistemology rested exclusively on
the reality of the object-subject relationship ano,
consequently, had to wrestle with the problems connected
with this dichotomy, 'how does the subject know the
object? s 'What is more real: the subject or the object?'
'What is the nature of the object, of the subject?' ' What
is the relationship between the subject and the object?'
These are the constant problems.
Buber’s dialogical philosophy of I-Thou cuts beneath
all these distinctions of the I-It epistemologies,
establishing an entirely different way of knowing, one
which avoids all the pitfalls of traditional epistemologi-
cal theories and nullifies the traditional epistemological
problems in general.
This elimination of traditional epistemological
problems Buber bases - in addition to the view of the
ontological priority of I-Thou over 1-It - on his anthro-
pological belief that the I-Thou relation between men is
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" rom a <3evel°Pffiental point of view, prior to the I-It
relationship among them. Consequently the I-It or subject-
objecv waj, of snowing must be based on and derived from
the dialogical way of knowing. The problems arising in
connection with the former become secondary. This marks
a complete reversal of the traditional view according to
which the relation between persons is derived from the
relation of the knowing, subject to the external world.
As I become I, I say Thou,' says Buber. From this,
feels Friedman, it follows that our belief in the reality
of the external world is based on our relationship with
other selves. Consequently, Buber is opposed to the view
that we know the external world of the senses directly
and other selves only indirectly by analogy, that the
child ^lrst knows the material objects through hie eenses
and only afterwards, through the behavior of other persons,
comes to knew them a t persons. Buber believes that the
child first, comes to know persons as persons, and then
arrives at a knowledge of the external world. A child has
the Innate potentiality of becoming a person. Its first
meeting with persons is prior to the knowledge of the
outer worlo, even prior to the child’s awareness of him-
self as I,
From this initial I-Thou relationship, Buber holds,
the child’s knowledge of the external world is derived.
The child, through the social relationship with others
gradually takes over the I-It relationship to people and
-144-
things of the adult. Through a constant comparison and
imitation of the perceptions of others and their way of
dealin with their environment, with its own perceptions
ant, ways of action, this transition from the I-Thou to
an 1-1 t relation with the external things is brought
about. Thus, on account of the derlvatory and secondary
character of the I-It relation, dialogue in later life
Which is often purely technical, thus no genuine dialogue,
and Itself belonging to the world of It, may yet produce
the strong belief in a reality 'outside.' It can do this,
however, only because it is based on the prior meeting
with the Thou.
4- LS. fL Response to and a Becominr Aware
Thie knowledge yielded through the reality of the
I-Thou relationship is not a knowledge of the other one or
my 8 elf as an objective entity, rather, it coneipts in a
genuinely reel pro cal meeting in which two brings enter j n to
relation with the fulness of their being. Dialogical
knowing is, In the end, a response to what Buber e^llr
the ei^np which, address us, It- is s * becoming aware*
ol these si gns , Alans are s imply every thins* we meet * The
signs of address, * Says Buber
are not something extraordinary
,
something that
steps out of the order of things, they are just
what goes on time and again, just what goes on in
any case, nothing is added by the address .What
occurs to me addresses me. (BMM p, 11)
ihe directne 8s of the dialogical meeting, writes
Friedman on Buber, is mediated by the senses but also by
the 'word,' i.e., all those symbolic forms of communication
such as language, music, art, ritual, etc. here, it
seems to me, Friedman makes a distinction which is at
the same time right and wrong. It is right insofar as there
are these two types of mediation, but it is incorrect to
the extent that it somehow puts these two types of media-
tors on the same level. There Is a difference not with-
in one category, but there are, somehow, two categories
on two different levels. Mediation through the senses is
necessary in all responding to signs, mediation through
the 'word' is not. For example, in the direct meeting of
a person, the dialogue need not necessarily be mediated
by the ’word,’ say, in our case, by language. I would call
the mediation through the senses a ’direct mediation.' ihe
mediation through ’words,’ through ’symbols’ a 'secondary
mediation.' 'lake for example, a painting. It mediates
between the concrete reality, i.e., the creative act of
the artist and his experience, and the man who watches
or meets’ the work of art, I e senses, In turn mediate
between the symbol, f i.e,, the picture, and the person,
1'bie way one can speak of the senses as a 'urinary*
mediator, and of ’ symbols'' as ’secondary’ mediators. The
senses somehow have the priority over ’symbols’ as mediators.
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cycLol,*' it Rsems to me, for Buber can mean
three different things, and accordingly serve three
different purpo se s
:
' Symbols * in the world of I -It may be identified
witn subject-object knowledge of the world. There they
are taken to be entities independent of the dialogue
between man ana the world, expressing either universal
ideas or denoting objective empirical reality. The latter
way of seeing ’symbols* separates the object from the
knowing subject, discarding any connotations and every-
thing that is not empirically verifiable. The former
points indirectly to objects instead of the dialogue
between two beings. (Even these symbols, Buber holds,
i
which are taken to be completely independent of dialogue
have been derived sometime from actual dialogic meeting.
I-It knowledge thus is really nothing but the socially
objectified meetings wnlch have been forced into the
categories of I-It. (Fried p. 166})
A * symbol f in the dialogical sense, as Buber under-
stands it, is not a conventional sign, a concrete mani-
festation of a universal. Bather It is *a mythical or
conceptual representation of a concrete reality. It is
the product of the real meeting in the actual present of
two separate beings, 5 (Fried p. 167) which always points
back to the reality of dialogical knowing.
The third kind of a ’symbol, 5 also a ’symbol* in the
dialog leal sense, yet different from the second kind, is a
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con Junction of a ’sign,’ l.e
and a ’ symbol ' of the first
> .
. ,
something addressing us,
I have termed It ’primary mediator’ - at ti e same tine,
For example, a painting that I have painted some time
ago and am looking at may point back to the concrete act
of creating the painting (second type of symbol) while
it may also, though probably not at the same tine, become
a Thou for me with whin? I enter into a completely new
relation, "big third type of ’ symbol
’ Is thus really a
'sign' that happens to have the form of a symbol (the
actual function of which is at the time of its becoming
a 'sign' only potential, and prevented from actualization
through the predominant functi n of becorai g a ’sign’).
Ida Adarc- so Through ! dim ns * Can.no V r e b>xc res sec anc
Communicated
Man is addressed all the time, yet he often coca not
know it. 'The waves of the aether roar on always,' says
Buber, ’but for most of the time we have turned off our
receivers. The 1 eason for our insensitivity is that we
do not consider these 'signs’ as something really address-
ing up, but only as objective phenomena.
Only by sterilizing it £the 'signU, removing the
seed of address from it, can I take what occurs to me
as a art of the world-hap-* ening which does not refer
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to me. The interlocking
which all this needs onl
titanic work. (EMM p, 11
sterilized ayatera into
^
to be dovetailed is man c
4a was seen above, for Buber, 'signs' are not Just
conventionally defined symbols from which everybody may
derive the same meaning. Bather, a 'sign' in Buber's
sense is something that does not speak to everybody, but
only to the one who sees it 'say' something to him. Neither
need It say the same thing to different people. To the
•observer' or 'onlooker' the 'signs’ won't 'say* anything,
but only to a person whose 'way of perception /Jsj
hg comic aware
.
' In other words, only to the Tnan who
stands in an I- Thou relation, whether in a reciprocal one
with other persons or a non-reciprocal one with nature *nd
works of art, etc., will the 'signs* 'say' something. (Ibid.
pp. 8-1 C
)
It is difficult for us to let 'signs' 'say' some-
thin- to us by 'becoming aware' of them in true ' present-
ness . ’ For we are conditioned to apply to all the 'signs'
the categories of space and time or to interpret them in
terms of physics, biology, or sociology, etc. We feel
we can 'look /.them/ up in /a/ dictionary ... even if not
necessarily a written one,’ since we believe that 'things
remain the same' and ’are discovered once for all,* and that
’rules, laws, and analogical conclusions ray be employed
throughout.' (Ibid. p. 12)
Dialogical perception, however, says Buber,
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WhGn °n6 51 oNonary is put down...What occursto me says something to me, but what it says to mec^ot he revealec by any esoteric information; for
i* Si!
never been said before nor is it composed ofhave ever been said
.
It can neither be
-
~ ; x .. ted nor oranslated, I can have it neither
—i ' -i,
!Rce
tuation,
v _
----- moment and cannot
~e Isolated, it remains the question of the question-er and will have its answer, (loc. cit,
)
g
Xmbolg age ?lytr ;cii xie to True Haloes If Thev Cease
T- rr— • is. iM of Elaloglcal Know in . and
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Similarly, as ’signs' cannot be looked up in a
dictionary, so ’symbols’ - the objectification of our true
meeting with the ’signs ’-must not become completely ab-
stract. B’or if they do become abstract and universalized,
the original meeting is forgotten, the symbols cease point-
ing hack to the reality of dialogical knowing. This, Buber
feels, is a great danger. If 'words' do not retain their
symbolical character in the dialogical sense, they become an
obstruction to true dialogue. Of course, subject-object
knowledge, along with the life of dialogue is necessary for
human existence, yet this knowledge should, even if only
to a very slight degree, retain the symbolical character
of dialogue. The dependent and mediate reality of the I-It
knowledge must not be forgotten completely. If symbols
are exhausted by their technical function, the world of It
is, as a result of this, set up as the final reality. Here
lies the danger of our day. If the fact that the social
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and categorized world of I-It is derived fro® the world
”' 3
’
13 "^gotten, the abstract symbols will not only
not point back to concrete reality, but they will be
applied to all future experience. Sociality then degener-
ates into purely ’technical dialogue’ in which human beings
deal with each other and with nature as mere Its, and the
categories of I-it are taken to be reality, instead of
being understood as the symbolic representations of
what '.as become. The present is being Judged by the past
’as if there were no present reality until that reality
had become past and therefore capable of being dealt with
In our thought categories.’ (fried p, 169) The knowing
subject is abstracted from his relations*?! with the
Other a O' ',eoones an ’ ob Jf ctive, 5 impersonal observer
who automatically presses rls encounter with ’signs’ into
the I-It categories of language, (the dialogic-symbolical
Character of which lias been forgotten conrcletel - )
.
PIa 3-orleal by uericncc is Chs meter! ge e by brloueness aril
Pres entrees
The alternative to this pressing of our encounter
with the Other, with the ’signs,' into the I-It categories
of the past is not a mystical union with the Other. Buber's
assertion of the reality of the I -Thou relation ever? with
nature rm.u t not be understood, this way. It retains the
distinction between the knowing subject and the object,
the betweenness of dialogue. But in distinction to the
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aclentlfic approach to nature, the I-Thou relationship
to nature is characterized by uniqueness and presentness.
Mature ceases to be the passive object of our thought
categories o the past, but is made present so that it
may 1 say ! something to us, and in this way has an I-Thou
relationship with us. We realize that we know objects only
indirectly and conceptually through the categories of I-It,
an.; therefore see things in their uniqueness and present-
ness and not already filtered through our categories of
knowledge and use. We then can i’eel the 'impact' of the
relation in the present moment between us and the noo-
human, but active, reality which has become a Thou for
us, an ‘impact’ which we cannot describe anart from this
relationship, (Fried pp, 169-170)^
The presentness of the Thou is most important in
man's dealing with other persons. In our modern time the
awareness of one's fellow as a whole, single and unique
person has become extremely rare, bather, an analytic,
reductive, and derivative lance predominates between
man and man. The whole body-soul being is tre tea as
something composite and thus dissectible. The mystery
between man and man is undergoing a radical dissolution.
Personality, once a mystery and motive ground for stillest
inspiration is levelled out, (Fried p, 125 )
But, the psychic stream, Buber feels, can never be
dealt with, a r on object, and reduced to a generally
describable and repetitive mechanism. The individual,
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central, dynamic principle of a person can not be replaced
l>y a general one.
distinction to things, defies complete
object! flcati on • he can, naturally, also become an
object of observation and scientific investigation, but
xn i is existing wholeness he can be experienced only as a
partner in dialogue. It is man’s ’person defining'
spirit that sets up this insurmountable limit to objecti-
fication. Only through pc-rsonale Ve r,v e ,- enwa er- 1 i gu n
g
. through
the awareness of the dynamic wholeness of other persons,
can man be understood as man. (Ibid, p. 1 7
1
) Of course,
psychology, for example, has shown that many human relations
are simply neurotic projections of relations in the
past and thus belong to the world of I-It. Nevertheless,
Buber feels, this does not disprove the ontological
reality of the I-Thou. Since psychological knowledge
belongs to the categorized, knowledge of the past it cannot
possibly disprove the reality of the I-Thou which is
always in the present. Insofar as it is scientific, and
thus ’objective,’ it excludes the present knowing of
the I-Thou, it judges the present by the past 'as if there
were no present reality until that reality had become past
and therefore capable of being dealt with in our thought
categories.’ (Ibid, p, 169) Since the I-Thou knowing is
prior to the I-It knowing, a criticism of the I-Thou on
the basis of I-It is a logical impossibility. The I-Thou
in its uniqueness, and resentness can never be disproved,
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it can only be proved by actually entering Into it.
~~~ dories of I -It are Indispensable
.
;i£LL dominate So Stronrlv as to Eliminate
In Its Ineffability "
but They Must
I-Thou ~ xv er-ience
ihe acceptance of the I-Thou epistemology does of
course not imply a rejection of science, its techniques,
and its findings. Science, even the social sciences, will
always have to objectify. Buber recognizes the indispensa-
bility of the ’emergency structures of analogy and typology’
for the work of the human mind, however, holds Buber, 'to
step on them when the question of the questioner steps
up to you,’ that is, when the sign addresses you, ’seems
to me, would be running away.' Buber also shows great
deference to the ’world continuum of space and time.' But
he also writes? 'I know as a living truth only concrete
world reality which is constantly, in every moment,
reached out to me,’ Concrete 'world reality' is ' inseparable,
incomparable, irreducible, now, happening once only.' (BMM
P. 12)
What has to be recognized, therefore, is that the
I-It relation is itself* based on 'confrontations’ and
is thus not the primary reality. The I-Thou and the I-It
types of knowing have to be integrated. This means the
recognition that I-It knowledge has to retain its symbol-
ical quality of pointing back to the dialogical knowing
from which it derives, if it is to fulfil its true function.
It also implies the realization that the essence of the
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Cther, especially of man, cannot be discovered as a
scientific observer, who la as distant from the object
" e observes as possible, but on y by somebody participating
in the Thou, who gains the distance from the object only
afterwards so that he can formulate the insights he has
attained, v or man is an integrated whole and not a sum
of parts, anc therefore cannot be understood by science
whose meth d is to investigate Its subject matter not as
a whole, but in selective aspects. The essence of tnancan
be discovered only by entering into a relation with him,
a relation which is more than just 'a poor combination
of "objectivity” and ’’subjectivity” in which subjective
emotion corrupts the otherwise objective power of reason, 1
(Fried p, 173) Lastly
,
this acceptance of the I-Thou way
of knowing means that man should try to gain or regain
the courage and the ability to respond, at least now
and then, to nature, man, and God as a genuine Thou in
relation, and to listen to a ’saying’ from, this Thou, a
saying that cannot be put into the language? of I-It
knowledge. It means that man in his experience allows
for uniqueness, for something outside the categories of the
I-It - even if this threatened his security and stability -
something beyond repetition, typology, categorization,
objectivication, etc, For example, writes Buber, such
an experience can occur
when in a receptive hour of my personal life a
man meets me about whom there is something, which I
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ob^ ective way at ',11,cannot graep in any
says something” to me. That
me what manner of man this
him, and the like. But it
to no., addresses
ontcre my own life. It can be something
-.bout
U1 is man, for instance that he needs me. But itcan also be something about myself. The man him-
self in his relation
what is said. He has
that
does not mean, says to
is, what is going on in
means, says something
s v -i • ui ; i ng to me, speaks son’: e tb.i n
g
Indeed not
to
no
S36 has nothing
relation to me,
to do wi th
he has
noticed me at all. It is net ! e wl o
me, as that solitary man silentlyBays it to
confessed his secret to his neighbour or; the seatbut it, says it... The effect of having said this to
me is completely different from that of looking on
cannot depict or denote or describe
through who m, someth!;
t has been
I to attempt it, that would be
,
y
and observing. I
the man in whom,
said to me. Were
thr crci of saying. (EKM pp/ 9-10)7
CivTCLGGY
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Buber's ontology is the least developed of all the
four fields I am dealing with. In fact, the 'ontological
statements' in Buber’s writings are very few. Yet on the
basis of these few statements, and by implicrtion from the
rest of his I-Thou philosophy, an ontology in Buber’s sense
might be inferred, an ontology, however, to be sure, that
is altogether secondary to the immediacy of the I-Thou
meeting.
A Personal 1st 1c Ontology
/.ill Herberg suggests that Buber's hidden ontology
might be called 'a personallstlc ontology.' ’"/The Thou7
does tJot help to sustain you in life, ’ Buber s^ys, 'it only
helps you to glimpse eternity, ’ from which one might infer.,
that whereas the I- It attitude gives access only to the
world of appearance, the I-Thou gives access to the world
of r eality ... It is in the I-Thou relation thst man in his
authentic personality emerges. "Through the Thou a man be-
comes an I." The primal reality in which men receives his
being is the ><1 schen-menschl i ch:
.
the ’’between man and man,
(Will Herberg;, op. clt., p. 15) and the 'betvreen God and man
Access to reality cannot be obtained except by enter-
ing into relation with the Other. For only ’between' the I
and the Thou, in the meeting of two persons, is true reality
Only the person, one taking stand in relation, can share in
true reality and thus become authentic. True being is always
primarily personal being, it emerges in the dialogical rels-
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tion of man with man, In the I-Thou. 'The I,' acya 3uber
is real in virtue of Its sharing /that Is, entering Into
true relation/ In reality. The fuller Its shoring the more
real it becomes.' (iTh p. 63)
Reality# for iuber, is therefore neither in the I
nor in the Thou, but somehow it is in between, it is some-
thing 'that neither merely belongs to him /the person'/ nor
merely lies outside him.’ (loo. cit.) 'All reality,' says
Buber, 'la an activity in which I share without being able
to appropriate for myself, Where there is no sharing there
la no reality. Where there is self
-appropriation there Is no
reality. The more direct the contact with the Thou, the
fuller Is the sharing, 1 (loc. cit.)
Reality
,
u;ius, is really the meeting of two persons
itself
. But since, by definition, the meeting consists in
the 'sharing of two persons, by virtue of this sharing
activity, the I or the Thou can never appropriate reality
i or themselves. For if they try to do so, then, by necessity
,
they cannot share any longer. Consequently there is no
reality which can be appropriated, since the sharing acti-
vity constitutes reality. The meeting, of the I with the
Thou brings about true reality, and a® it brings it about,
the I and the Thou themselves, in a reciprocal process,
obtain reality by sharing in the reality which they have
created through their meeting. (This is really tautological,
since the meeting is sharing. ' Raring' (which brings about
true reality, better, is true reality), is Identical with
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sharing In reality.' clarity of exposition is here
prevented by the limitations of our language.)8
j-. '• 1 1
->y is rcircle cf ri?iue Reality
Accordingly as only a person, that is, one in dialogue,
shares in true reality, the individual, that is, someone
who does not enter into true relations where he can share,
does not have access to reality. In separation, that is, In
an I-It relation, man is devoid of true being.
However, says Buber, ’the I that steps out of the
relational event, into separation and consciousness of sepa,-
ration, does not lose Its reality. Its sharing is preserved
in it in a living way... ''the seed remains in it." 1 (ITh p. 63)
This state of a person, not being in relation but willing
to enter into it, Buber calls the state of ’subjectivity.'
In it, the person is still connected to reality although
the snaring is not very lull; yet he is not completely remote
from reality ns is tne man in the state of pure individuality.
In. complete Individuality there Is complete separation from
other persons, while in subjectivity there is only lack of
actual relation; nevertheless in It 'the I is aware with a
single awareness of its solidarity of connection and of its
separation.
. ./and/ the desire formed and heightened for ever
higher, more unconditioned relation, for the full sharing in
being.' (loc . cit .). Genuine subjectivity Is the state of a
person, of an I, conscious of itself as partner in a rela-
tion, or as a potential partner of a fhou. It is only pure
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’ individuality in differentiating Itself from others
/completely thr t/ is rendered remote from true being...
/Only/ individuality neither shares in nor obtains any
reality. 1 (Ibid. p. 64}
However, b cause individuality is remote from 'true'
being, sc remote that it does not have any ‘true’ being
at all, (this never really happens because of the eternal
presence of the Divine Thou), it need not necessarily
have no being at all. From Buber’s constant qualification
of dialogical reality as 'true' reality It can be seen
that for him also other modes of being exist, besides that
of ’true' reality, that is, that individualities too have
some kind 0 i being, that objects of perception - even if
they are not in dialogue - have some sort of being. This
being which individualities have, for Buber
,
is that of
ontological (not only epistemological )9 abstractions,
derivatives from the original dialogical meet In with the
Thou. All I- It, Buber holds, is derived from I-Thou.
In reality, of course, there is no simple split in
Gog's creation between I-Thou and I-It, but there are
indefinite amounts of degrees of participation in true
being, just as many as there are beings in the universe.
Buber's philosophy thus - although Buber never expressed
this himself - seems to imply the notion of 'degrees of
true reality, ' the degree being determined by the amount
V
of sharing of the Individual being in true dialogue . Pure
indlviauality, accordingly, since it lacks dialogue
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corapletely, would (If It could exist) have no true reality
at all. However, I feel, despite its complete lack of
true reality, Buber would not deny its plain being, as It,
thfit is, the being of an ontological derivative from I-fhou
that has cut all its bonds to the latter 1
.
Tru cJ ..g-allty is not Unity of beliy?
Just as true reality cannot be found in separateness,
there is no true reality where there is ’unity of being,
’
This unity of being can be twofold; first, thrt of man
wit)..' nimsclt
,
second, tn< u ol man with God, fellow—men, or
nature, in mystical union.
ban's unity with himself, Buber feels, Is a colossal
illusion of the human spirit bent back on Itself. In. it
mar reduces God and the world to functions of the human
soul, whereas, in reality, the world and , od have separate
existence. The image of the world may be in man, but not
its reality. 'All modern attempts,' writes Buber, 'to
interpret this primal reality of dialogue as :• r o'l • tier
of the I to the Seif, or the like - as an event that Is
contained within the self-sufficient interior of man - are
futile: thy take their place In the abysmal history of
destruction of reality. ’ (Ibid. o. 85 )
Similarly, a mystical union bet’, een man arid God,
other men and nature is an illusion. Unity between the I
and the Thou does not exist.
•hat the ecstatic man calls union is th"
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^?r
U
r
in
f+
dyr!M1 ? of relation,., the relation\ts®~{. in * ts vl °al unity ie felt so forcibly
i-. o.t its parts seem to face before it. and ir
? t f
ce
.
of its life, the I and the Thou, between
v/aich it is established, are forgotten. (Ibid. p. 87)
.i-ven if mystical union, union of being, could exist,
reality could not be found in it. To be sure, ’in lived
reality there is... the becoming one of the soul,’ the
concentration of all one’s powers and urges, ’but this
does net involve, like absorption, disregard of the real
\
person. True reality, even inner reality, ’exists only in
effective ^mutual/ action,' and ’the most powerful and
deepest reality exists where everything enters into the
effective action, with ut reserve the whole man and God the
all-embracing - the united I and the boundless Thou.’ (Ibid,
p. 89)
Is God Self-Gu.fflelent?
Ultimately God is a mystery, consequently no state-
ments ab ut his nature, his self-sufficiency, can be made.
All we know about Him is that He is the Eternal Thcu of his
creation.
From this it would follow, that the question as to
whether the absence of man’s relation to God or vice versa
would render God imperfect or not, that is, not ’truly'
real or not, cannot be determined by man.
Buber, though, makes a statement which at first
glance seems to imply that he holds that God's per-
fect! • n defends u on the reality of His relation to us.
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H© writes:
t*d .needs you - In the fulness of His eternity
n^.
n
(ma!°p: 82^
the very ™6Enins of your
Yet, this sentence may he interpreted in such a way thrt
God's perfection apart from a relationship to us is not
questioned. For God, according to the above quote, does
not need us for the very meaning of His life, but only for
the very meaning of our life. This is like saying, »i need
a dog so that the dog can run.
'
However, there definitely is Illogicality involved,
since the word 'need' has no connection to the consecutive
sentence, ’for the very meaning of your life.’ Consequently,
even If Buber really wanted to express that God needs us,
Go-c
,
* ccordlng to the abovs quote, would not need us. The
qualifying consecutive sentence, ’for the very meaning of
your life,’ renders the first one, 'God needs you,' mean-
ingless.
The question remains unresolved.
Traditional Categories such as ' latter, ' 'Spirit,' etc..
are Abstractions from the Primary Meet lit of th I with
the Thou
It is difficult to say what Buber's view is with
respect to traditional categories such as matter, spirit,
suostance, process, etc. Buber simply isn't concerned with
these traditional ontological problems. This unconcern, it
seems to me, though, Is not due to unjustified indifference,
but to the fact that Bubor meant to cut beneath all these
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traditlonal distinctions with his I-Thou philosophy,
which doesn't fall into any of these traditional cate-
gories. Thus Buber is not unconcerned with traditional
ontological problems, rather, he somehow overcomes them.
According to Friedman, Buber agrees with Kant thet
we cannot know the world in itself apart from its rela-
tion to the knowing subject. This way Buber avoids re-
moving reality into the knowing subject as the idealists
have done, but he does not agree with Kant's assertion
that we cannot know reality but only the categories of
our thought. (Fried pp. 163-64) Buber believes th^t we
do actually get in contact with reality - not by way of
scientific investigation, however, but by entering into
genuine relation with God, men, and the world. 'Matter,'
and similar categories, for Buber, seem to be abstractions
of encounters with the Other, abstractions which are
acquired in early childhood when the child moves from its
initial I-Thou relation to its environment, to an I-It
q
relation. Later in life, the abstraction is intensified
through education or active scientific Invest igation,
(which la always I-It). One could thus say, that categories
such as 'matter' are epistemological derivatives from man's
truly dialogical relationship with people anu: the world,
Whether
,
however, these categories are also abstrac-
tions, derivatives, in the ontological sense, Buber never
states. For example, he never expresses his opinion as to
whether he believes that there are atoms or not, as he
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w°ulo. claim that there are trees, which do have some kind
oi he in
,
even if man does not enter into relation with
tnem, the being of an ontological derivative from I-fhou.
juber neither affirms nor denies the plain being of ’natter,
•
spirit,' etc. One thing seems to be certain: if they do
have some kind of being, it is not ’true reality' in the
dialogical sense.
PART THREE
BUBLR COMPARED
-168-
Buber'a philosophy snows great similarities with
the philosophies of modern existentialist thinkers -
(although non© of them anticipated or repeated him, or
defined the I-Thou relation with his precision) - especially
v, ith the philosophies of the other three outstanding
existentialist thinkers of cur timej Marita in, Tillich,
ariu Berdyaev* The similarities here concern es ec tally
the social, existential, porsonaliatic, and ontological
aspects of the respective philosophies.
Despite the a'T initios between Buo i and theoe other
three t <i kers, I hove decided to attempt a comparison of
Buoer with Kierkegaard, Bergson, Whitehead, and Buddhism
and Hinduism. The main reason for this choice was that I
believe a comparison with these philoso hies to be more
illuminating, especially since the latter philosophies
are somewhat closer to traditional philosophy than those
of the three religl us existentialists mentioned above.
Consequently, Buber’s philosophy will be set better into the
context of traditional philo ophy and the relative novelty
of his thought will become clearer than if compared with
the religious existentialists.
The other reason for this choice of philosophies for
comparison is the fact th- t Buber himself ha contr sted
his philosophy with those of Kierkegaard, Bergson,
Hinduism and Buddhism (although not with VL 1. teheed 'e )
.
As a result, the following comparisons will allow for
greater authenticity than would a cc pp.rlson of Buber
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with other philosophies chosen at random.
I
• yi v ^.Ahrd 1 s Oabegoi y 01 bho wl.i; f... Cite
Kierkega rd was probe oly the greatest single influence
on Buber's thought « It is virtually on Kierkegaard's category
of the single Dug, that Buber bases one develops his persona—
listic philosophy
. jut although Buber was influenced so strong-
ly by Kierkegaard
,
and despite the strong affinities of
his philosophy with the one of Kierkegaard, one would do
injustice to both men if one wore to lump together their
philosophies. The differences between the two philosophies
are essential - and the point where these essential differen-
ces lie is exactly where there are the strongest affinities -
the category of the Single One. Buber took over Kierke-
gaard,' 3 category of the single One, but transformed the
concept essentially; setter, he expanded it, thus giving
It an essentially different meaning.
According to his own interpretation of Hi rkegar rd's
philosophy, Buber himself, in Between I :.n and, dan, dis-
tinguishes his philosophy very sharply from the one of
Kierkeg- ard
,
Buber agrees with Kierkegaard tin t in order to be
able to enter into an I-Thou relationship with fod - which
for both men, although in an essentially different way , is
the ultimate aim - man 1ms to become a .Ingle One, a uni-
fied whole. *A man, * says Buber, 'can have dealings with
God only as a Single One.' (3MM p. 43) Consequently Buber
stands with Kierkegaard in the latter '3 insistence on re-
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fusln6 to b© swallowed up in the ' crowd * ' ’only /b.b
J
a self,
^as7 a real person,' he says, 'is /man/ able to have a com-
plete relation of his life to the other self. 1 (ibid. p. 175)
Buber, as Kierkegaard, knows that without being and remain-
ing oneself there is no love, no genuine relation. Lastly,
both men also agree that being a Single One 'means to let
oneself be helped by God.
*
(Kierkegaard)
Buber goes along with Kierkegaard in these respects.
However, he disagrees with him insofar as he thinks thrt
being a Single One in Kierkegaard's sense is not enough for
being a full person in a truly dialogical relationship with
Bod. 'And yet,’ says Buber in this context, being a Single
One in Kierkegaard's sense 'is not the way,' (Ibid. p. 50)
for becoming a single One in Kierkegaard's sense
means to be made ready for the one relation which can
be entered into only as the Single One, the one,
the relation for whose sake man exists. This relation
is an exclusive one, and this... means that It Is the
exclusive relation, excluding all ethers j more pre-
cisely, that it is the relation which in virtue
of its unique, essential life expels all other
relations into the realm of the unessential, (loc. cit.)
not
Thus, 'the dingle One has to do essentially - isA to be
“chary” - only with Pod, * and with himself. (Ibid. p. 51;
underlining mine)
To this interpretation of Kierkega- rd's category of
the Single One Buber la radically opposed. He refuses to
Unit the interpersonal relation si ply to relatione between
God end man, to the exclusion of other human beings. As
against Kierkegaard's assertion that 'everyone Bhould be
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chary about having to do with the "others" and should essenti-
ally speak only with God and with himself,' Buber claims
that true relationship Is triadic, including the self,
uoo
»
nw uod '° crertlon, that is, fellow-men and the world.
'This joining of the "with God,'" he says,
with the with himself is a serious incamoatibilitytnrt nothing can l itigate.
. . Speaking with God is
something ^pto i - different from ' s oeaking with
oneself, whereas, remarkably enough, it is net
something teto different from soeaking
v:ith another human being. For in the latter coBe,
thei e is in common the fact of being approached,
grasped, addressed, which cannot be anticipated in
any depth of the soul; but in tho former, there is
no such common fact In spite of all the soul’s
adventures in doubling roles... only when I have to
Go with another essentially - that is, in such a way
thft he is no longer a phenomenon of my I - but
instead is my Thou - do I experience* * .the irrefra-
gable uniqueness of mutuality. (Ibid. pp. 50-51)
'Real relationship with God cannot be achieved on earth
if real relationship to the world and mankind is lacking,
'
(AT p. 39) just as real relationships with other human
beings are possible only through a relationship to God.
'Kierkegaard, ' says Buber, 'the Christian concerned
with "contemporaneity** with Jesus. . .contradicts his master.'
(BMM p. 51) For he misunderstood the Great Commandment!
'Love God with all your might' and 'Love your neighbour
as you love yourself.* 'God and man, 1 says Buber
are not rivals. Exclusive love of God ('with all
your heart') is, because He is God
,
Inclusive love,
ready to accept and Include all love.../God/ limits
Himself In all His limltlessness; He makes room for
creatures, and so, in the love of Him, He makes
room for love to creatures. (Ibid. pp. 51-52)
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Bubcr disaGreea violently with Kierkegaard * s state-
nc-nt about his renunciation cf Regina Olsen: Mn order to
cor.e to love, I had to remove the object.’ Kierkegaard,
Buber feels, here sublimely misunderstood God. ‘Creation,*
he writes.
Is not o hurdle on the road to God; it is thero^
.tself. i/e are created along with one another
':r- nl-erJ
0
?
t0 R life with one mother, creatures
-ire P aced In ray way sc that I, their fallow
creature, by means of them and with them, may find
wrniJT^ +°
G
°?u
A °°d reached by excluding them
n V
ot bo tj
.
e *11 beings in whom all
~t fVi
f
J
llod * A God in vh<m only the parallelj...nwS cf single approaches Intersect 13 more
fn:
n
i °, ? ,?
oc
l of the philosophers’ than tojl -" : u ° 0., AbraJiam and Isaak and Jacob, ’ God
to c
<J
me *>0 him by means of the Reginas
ne h s Cxor ted, and not by renunciation of them.
It
We
,
ove object, then - we have removed
o,?e object altogether. Ithout an object, arti-Ileially producing the obj ct from the abundance
of the human spirit and celling It God, thislove has its being in the void. (ibid. p. 5?)
Aim cannot reach God unless he embraces the world that
2.Q given to him, unless he serves in God's plan of creation
and redemption. In this embracing of the world it is not
essential
that we should see things as standing out from God,
nor as being absorbed in him, but that we should
'pee things in God, “ the things themselves
. . . Onlv
wrhon all relations, uncurtailed, are taken into
the one relation, do we set the circle of our
life’s world round the sun of our being. (Ibid. p. 54 )
The Single One ’ corresponds ’ to oc only when he.
in his human way, embraces the bit of the world
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not to' be^found by Safe to ttloved by reduction, (role. PP . “,=!) be
rhe ,0thic^1 »* that is 5 man's relation to fellow-
men and the world, for Buber is not, as it is for Kierke-
<rrrdj a ' morality belonging to a realm of relativity,
tiiD© and ag in overtaken and Invalidated by the religious; •
it is not ’a "stage" from which a "leap” leads to the
religious,
' but 'It means essential acting and suffering
in relation to men, coordinated with the essential re-
lation. to God,' Neither religion nor ethics, writes Buber,
is aut- r.;i, neither can bo freed from the other 'with-
out Of sing to do justice to the present truth.* (Ibid,
p. 56)
Accordingly, as man can have a true relation to
^oci only if he embraces the bit of the world given to
him, Buber disagrees with Kierkegaard also on the latter's
view on marriage and the 'body politic.’ hile, in Buber’s
opinion, Kierkega rd thinks of marriage as of a symbol,
and while he considers marriage to be an impediment for
a true relation with God, Buber believes that marriage
is not only symbolical - thus essentially impersonal,
but essential. Although the woman, says Buber, stands
'in a dangerous rapport to finitude,
'
(kierkegarrd)
and finitude certainly is a dnger.
. «our hope of
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snlvation 13 forged on tk-I
human way to the'infinito'
-ul fillo ' fInitudo
.
( ibid
.
s very danger, for our
leads only through? -I)
And while Kierkegaard is sharply opposed to the 'body
politic, 1 Buber believes that the ’body politic , * how-
ever degenerate it may be, should not be rejected*
r
V®
•i
i
n
;
:le 0ne 13 aot the man who has to do
!r
J,p-
e3
-©ntlally, and only unessentially
otnere, who is unconditionally concerned
w:ltn God and conditionally with the body noil-
:j
j
. o • .’ha dingle One Is the man for whom* the
re lity ox relation with God as an exclusive
relation Includes and eucompasses the osslhili-
v
of relation with all otherness, • nd for
bony politic, the reservoir of oh c-
ness —offers just enough otherness for him
r* In 1 & J* . * X » • I / _ ^to pass hie life with-it. (Ibid. p. 65)
i° be sure* Buber too z • .3 the 1 crowd* as it is,
since it prevents many people from being true persons.
3ut his rejection differs from Kierkegaard’s, ihile
Klerkeg 1 cl aimply does not want to have anything to do
with the crowd - except maybe where it is useful in daily
life, Buber rejects the croud in the sense that he does
not want the crowd to remain a crowd* That Is, he does
want to have something essential to do with the crowd,
namely
,
to change it into a community In which the
life of dialogue can prosper. Thus he rejects the crowd,
If I may say so, in & positive way, while Klorkegarrd
does it in a negative way, rejecting the crowd completely
,
or dealing with it only if it offers itself as a suitable
means for something higher.
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Certainly, Buber admits, 'monastic' solitude Is
necessary from time to time, so that our relationships
>.
rlt.u hum.- n beings will not become Encapsulated*
' However,
solitude must not for ever be exchanged for the life of
dialogue* a. i ter a while we have to leave solitude and
participate again in ’Present Being.’
4HMfr
Buber stresses that h© Is not criticizing Kierke-
gaard as a person. 'I do not say,’ writes Buber, ’that
It is forbidden to Kierkegaard on his rock, alone with
the mercy of the Merciful. I say only that it is for-
bidden to you and to me.’ (Ibid. p. 56) In Buber’s eyes
Kierkegaard 13 wrong only in saying ’Lot everyone do so,'
in his trying to ’win over the beloved Individual into
"his” world as if it were the true one.’ (Ibid. p. 55)
Kierkegaard’s view of the Single One, Buber says, ’is
based on personal nature and destiny,' (loc. cit.)
and must not be extended to all other human beings.
Buber also feels that Kierkegaard, although wanting
to 'let every one do so,' was at the oa: e time ’dee ly
conscious of the dubiousness which arises from the negati-
a
vising extension of the ctegory of the Single One.' (Ibid*
p* 52 ) Bo, for example, feels Buber, does Kierkegaard
refute his own idea of the category of the Single One
by describing the ’ethical' a.s 'the only means by which God
communlc-tos with "man**1 ' (Kierkegaard) This, says Buber,
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dceB Of course not mean that Kierkegaard absolutizes the
* ethical , ' but it means that the ‘religious* cannot be
autark y and that the ‘ethical* is no longer a 'stage
irom v ich a leap leads to the religious.’ it means that
man 'is forbidden to speak essentially only with God and
/hlm/self .
‘
(Ibid, p, 56 )
At another occasion too, Buber remarks, Kierkegaard
brilliantly refutes himself. In 1843 he confessed in a
journal j ‘Had I had faith I would have remained with
Regina.' Buber translates this into his own language:
'Had I really believed that “with God all things are
possible,” hence also the resolution of this - my
melancholy, my powerlessness, my fear, my fateful aliena-
tion from woman and from the world - then I would have
remained with Regina.' (Ibid. p. 57)
II
. Bergson's Bonce
.t of Intuition
Buber’s I-Thou relation, involving a participation
of the knower in the situation which he knows, must not
be confused with Bergson's concept of absolute intuition
which yields to man a sympathetic knowledge of the world
without any separation from it.
Bergson, unlike Buber, does not differentiate between
the subject and the object In the act of knowing, he fails
to see the difference between the I and the Thou, postu-
lating an act ol intuition by which one transposes oneself
j.nto the interior of the object. He abolishes the duality
of observer and observed first by plunging into the
immediate process of the experienced happening, there,
'where we no longer see ourselves act, but where we act.’
(her son) The rot of knowledge must coincide with the
act that reduces reality. Once this Is accomplished
within a person - that Is, that acting and knowing fall
together - then also intuitive and absolute knowledge of
the world around him can be obtained.
Bergson, writes Buber, attempts to bridge the cleft
between being and knowing through showing that intuition
develops out of instinct. In Its relation to the environ-
ment and to Itself the life principle has split into
instinct and intellect. But the intellect yields only an
image arising under the influence of utilitarian aspirations
Instinct gives no image at all. Consequently, the intellect
has to liberate Itself from the mastery of utilitarian
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"iv:,. In dolns so, however. It will find that It cannot
find a better alternative except by taking refuge ln
instinct. Sow 'the task devolvoa uoon It of raking Instinct
self concclous, of bringing It to the point where it "Inter-
nalizes Itself In knowledge Instead of externalizing itself
in action; " (PW pp. G4-85) where It reflects on Its objects
and upon Itself. The Instinctive and absolute knowledge
of one being of another is given through the unity of
Life Itself.
Buber, in c osition to Bergs on,holds that ’life can
only know itself through the act of knowledge of living
individuals* and that 'no way leads from instinct to intui-
tion.’ (Ibid. p. 86) Consequently, the identity of observer
and that which is observed is impossible. Any kind of
knowledge, whether It, is a ’seeing oneself act' or whether
it ds ’Intuitive' will influence the act. Thus it is
something outside the act, it cannot be identical with
it. Similar is it with man's experience of beings other
than himself. Intuition of, say, other people does not
overpass the duality between the beholder and the one
beheld. The beholder transposes himself into the posi-
tion of the beheld and experiences his particular life,
his sensations and impulses from within. 'That he can do
so is explicable /oriLjj through a deep commu ity between
the two*' (Ibid. p. 81) But this does not mean that the
f^ct of duality is thereby v/eakened. On the contrary,
feels Buber, it is exactly this cleavage of the primal
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oommmlty that is tho foundation of the act of intuition.
The intuitive way of knowing is, like all other ways of
knowing
,
based on the undimlniahed dual presence of tho
observer and the observed. The being that is perceived
and ’known 1 is never identical with the actual existing
being. Intuition may diminish the difference, but it cannot
abolish it.
Tnls tension between the image of the person whom we
have in mind In. our contact and the actual existing person
Is, ho ever, not to be understood merely negatively. Rather,
it often makes an essential contribution to the dynamic life
among men. Just as, for example, the tension between the
meaning of a word as I see it and the meaning it has for my
companion can prove fruitful and lead to a deeper personal
agreement, so a genuine understanding between two people
can spring forth from the tension between the image of the
person and the existing person. The fruiful meeting of two
persons issues in a break-through from image tc being.
The Thou whom I thus meet is no longer a sum of
conceptions nor an object of knowledge, but a
substance experienced in giving and receivin'. •
(Ibid. p. 83)
Intellect, writes Buber, operates where we know in
order to act with some purpose; Instinct rules where we
act purposefully without requiring knowledge} intuition,
however, prevails where man’s whole being becomes cne in
the act of knowing.
The Intellect, which divides the self, holds uo
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• ro from t ie world that It assists us In util I'M m-
JO
;?
a us t0 world
,
but not To ££.one?
G *
f through vision, binds us as persons with13 over aS^inst us, binds us tolu •
-tuout oeing able to make us one with Itthrough a vision that cannot be absolute. This
vision is a. limited one, like all our perce tlcns.
5J
u
f Y^^'^sal-hiiiiian ones and our personal ones.
. i t L n.fiords us a gli ae in unspeakable inti-
macy into hidden depths. (Ibid. p.’86)
Buber, thus, considers intuition an imrluble
ala in xli e, in the life of dialogue; but he does not -
in distinction from Bergson - ascribe to it the powers
of oft cting unity betvreen the observer and the observed.
He emphatically denies that Intuition yields absolute
knowledge, for all knowing is subject to the duality of
the knower and the known, jergaon, Buber writes
,
defi-
nitely ‘raised a claim for intuition that cannot be due
it nor any mortal knowledge whatever.’ (ioc. cit.)
x i • hi tab,- u ' a ?i ocess i-hllosophy
It has been attested to assimilate Buber’s ontology
to Whitehead's process philosophy. This, I feel, and here
I so along with a remark made by Will Herberg, has been
done on utterly inadequate grounds. Buber's ontology
simply cannot be classified as a substance or process
philosophy, ior It cuts beneath these ontological distinc-
tions .
Whitehead is concerned in his writings with the sub-
stitution of the traditional and classical categories of
substance and mass by the more adequate concepts, (so
Whitehead feels), of process and field. 'Material substance
as well as spiritual substance* for hitehead become mere
abstractions which have only practical value. In reality,
the world around us cannot be defined in terms of certain
constitutions of matter and spirit, but only in terms of
successions of events. The latter are exemplifications of
non-existing eternal essences, and come into existence
through God, the principle of concretion. Everything is a
process (with the exception of God and the eternal essences
trees, atoms, etc. Consequently, the universe, at a given
moment, has no reality. What Is perceived by men, here and
now, is an epistemological abstraction which depends in
its existence upon the activity of our minds, and which,
consequently, ceases to exist as soon as our minds cease
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to produce It.
Buber
,
on the other hand, is not concerned with the
elimination of the traditional substance-process dichotomy.
He is in no way arguing against the traditional concept
of the '''torn* (matter), against the existence of a concrete
Independent reality, here and now, in favor of a process
philosophy. He does not think of men and of the world in
t.r'.:,.- oi Processes, In terms of successions of events.
oertainly Buber
,
like Whitehead, consider® the
categories of ’matter* and 'spirit* as being abstractions
of the human mind, only necessary for man's practical
life. Yet Buber cannot be lumped together with Whitehead
as far as their proposed alternatives to the traditional
substance philosophy in concerned.
Whitehead replaces substance-philoso >hy by
process-philosophy, thus remaining within a traditional
die. otomy
,
namely the division betv on suostance and flux.
He merely switches sloes, excluding substance, that is,
concrete reality, her e and now, as unreal, and declaring
process as real. Buber, on the othei ha n , never commits
himself to a substance-process dichotomy, or to a substance
or a proce s philosophy, although, m^ybe, a modified
substance-process dichotomy is implied In his philosophy.
But if so, then It Is epistemologically and, if it has any
ontological st-tus at all, else ontolo, Ic-lly derived
from the primal reality of the I-Thou. Like al] dichotomi s,
so also the substance-process dichotomy, Buber overpasses.
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yet retaino, by a third principle - the dialogical prin-
ciple. (If the elimination of dichotomies were an aim
In the philosophies of both Buber and Whitehead (it la
not for 3uber)
,
then Buber's philosophy. In my eyes,
would be superior to Whitehead's, Insofar as Buber does
not fall from one side of a dichotomy to the other.
For a dichotomy
,
In my opinion, cannot be overcome by the
exclusion of one component of the dichotomy, but only by
a third factor, one that combines the two under a wider
principle. I air. not concerned here, however, with the
question as to how satisfactorily Buber eliminates the
substance-process dichotomy, but only with showing that
Buber's philosophy os.nnot be lumped together with White-
head's process philosophy.)
iiu kipt ctlifore from Whitehead also with respect to the
latter's views on the ontological status of the world
as peroeiv
-d here and now.
Accordingly, as for Vhiteheed there exists only one
reality
- process, events - the world as soon at a given
moment has no reality* It is an abstraction of the human
mind, and vanishes as soon as our mind ceases to generate
it. bo, for example
,
a tree, for i.hltahead, as given at a
cert; In moment is only an epistemological abstraction.
For Buber, on the other hand, entities other than dia-
logical ones are not all mere abstractions in the sense
that they are only creations of the mind and will cease
to exist if the mind ceases to exist. To be sure,
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a tree, for Buber, is an abstraction from dialogical reality,
as a tree is an abstraction from process for- ’hltehead.
But for Buber a tree has some kind of be Ing in itself,
apart Irom cur minds, here and now; it is more than just
an appearance (although it is also not dialogical reality),
V.hile t or whitehead a tree is only an epistemological abstrac-
tion of the primal reality, that is process, for Buber a
tree is an epistemological abstraction of the dialogical
reality Oi our ice ting with the tree, and also a being
apart from out mind
,
here and now, as an ontjological
derivative from the I- Thou.
Moreover, a tree, for Buber, has - besides the onto-
logical status of its own which it has in sedition to
being an epistemological abstraction as granted by .hitehee
- also the potentiality of becoming truly real by virtue
of becoming a Thou* For Whitehead this is an impossibility,
since r nlity, he believes, cannot be found in the isolated
present* A tr©v. remains an abstraction whether one responds
to it or not. For Buber, however, ultimate r allty is in
the lived concrete, here and now. For Miitehead, whose
process cannot be divorced from prehension, the lived
moment in its isolation is : n epistemological sbstr 1 ction.
Whitehead’s philosophy of process :n the only and
hi,
-
host existing re r lity cr. not be
. ted with Buber's
philosophy of dialogue not only jecause (according to the
latter's belief) everything, so also process, is an ab-
straction, a derivative, from the reality of the dialogical
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mee-t lr.fS , but because In Buber's philosophy th. static eleme
in U>; I*Th0U r:latlon “ust not be foreotter,
. Consequently
the exclusive status of 'process' is abandoned. This
static element is not the 'true reality
,
1 however, It is a
necessary element for the 'true reality 1 to emerge. For
Buoer, it seems, there has to be something that is in
dialogue, in process. Process is relational end thus
cannot exlat by itself, but requires a counterpart. In
exclusive process (if this were possible) the I and the
Thou could not be kept apart from each other, that Is,
the I and the Thou could not exist (at least I do not know
how they cold )
,
and dialogue and dialogical reality
would be made Impossible* What, for Buber, this 1 static'
element is, he never explained. It probably differs in
different dialogical relations, depending who constitutes
the I and the Thou, God, man, or the world*
Although proc as one a static element seem to be
repair eo xn human dialogue, it would be wrong to conclude
that dialogical r ality is *st‘ tic element in 'rocess. ’
Dialogical r lity cannot be reduced to traditional
categories. Rather, it comprises all of there, at the
same time going beyo d there. It gives all of them their
derivative ontological st bus . 10
IV. illnchtnn and Buddhism
Both Hinduism and Buddhism deny the reality of
material substance, the reality of the material world.
Buddhism, in addition, denies the reality of spiritual
substance. As far as this denial of substance Goes, Hin-
duism and Buddhism are very akin to 'whitehead’s philoso-
phy. But
,
like Buber, they differ from hiteherd with
respect to their alternative to this denial of substance.
Therefore, I do not think it appropriate to assimilate
Buddhism or Hinduism to a kind of process philosophy like
tne one of Whitehead. Rather, these Oriental philosophies,
liku Buber’s philosophy, cut beneath the substance
-process
dichotomy. The unifying principle, however, is altogether
different in Buber's philosophy from that in Buddhism or
Hinduism. While for Buber tho primal reality is dialogical
reality, requiring the meeting of an I and a Thou, the
ultimat reality for Hinduism is Brahman, the One besides
which nothing exists, and for Buddhism Sunyate
,
Nothlngnes
Ultimate reality in Buddhism and Hinduism means all-
embracing unity, while for Buber it implies duality. (In
this respect Whitehead is closer to Buber than the two
Oriental philosophies, since for Whitehead there Is still
a distance between Bod and man, thus duality, although the
Whiteheadian God-man relationship Is not quite an I-Thou
relationship In Buber's sense.)
Hinduism, with its doctrine of true being and
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°f absorption, has nothing in common with Buber 1 b doctrine
of lived re lity, since it reduces lived reality to a
world of appearances
. Consequently
,
since only 'dlalo.
;
ical
oein^ is true being, Hinduism, Buber feels, 'leads... to
^annihilation, ' where no consciousness reigns and whence
no memory leads.* (iTh p. 88)
One might possiuly argue that Hinduism is not alto-
gether different from Buber's philosophy, since It puts
emphasis on the realization of one’s self, which, for Buber,
is the resup posit ion for genuine relation. This argument,
however, would oe overlooking the difference between Hindu-
ism and Bub r's philosophy with respect to the motivation
for the endeavor tc realize one's self. While for Buber
the unity of the seif is necessary for true dialogue, ne-
cessary for the saying of the Thou, the realization of one's
self for the Hindu is, paradoxically enough, necessary for
y
the realization that one does net neve an individual self,
but that the self, atman
,
is identical with the World Soul,
Brahman . This doctrine of self-being as being identical with
universal being, Buber says, makes impossible the genuine
saying of the Thou, and by that denies that dialogical
reality exists and is identical with ultimate reality. Con-
sequently, Hinduism stands in radical opposition to Buber's
views exactly where a superficial look might detect simila-
rities - in the demand for one's self-realization. In oppo-
sition to Hinduism, Buber says: 'I bear within me the sense
of Belf that cannot be included in the world, ' or in a
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World Soul, 'a aense of Self ^thatf is not a “knowing
subject ’ but simply the total status of the I ae I. here
no further ''reduction” is possible.’ (ITh p. 94) The doc-
trine of absorption, he says, demands refuge into the
One Ihinking Essence, refuge into pure subject. ’But in
liveo reality there is not something thinking without
sot ©thing thought, rather is the thinking no less dependent
on the thing thought than the latter on the former.'
(Ibid. pp. 89 -.9C)
Buber is somewhat more sympathetic towards Buddhism
tt,an towards ’ induism. For, Buber feels, Buddhism con-
tains at least a few, although weak, dialogical elements.
In distinction to Bincuism, Buddhism does not propound
a withdrawal from the world, a monkish life that is turned
inside, but it affirms life and the world. 'Loyal to the
truth of our meeting,' says Buber, 'we can follow the
Buddha as . nr as this, but a step further would be dis-
loyalty to the reality of our life.' (Ibid. p. 91 ) For,
for Buddhism the living of one’s role in the world is only
a means to an end. It is a means for leading man 'apart
from the "illusion of forms" - which for us,’ says Buber,
’is no illusion but rather the reliable world (and this
In spite of all subjective paradoxes in observation oonnec ted
V
t
h i_t for us
.
)
(Ibid. p. 9^) The involvement of the
Buddhist In the world Is superficial, that is, the self
is not bound up with the world but remains as detached
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from it as possible. And this can be achieved only by
perfectly living one’s given role, since V is will yield
complete mastery over one’s desires, rather, it will briny,
about the elimination of all desires. The self then,
after the complete liberation from all desires, dissolves
into nothingness. (This appears so from the standpoint
of the 1Hastened mind; in reality the self never existed
at all.) Buddhism too, thus, contains wrong disregard for
the world and for lived reality.
To this disregard of the world, and especially to
the doctrine of the dissolution of the self, Buber is,
naturally
,
bitterly opposed. For the latter would mean
the death of any relation, since ’the real self appears
only when it enters into relation with the other. Where
this relation is rejected, the real self withers away.
( IT(J p. 97) The annihilation of the self would necessarily
remove any possibility of true dialogue.
Buber, however, feels sympathetic to Buddha for
another reason, namely, for the latter’s refuse! ’to
assert that unity exists or that it does not exist, thnt
he who passed all the tests of absorption exists aftei
death in unity or that he do s not exist in unity*’
(ITh p. 90) The Buddha does not ccrc.it himself to a pre-
carious doctrine of absorption, he does not fall into
the traps of a false gnosis. This 'noble silence' can
be explained, Buber feels, in term's of Buddha's belief
that fulfilment is beyond the categories of thought and
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expres3ion, and that one would, if one tried to describe
it, 'pull it into division, into the antlthetics of the
v/orld of It, where there is no life of salvation.' (loo.
elt,) Here the Buddha is very similar to iiubor, in his
respect for the mystery of God and of Being. It is with
this in mind, I feel, that Buber's relatively undeveloped
ontology can be accounted for. 'The primal condition of
salvation,' writes Buber, 'is undivided confrontation of
the undivided mystery.' (I bio. p. 91) Buddha makes only
one assertions that there 1 b an Unborn, neither become,
nor created, nor formed. And 'in the silent depth of his
being,' iudsr feels, the Juddha knew the 'saying of the
Thou to this primal cause,' (Ibid. pp. 92-93) and stood
'related to it with his whole being, ' (EG p. 28) although
he preserved silence shout it. The Buddha, Buber holds,
also knew the saying of the Thou to men, although ho
didn't teach it, although his 'innermost decision seem^ed/
to rest on the extinction of the ability to say Thou.'
( I Tii p. 92)
CONCLUSION
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a artin uuoor, I feel, can be considered one of
the most profound and penetrating thinkers of our time,
He has introduced a completely novel way of thinking -
novel not in the sense of ‘modified’ and ’extended’ -
but a radically new perspective on life, its problems
"nd contradictions
. one might most successfully sum
up this novel conception of thought and life as the
philosophy of the ’narrow ridge,’ a philosophy which
puts emphasis on those phases of human thought and
life v.iiich cannot be defined completely, where ’there
Is no jursij .?££! Oj expressible knowledge, ’ where undi-
vided mystery confronts man, where solutions are be-
yond man’s re? oh - there, where there Is only 'the cer-
tainty of meeting what regains undisclosed.
'
(BMM p. 184)
This attitude of the 'narrow ridge' is not one tJr t
looks for a happy middle, but rather, one that holds
the life in a 'holy insecurity' to be the essential
life of man; a life of dialogue, in which men meets
unreduced reality, end in which he courageously res ends
to
with his whole being* whatever he meets, despite the para-
doxes and contradictions that may be involved* The life
on the 'narrow ridge' means man's unquestioned accept?' nee
as paradoxical unities what are usually considered
irreconsilable alternatives and dichotomies, it means
n defiance of the ©ither-or way of thought and life pre-
dominating in our age.
Accordingly, as for Buber good end evil are not
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opposites, but are essentially related to one another,
ana accordingly
,
as reality and truth are only found In
the full meeting ci man with fellow-men and the world
in all their otherness, mystery, and concreteness,
all dichotomies and either-or’s of our age are inte-
grated in life - even if this implied the acceptance
of paradox, borne of these dichotomies are; I versus
Thou, selfishness versus altruism, love versus justice,
dependence versus freedom, emotion and passion versus
i er son, moral autonomy versus mor: 1 heteronomy
,
morality
versus religion, love of God versus fear of God, trans-
cendence of God versus immanence of God, subjectivism
versus objectivism, personal and poetic truth versus
scientific truth. Individualism versus collectivism,
unity versus duality.
Almost all fields of human enterprise tod- y are
poisoned by some kind of elther-or proposition. Buber
poses his all-inclusive philosophy of the life of dia-
logue - in which, man, although walking on the 'narrow
ridge' bet'- sen all dichotomies, combines the two alter-
natives of the dichotomy - as a remedy for all the
detrimental and disrupting elther-or 's; he . c-sea it
as a safeguard for nan's authentic existence with all its
concreteness, complexity, and problems; as a safeguard
of human truth, which is neither subjective nor objec-
tive, out which is existentially realized in dialogue.
Buber's writings ore wide In their scope. They
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are directed at the totality 0f human life. Despite
the v i let;; of thought, which is necessary if one deals
eith so many aspects of human existence as Buber has,
Buoer's writings are oervaded by a remarkable unity.
It is a unity which c*n be achieved only by a man who,
like Buber, has combined his own way of life with his
thought, who has been as great as a person as as a thinker.
Buber has honestly shared a life In dialogue himself;
he has lived with the responsibility of a true Thou.
And t s such he addresses his reader in his books. For
thrt reason Buber cannot be understood only by lcgl-
cal reformulation of his ideas, but through the full
acceptance of his writings, by an approach as a Thou.
To really understand Buaer, one must be ready to accept
his sharing, and to enter into relation as often es
possible in one's own life.
FOOTNOTES
In each of the three spheres man has at the seme time
a relation to God. Km, thus. Is rerlly capable of
having relations with four kinds of Thcus.
This dlst notion Is very similar to M-rltain's dis-
tinction b t een ’individual* and ’person.’
For Plato it would be vice versa* the et rnal idea of
the Good, the s< urce of all goodness would do the
bestowing and. the religious (the concrete), the
receiving.
A rigorous distinction between individualism *~nd
collectivism on the personal and on the social-
political level is v ry difficult, since they usually
go along together# Imply each other and ov r-lap*
Consequently neither can be thought of without the
other In many respects. Yet, they cannot be acid to
be equivalent; some kind of distinction cm be ra^de
between them. 3uber himself never explicitly dis-
tinguished between the to types of illusory con-
firmation on the p* rsonal and ocial level; however,
a distinction, it seems, is implied in his writings.
According to my understanding, and I think also In
agreement with Buber’s writings, the distinction
between personal and socic.1 individualism and between
personal nc social-political colxe tivlsra is roughly
as follows*
While individualism on the personal level refers to
people who are cut off from the relat on- with their
fellbw-men on account of lack of courage to face the
r allties of the world, thus s owing little positive
concern for the world around them, individualism on
the social level refers to copit li ts who actually
use the world on a large scale in order to appropriate
as much as possible. Their individualism is not only
a. lack of concern fox- the world like that of the
Single One in Kierkegaarc 's sense, but it Involves
the xsing and possessing of great ports of society.
Social Individualism, thus, comes to be a personal
Individualism In an extreme form and on o large scale,
characterized by the actual using an fectlng of
a host of Individuals in r detrimental manner.
Accordingly os collectivism is, In my opinion, a more
complex concept tir n indivi ualism, a distinction
between personal and social collectivism is more
difficult. Collectivism on the personal level, in my
eyes, refers to single Individuals who conform
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completely to some outward standards, be this anotherperson or another group, be it with respect to his* wholelife or only one aspect of it, for example, art ap-
preciation. Personal collectivism is thus what one
usually understands by
' conformism
' to social behaviour,
ait appreciation, values pertaining to everyday life,
etc. It is of course possible that personal conformism
becomes collective — as it has to a large xtent in
t . is country
— (tills has come about especially because
of modern means of mass co unication). But even in
this case one would not talk In terms of ' collectivism
'
but rather, in terms of ‘conformity*.
If one uses th© term * collectivism*
,
on© usually refers
to what was termed ’social collectivism* above/ It
refers not to the conformity described oefore, but
to th controlling of a whole society by the State.
This control can do total or partial. If it is toVl,
as seems to be the case in the Soviet Union, where
people are determined in all phases of life, per-
sonal collectivism n th: large scale - what I called
'conformity* - is n cesaarily included in the
totalitarian political collectivism - better, it is
turned into totalitarian social collectivism. Here
society is amalgamat d into the State completely.
But, as -1ready mentioned, t; Is political collectivism
ne d not be total nd reaching into all spheres of life.
The United States is an exr npi© for partial social
collectivism* While there is freedom with respect to
social behaviour, art appreciation, and. the like,
(that the freedom with respect to these aspects of
life is not taken advantage cf, but replaced by
conformity on a lar
:
*ejHs sod; however, - although
from a pragmatic vi:v;po!nt much alike to the collecti-
vism in Russia with respect to these aspects of life -
the conformity In this country is essentially different
from that of Ru sia, since it Is 'voluntary * from the
viewpoint of the State ^although maybe, forced upon
people in another vicious way - by mass co muni cat Ion/)
,
with respect to work (although from a pragmatic point
of view the freedom is often more or less theoretical
because- of the huge c pltalistio enterprises which
virtually force many 'little* in ividualists into a
'collective* job w 1 ch is dull and without fulfilment),
and with respect to political opinion, (at le at within
the domain of democracy), etc., there is, feels Buber,
collectivization and centralisation to a certain
extent - and this with respect to tho m< sures that
have eeen taken In order to maintain national security.
Che collectivist tendencies are shown with respect to
service in the army, guidance of many scientists as
to th ir field of work, amount of money that is used
for armament rather than social welfare, control of
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uolitlcr 1 opinion to the extent that Communist tenden-
cies are exterminated, etc. This collectivisation Is
of course necessary. The fact of Its necessity
hov/ever, remains a sad point.
l.hlle the
-ersonal collectivism, that la conformisminvolves some kind of freedom to conform, (and thus*
can occur on a small or large ac^ le noth with respect
tc the number of conformists and the number of rs'ects
of life that ere conformed to by the single ind ivi-
dual), social collectivism means domination by the
State, leaving no (as in iusaia) or partial (as in
the West) freedom to be a person, or a true indivi-
dualist
,
(In mber's sense), or a personal conformist,
with, res ect to work
,
to mass-production, as found
in this country, I am not sure what kind of collecti-
vism to ascribe to it. The control Is not political, yet
it is rather strong - though not absolute - by virtue
of the centralizing tendency of the big enterprises.
Personal and social collectivism, thus, can occur
in various forms, depending upon how many r sweets
of life are affected by It. They cannot be separated
completely, (at least not insofar as every social
collectivism must be originated by some persons,
thus being In part, with respect to these originators,
personal collectivism) , and usually go together on
the social scale, although this latter concurrence
is not necessary.
One more difference between individualist and collec-
tivism on the personal level end individualism and
collectivism on the social level seems to exist with
respect to the people concerned in the change from
individualism to collectivism, bile in personal
individualism the individualist himself finally
becomes r collectivist (conformist), on the social
level the capitalists do not, at least in most c ses,
become collectivists themselves, sther, collectivism
arises either as a reaction (like Karris; or Soviet
totalitarianism, where the bearer of collectivism is
not the former capitalist out the personal individualist
in atomized society threatened by capitalism), or
collectivism arises s a consequence insof r as capi-
talism forces m^ny people - by threatening their vital
and social security - into collectiv s (especially
with respect to work). There are, to he sure, c^ses in
which capitalists, on account of the insecurity
resulting from too powerful competition, also quit
business and end up In the collective.
b. In the following ex losition of Buber’s theory of know-
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ledge I shall In part heavily rely on Mauri oe
Friedman's interpret tlon of Buber's epist mole y
as presented in The of Dialogue
. pp. 161 -'i?5 .
•
6, The I-Thu u relationship with nature, similar to our
relationship to ' orfcs of art, is not s cor. plete as
the lrlogue between tvo persons, since it lacks the conscious
reciprocity of the latter. Hatur can say* something
to me, and can thus consciously become a Thou foi me,
hut because it doesn’t have the consciousness of a
self, I cannot become a 'Thou for nature in the same
mr oner.
Bub r co a not hold, however, that there is no recipro-
city in c n *
b
relation with nature at all. Even
in Inanimat nature - although there, most likely,
is no mutuality in consciousness - 'there ie a
reciprocity of the being itself, a reciprocity w ch
ie nothing but being in its course- ( belend )
.
1 The
reciprocity is 'that of the pro*threshold! 1 of con-
sciousness. (ITh p. 126)
7* Although Buber puts great emphasis. In his biologic"!
life, on the immediate sense experience, it would be
wrong to classify him as an empiricist after the order
of Wil icm James . It is true that for Buber all true
relation must start with sense experience, and, if it
is to be perfect, must fu iy include it. But it
would be misleading to think, that the relation is
exhausted by sense-experience* Rather, true relation
is 'the vital contact withEl being, an ever-renei ed
vital contact with it in ich the experience of
the senses only fits in as a factor* 1 (FW p. 84)
The I-Thou relation cannot be complete, if the sense-
experience I have of my Thou Is being curtailed, but
it is not made up of sense-experiences alone. Conse-
uently, Buber holds that the di logical life can con-
tinue - although not with full intensity - 'even when
2the I and. the Thou/ are separated in apace, as the
eonfnual potential presence of the one tc the other,
as an unexprea ed intercourse.' (EM! p. 97) For
1111am James, on the other hand, who hoi s that reality
is immediate a nse-exper ience, separation in spree
from any person or object would make impose! ;la the
e : r nee of re lity in connection with them.
8. K difficulty arises especially with respect to the
estion !3i5 to w o creates the dialogical reality*
It was 8^ id earll r that two union beings, by entering
into a i elation, create true r ality . Ti ls ie right
insofar as by virtue of t elr me ting dialogical
1
un-
reality
reality
in true dialogue
.
that the
i3e ing
. Yet
emerges. Yet it is wrong insofar r s dielo ic r->l^ rg a only by virtue of the inclusion of
.
& * However, it would be wrong todialogical reality is part of the Divine
God
say
part
-cipates
of Div ne
according
in Divine
to Bulger, In dialogue man
.
Being* Tha situation seems to
° r paradoxical - the meeting is partially a real!
Being, yet it is not part of the Divine
ation
Being,
J
»
See chapter on 1 Epistemology *
:
‘The Kay of nowin* ’•ELimintion of Tr ditionel Epistemological roolene
on the Basis of Epistemological Priority of T-Tbou
over I- It’.
10 , The closest affinities between Buber and ' hiteheed
are probably to be found in t eir doctrine of the
rel tionsrip between Goo and men. Both men believe
in the concrete me ting of man and Goc
,
-nd that
redemption of evil results from the mutual love and
r 1 tion of God and the world. Yet even here,
vhltehead differs from Buber in that he is relatively
unconcerned with man ‘ s relation to God, and more
concerned with the enerie rel-tion of God to man*
Conse uently, Kbitahead' s God-man rel tionship is
1-Xt more than I-Thou • It lacks the tension of
Buber's 'meeting' and ’over-againstness ,
'
(Fried p, 227)
11. Here one might object, that only Buddhism, but ot
Hinduism, cuts beneath this subst^nce-orocees
dichotomy, since Hinduism postulates as ultimate
reality a
-orId Soul, "nc thus seems to cling to the
belief in the reality 'spiritual substance*
However, whether this equating of brahman* with
'spiritual substance' is correct, I do not know.
To the extent, thus, as I am uncertain in this respect,
the statement ab ut Hindi ism as cutting beneath the
substance-process dichotomy is uncertain too.
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